Taiwan Must Review Security Risks

The recent US Department of Defense report on PRC military modernization is a useful reminder of the challenges posed by China's rise as a major regional power. This year's report is the most detailed and insightful to date and a number of issues are worthy of consideration for Taiwan.

First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.

Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.

For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.

Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.

Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.

Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.

To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?

While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.

With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.

Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?

Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?

An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.

Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.

While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.

As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.

But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.

One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?

In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.

Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.

In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.

For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?

Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.

Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.

Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.

In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.

Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.

In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.

As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.

Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.

The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.

In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.

Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.

Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.