Ma's China Policy Lacks A Sense of Realpolitik

By Liu Kuan-teh 劉冠德

Sunday's presidential debate rarely touched upon foreign policy. The main reason lies in the fact that China's diplomatic suppression and international isolation of Taipei is not contingent upon any "blue or green" policy.

During the debate, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continued to criticize what he called the Democratic Progressive Party's(DPP) "fire-setting diplomacy" and blamed it for Taiwan's loss of diplomatic allies under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Ma also blamed the DPP's bids to use the name "Taiwan" to apply for memberships in the WHO and the UN for creating distrust between Taiwan and many allies, including the US.

Since China is behind Taiwan's diplomatic difficulties, Ma promised to start negotiating with China over international space.

For Ma to characterize the DPP government with what he called a "confrontational approach" to Beijing and to overlook the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the real threat to Taiwan's international recognition and security was not surprising.

What concerns most voters is Ma's theory of using the so-called "1992 consensus" as the starting point to resume talks with Beijing. There are inherent contradictions to Ma's approach.

Ma seems to assume that seeking an improvement in cross-strait relations will automatically make China give Taiwan more international space and better treatment. Therefore he argues that both Taiwan and China should stop talking about "mutual recognition" and focus on "no mutual denial."

Ma's idea is wishful thinking and fails to address the question of the different definitions of "one China" made by the KMT and Beijing.

Even though there is no such thing as the "1992 consensus," the KMT advocates the "Republic of China [ROC]" as "one China," while the Chinese Communist Party insists the "People's Republic of China" represents "one China" and that "Taiwan is a part of the PRC."

Beijing does not accept the "Republic of China" as "one China" and has been excluding the ROC's participation in almost every international arena under the KMT's rule.

The then-KMT government enacted the so-called National Unification Guidelines and established the National Unification Council in 1991. Both governments engaged in political dialogue in 1992 and 1993.

The political atmosphere between Taipei and Beijing should have been moderate. However, between 1992 and 1998, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea, Saint Lucia, South Africa and the Central Africa Republic. The diplomatic warfare continued even though cross-strait relations seemed relaxed.

How can Ma insist that he is for maintaining Taiwan's sovereignty while engaging Beijing with "no mutual denial?"

The assumption that Beijing would give Taiwan more international respect and space if Taiwan improves cross-strait relations is not realistic.

The most inconvenient truth is: If Ma is elected, Beijing will still not allow Taiwan to have observer status during the World Health Assembly in May.

The newly-elected president of Taiwan will be rejected a transit stop in Washington en route to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America.

Even with a new electoral mandate, Beijing will not accept Ma's attendance at the APEC leadership summit in October.

Unless of course Ma plans to wait until his counterparts accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and then starts to perform his duty as a democratically-elected president of Taiwan. In that case, why would the voters waste their ballots and chose such a coward?

Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.