Very interesting POV.
馬英九政權倒台後的台中美三國關係
一個人想要自由選擇自己的前途，還會因為自己是不是權貴而不同，難道選擇的自由，只限於這些權貴嗎？
康建淽2008/06/11
康建淽暑假獲得美國華府智庫的獎學金，到智庫擔任訪問研究員的暑期工作，因此這個暑假就不回台灣了。
康建淽這次獲邀研究的主體是『馬英九政權倒台後的台中美三國關係』，重點在分析從美國的觀點，分析馬英九政權是否會倒台，何時倒台，與倒台的速度，美國政府應該如何因應，確保美國在東亞的勢力與利益。
就像康建淽2007年11月所寫的『台灣共和國第一任總統: 馬英九總統』。美國透過讓馬英九當選，有效控制台灣國內政治的局勢，讓馬英九押著國內外省少數族群，與泛藍媒體，透過壓制住這一群過去影響台灣過去 8年穩定的因素，讓馬英九成為台灣繼續保持獨立的公僕與拉車狗。
諸位網友不見，馬英九當選與就職後，過去在陳水扁時代『許多媒體，紛紛透過假資料與特定立場的學者，看壞台灣，並藉此製造民進黨政府執政不佳的印象，營造出國民黨輪替的正當性，或是，台灣一定要與中國整合或統一的言論。馬英九在2008當上總統後，媒體從此不敢看壞台灣，甚至紛紛製造出台灣一定好的言論，鼓勵台灣人消費，與外資進入。』
這些用新聞自由與人民知的權利為名，卻去進行政治鬥爭陳水扁政權的媒體與名嘴，現在紛紛站在支持馬政權的一邊，新聞報導避重就輕，不敢太過批評，以免傷了自己的嘔像。可笑的，自己卻忘了過去所宣稱『媒體是第三權，要一直監督政府』的說法與大旗。
七月4日，開放中國觀光客來台灣國內觀光，卻反而讓一般沒有與中國人接觸過的台灣人，經過與中國人互動的第一手經驗，感受到中國人的水準與不同，因此更深化台灣人不是中國人，台灣不想與中國統一的政治發展。許多中國觀光客，更分享自己住在中國共產黨政權下的經驗，讓台灣人更了解中國經濟與政治發展的內幕。
好笑的，七月4日不僅是美國獨立紀念日，未來更因為馬英九的開放中國觀光客的政策，讓台灣更進一步與中國分離，邁向永久法理獨立的發展。可能成為台灣共和國的獨立紀念日。
台灣人一方面對中國觀光客，『來一個打一個』，口袋賺的飽飽，與中共事與願違的，台灣經濟越好，台灣意識持續升高，台灣人越不想與中國統一。
美國的長期戰略是，先透過外省人馬英九與國民黨政權安住台灣內部，讓台灣國民將台灣意識，逐漸深化到台灣人每一個人的心中，讓台灣獨立成為每一個台灣人，每天生活呼吸的一部份等。國際政治環境許可，美國才用最少的成本，讓台灣獨立，確保美國在東亞的利益可以保持。
套在馬英九政權頸上的國際與國內的繩索，讓馬英九與其代表的政黨，變成一群替台灣人民服務的拉車狗，只可以在台灣人民許可的保持實質獨立的情況下執政。民主發展的台灣，讓馬英九政權動輒得疚，不過過度往中國傾斜。
許多網友都已觀察到，馬英九政權在短命的蜜月期時間，所發生的物價上漲，『台灣郵政』改名爭議，『訪華』與『訪台』的政策急轉彎，高級官員的綠卡事件，可以看出馬英九政權，如果馬英九政權做出不符合台灣人民集體利益可以隨時倒台。
過去在國府蔣家政權時代，只可以當國民黨外省權貴奴隸的台灣人，現在終於享受到讓外省權貴吹喇叭的服務，透過台灣幾十年所發展的民主機制，馴服一群權貴，替台灣人做牛作馬。
美國隨時可以透過釋放出馬英九政權高官的綠卡與國籍資訊，以及馬英九政權高官在美國的『人質』[如馬維中等人] 與所持有財產的相關資訊，控制住馬英九政權，可以讓他在美國利益為主，當美國政府的代理人，繼續保持台灣繼續獨立，並在符合美國的利益下與中國接觸，讓美國透過台灣，牽制住中國。
諸位網友們不是看到，在美國洩漏出馬英九政權高官擁有綠卡的消息之後，稍稍試一下勒馬索的強度與力道後，馬英九政權高官雞飛狗跳的窘態，馬英九在總統府幾週不出來，好像在思考『燒炭』一般 【引自一位泛藍名嘴，曾經笑話陳水扁選戰失敗的名言】。
This is what baggage brings you.
台灣人民本來就可有自由遷襲的選擇國籍的自由，可悲的是，這些馬英九政權高官，口口聲聲捍衛中華民國，要和中國統一，用台灣不好，要用【中華】。但輪到他們自己可以自由選擇『統一』的地點，卻都只是美國與加拿大等民主國家統一，先透過持有這些國家的綠卡與楓葉卡，未來可以喪自己去自由選擇的去入藉這些國家，宣誓效忠這些國家。
相反的，台灣人想要自己建立起新國家，想要維持自己民主自由生活方式，不想要自己與子孫被一個共產不自由不民主的國家，強佔與統一，就要受中國武器威脅，以及『背叛中華民國』等大帽子污衊。
一個人想要自由選擇自己的前途，還會因為自己是不是權貴而不同，難道選擇的自由，只限於這些權貴嗎？
馬英九政權會不會倒台，何時倒台，倒台的方式是4年一次的政黨輪替，或是因台灣國內問題被人民推翻，美國政府現在看到一個綠卡事件，就可以整的馬英九政權雞飛狗跳，威信盡失。
美國政府可以知道馬英九政權的容易掌控。
本來擁有綠卡與楓葉卡，不一定代表對中華民國不忠誠，但是政府官員本來就和一般老百姓與企業ceo 不同。政府官員掌握國家機器與龐大預算分配，甚至國家機密。哪一個國家可以允許其政府高官擁有另外其他國家的居留權，去享有治理國家與管理人民的權利。台灣的國民，願意被一群『八國聯軍』式的外國買辦來管理。難道台灣的人才都死光了？台灣本地人才不夠資格來管理自己。難道現在台灣是美國與加拿大的租借地。
擁有這些綠卡與楓葉卡馬英九政權的高官，難道不會因為想保有居留權，受美國與加拿大政府的威脅，做出背叛中華民國與台灣人民的事情?
擁有這些綠卡與楓葉卡馬英九政權的高官，難道不會因為想在綠卡事件中脫身，說出一些可笑的綠卡『自動失效』，『辦過美國簽證就失效』說法的，受美國與加拿大政府的威脅要說出綠卡與楓葉卡失效的正當法律程序，做出出賣中華民國與台灣人民的事情？
全台灣2千3百萬人之中，難道找不到一群乾乾淨淨，正正當當的政府官員，來當我們的公僕？
馬英九政權的脆弱性，在台灣的執政可以不可以符合美國的國家利益，繼續作為美國在東亞的買辦，美國會考量自己的國家利益下，密切觀察。康建淽本次所進行的研究計劃，就是協助發展出不同的SCENARIOS [劇本] ，協助美國智庫作出正確的建議。詳細情況，康建淽在研究進行過程中，再和網友報告了。
〔 資料來源： 油雞不落-康建淽 | 引用網址 〕
2008年6月11日 星期三
2008年3月20日 星期四
US Deploys Two Aircraft Carriers Close to Taiwan
By Charles Snyder, additional reporting by Jenny W. Hsu
'RESPONSIBLY POSITIONED': Washington was mum on whether the violent Chinese crackdown in Tibet would have an impact on the presidential election
Two US aircraft carriers, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Nimitz, have been sent to the Taiwan region for training exercises during tomorrow's election, a US defense official said on Wednesday.
The two carriers were "responsibly positioned" in the Pacific Ocean somewhere east of Taiwan and would remain in place through Saturday's presidential election and referendum on UN membership, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
He declined to elaborate on the positions of the two vessels.
"We feel we are responsibly positioned at this time," the defense official said, adding that the two carriers were not close enough to Taiwan to provoke China, but would be able to "respond if there's a provocative situation."
Navy officials said the Kitty Hawk left its base in Japan en route to Hawaii on Tuesday and would continue on to the continental US later for decommissioning.
In Taipei, the Ministry of National Defense did not comment on the deployment.
American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young said that the vessels were merely making a routine patrol in the Strait and that it had nothing to do with tomorrow's election.
Meanwhile, high-level US State Department officials on Wednesday refused to speculate on how the uprising in Tibet and the violent response by Beijing authorities might affect tomorrow's election in Taiwan, but the officials once again criticized the planned referendum on UN membership.
The officials were responding to a flurry of interest in the Taiwanese elections by journalists in Washington in view of reports from Taiwan about the local impact of the Tibetan uprising and repeated comments by department officials on the referendum.
Meanwhile, four Taiwan supporters in the House of Representatives wrote a letter to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday, urging her to support the referendum.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill sidestepped a question about whether events in Tibet could have "unexpected implications" for the Taiwanese election and "negative implications" for cross-strait relations.
"I'm not going to handicap ... make judgements ... about how the people in Taiwan are going to make their vote. They have information. They'll look at information and I'm not going to start predicting what things that happen in the world can affect their vote," he said.
"Obviously ... we look forward to a free and fair election in Taiwan. We have every reason to expect it to be. But I am not really in a position to tell you what is affecting the vote and what is not affecting the vote," Hill said.
He also said he had nothing to add to the criticism that Rice has leveled at the referendum recently.
"How [the elections] are conducted is a matter for the people of Taiwan to accomplish. I'm not going to give them advice on what to do in their elections," he said.
US State Department spokesman Tom Casey, however, took the opportunity to level yet one more barb at the referendum.
"As we've indicated," he told a reporter at the department's regular daily briefing, "the United States is opposed to the specific referendum [on UN entry under the name `Taiwan']. We believe it is unnecessary and unhelpful and will not have an effect on Taiwan's ability to join the UN or other organizations requiring statehood."
Casey also said the US "does look forward to a free and fair election in Taiwan. And we will work within the parameters of our existing relationship with whoever is elected by the Taiwan [sic] people."
The congressional letter to Rice was signed by representatives Robert Andrews, a Democrat, and Scott Garrett of New Jersey, John Linder of Georgia and Thaddeus McCotter of Michigan, who are Republicans. Andrews and Garrett have been among Taiwan's biggest champions on Capitol Hill.
"We strongly urge the United States to support the referendum," the lawmakers said.
"The Taiwanese people have the right -- as all people do -- to self-determination," the letter said. "However, the ability to exercise that right is severely compromised when a nation's largest ally turns its back."
"For too long Taiwan has stood its ground as a bulwark of democracy against the encroaching aspirations of an authoritarian communist regime. We should not condemn or oppose the dreams of those who want only to remain free and take their place in the international community," the letter said.
'RESPONSIBLY POSITIONED': Washington was mum on whether the violent Chinese crackdown in Tibet would have an impact on the presidential election
Two US aircraft carriers, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Nimitz, have been sent to the Taiwan region for training exercises during tomorrow's election, a US defense official said on Wednesday.
The two carriers were "responsibly positioned" in the Pacific Ocean somewhere east of Taiwan and would remain in place through Saturday's presidential election and referendum on UN membership, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
He declined to elaborate on the positions of the two vessels.
"We feel we are responsibly positioned at this time," the defense official said, adding that the two carriers were not close enough to Taiwan to provoke China, but would be able to "respond if there's a provocative situation."
Navy officials said the Kitty Hawk left its base in Japan en route to Hawaii on Tuesday and would continue on to the continental US later for decommissioning.
In Taipei, the Ministry of National Defense did not comment on the deployment.
American Institute in Taiwan Director Stephen Young said that the vessels were merely making a routine patrol in the Strait and that it had nothing to do with tomorrow's election.
Meanwhile, high-level US State Department officials on Wednesday refused to speculate on how the uprising in Tibet and the violent response by Beijing authorities might affect tomorrow's election in Taiwan, but the officials once again criticized the planned referendum on UN membership.
The officials were responding to a flurry of interest in the Taiwanese elections by journalists in Washington in view of reports from Taiwan about the local impact of the Tibetan uprising and repeated comments by department officials on the referendum.
Meanwhile, four Taiwan supporters in the House of Representatives wrote a letter to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday, urging her to support the referendum.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill sidestepped a question about whether events in Tibet could have "unexpected implications" for the Taiwanese election and "negative implications" for cross-strait relations.
"I'm not going to handicap ... make judgements ... about how the people in Taiwan are going to make their vote. They have information. They'll look at information and I'm not going to start predicting what things that happen in the world can affect their vote," he said.
"Obviously ... we look forward to a free and fair election in Taiwan. We have every reason to expect it to be. But I am not really in a position to tell you what is affecting the vote and what is not affecting the vote," Hill said.
He also said he had nothing to add to the criticism that Rice has leveled at the referendum recently.
"How [the elections] are conducted is a matter for the people of Taiwan to accomplish. I'm not going to give them advice on what to do in their elections," he said.
US State Department spokesman Tom Casey, however, took the opportunity to level yet one more barb at the referendum.
"As we've indicated," he told a reporter at the department's regular daily briefing, "the United States is opposed to the specific referendum [on UN entry under the name `Taiwan']. We believe it is unnecessary and unhelpful and will not have an effect on Taiwan's ability to join the UN or other organizations requiring statehood."
Casey also said the US "does look forward to a free and fair election in Taiwan. And we will work within the parameters of our existing relationship with whoever is elected by the Taiwan [sic] people."
The congressional letter to Rice was signed by representatives Robert Andrews, a Democrat, and Scott Garrett of New Jersey, John Linder of Georgia and Thaddeus McCotter of Michigan, who are Republicans. Andrews and Garrett have been among Taiwan's biggest champions on Capitol Hill.
"We strongly urge the United States to support the referendum," the lawmakers said.
"The Taiwanese people have the right -- as all people do -- to self-determination," the letter said. "However, the ability to exercise that right is severely compromised when a nation's largest ally turns its back."
"For too long Taiwan has stood its ground as a bulwark of democracy against the encroaching aspirations of an authoritarian communist regime. We should not condemn or oppose the dreams of those who want only to remain free and take their place in the international community," the letter said.
2008年3月12日 星期三
Ma's China Policy Lacks A Sense of Realpolitik
By Liu Kuan-teh 劉冠德
Sunday's presidential debate rarely touched upon foreign policy. The main reason lies in the fact that China's diplomatic suppression and international isolation of Taipei is not contingent upon any "blue or green" policy.
During the debate, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continued to criticize what he called the Democratic Progressive Party's(DPP) "fire-setting diplomacy" and blamed it for Taiwan's loss of diplomatic allies under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Ma also blamed the DPP's bids to use the name "Taiwan" to apply for memberships in the WHO and the UN for creating distrust between Taiwan and many allies, including the US.
Since China is behind Taiwan's diplomatic difficulties, Ma promised to start negotiating with China over international space.
For Ma to characterize the DPP government with what he called a "confrontational approach" to Beijing and to overlook the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the real threat to Taiwan's international recognition and security was not surprising.
What concerns most voters is Ma's theory of using the so-called "1992 consensus" as the starting point to resume talks with Beijing. There are inherent contradictions to Ma's approach.
Ma seems to assume that seeking an improvement in cross-strait relations will automatically make China give Taiwan more international space and better treatment. Therefore he argues that both Taiwan and China should stop talking about "mutual recognition" and focus on "no mutual denial."
Ma's idea is wishful thinking and fails to address the question of the different definitions of "one China" made by the KMT and Beijing.
Even though there is no such thing as the "1992 consensus," the KMT advocates the "Republic of China [ROC]" as "one China," while the Chinese Communist Party insists the "People's Republic of China" represents "one China" and that "Taiwan is a part of the PRC."
Beijing does not accept the "Republic of China" as "one China" and has been excluding the ROC's participation in almost every international arena under the KMT's rule.
The then-KMT government enacted the so-called National Unification Guidelines and established the National Unification Council in 1991. Both governments engaged in political dialogue in 1992 and 1993.
The political atmosphere between Taipei and Beijing should have been moderate. However, between 1992 and 1998, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea, Saint Lucia, South Africa and the Central Africa Republic. The diplomatic warfare continued even though cross-strait relations seemed relaxed.
How can Ma insist that he is for maintaining Taiwan's sovereignty while engaging Beijing with "no mutual denial?"
The assumption that Beijing would give Taiwan more international respect and space if Taiwan improves cross-strait relations is not realistic.
The most inconvenient truth is: If Ma is elected, Beijing will still not allow Taiwan to have observer status during the World Health Assembly in May.
The newly-elected president of Taiwan will be rejected a transit stop in Washington en route to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America.
Even with a new electoral mandate, Beijing will not accept Ma's attendance at the APEC leadership summit in October.
Unless of course Ma plans to wait until his counterparts accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and then starts to perform his duty as a democratically-elected president of Taiwan. In that case, why would the voters waste their ballots and chose such a coward?
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Sunday's presidential debate rarely touched upon foreign policy. The main reason lies in the fact that China's diplomatic suppression and international isolation of Taipei is not contingent upon any "blue or green" policy.
During the debate, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continued to criticize what he called the Democratic Progressive Party's(DPP) "fire-setting diplomacy" and blamed it for Taiwan's loss of diplomatic allies under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Ma also blamed the DPP's bids to use the name "Taiwan" to apply for memberships in the WHO and the UN for creating distrust between Taiwan and many allies, including the US.
Since China is behind Taiwan's diplomatic difficulties, Ma promised to start negotiating with China over international space.
For Ma to characterize the DPP government with what he called a "confrontational approach" to Beijing and to overlook the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the real threat to Taiwan's international recognition and security was not surprising.
What concerns most voters is Ma's theory of using the so-called "1992 consensus" as the starting point to resume talks with Beijing. There are inherent contradictions to Ma's approach.
Ma seems to assume that seeking an improvement in cross-strait relations will automatically make China give Taiwan more international space and better treatment. Therefore he argues that both Taiwan and China should stop talking about "mutual recognition" and focus on "no mutual denial."
Ma's idea is wishful thinking and fails to address the question of the different definitions of "one China" made by the KMT and Beijing.
Even though there is no such thing as the "1992 consensus," the KMT advocates the "Republic of China [ROC]" as "one China," while the Chinese Communist Party insists the "People's Republic of China" represents "one China" and that "Taiwan is a part of the PRC."
Beijing does not accept the "Republic of China" as "one China" and has been excluding the ROC's participation in almost every international arena under the KMT's rule.
The then-KMT government enacted the so-called National Unification Guidelines and established the National Unification Council in 1991. Both governments engaged in political dialogue in 1992 and 1993.
The political atmosphere between Taipei and Beijing should have been moderate. However, between 1992 and 1998, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea, Saint Lucia, South Africa and the Central Africa Republic. The diplomatic warfare continued even though cross-strait relations seemed relaxed.
How can Ma insist that he is for maintaining Taiwan's sovereignty while engaging Beijing with "no mutual denial?"
The assumption that Beijing would give Taiwan more international respect and space if Taiwan improves cross-strait relations is not realistic.
The most inconvenient truth is: If Ma is elected, Beijing will still not allow Taiwan to have observer status during the World Health Assembly in May.
The newly-elected president of Taiwan will be rejected a transit stop in Washington en route to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America.
Even with a new electoral mandate, Beijing will not accept Ma's attendance at the APEC leadership summit in October.
Unless of course Ma plans to wait until his counterparts accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and then starts to perform his duty as a democratically-elected president of Taiwan. In that case, why would the voters waste their ballots and chose such a coward?
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
China Wants to Manage US Policy
By Sushil Seth
China's leadership has tended to largely follow Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) advice to "hide our capacities and bide our time." What it means is that Beijing should avoid confrontation with the West, principally the US, until it is in a position to prevail.
And its priority area to prevail is Taiwan. Since the US is committed to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a Chinese attack, it would mean having to confront the US.
A virtual showdown in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, with two US warships cruising in that direction, had a sobering effect on China.
Since then Beijing has followed a mixture of strategies, including legislative annexation of Taiwan and declaring in essence that any declaration of independence in Taiwan would require China, under its domestic legislation, to take military action.
And to impress its seriousness, Beijing is building up a huge arsenal of missiles targeted at Taiwan by reportedly adding "more than 100 missiles a year to the 1,000 already aimed across the Taiwan Strait."
The context for this new evaluation of the Chinese threat is the Pentagon's annual report to the US Congress on China's military buildup, with another double-digit increase of about 18 percent in its military budget.
China's military spending, according to official figures, recorded an average annual rise of close to 15.8 percent between 2003 and last year.
The official figures, in any case, are a gross underestimation and the real annual defense spending is likely to have been double the official figure, or US$150 billion.
The People's Liberation Army is being transformed, according to the Pentagon evaluation, from a mass army "designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration wars along its periphery against high-tech adversaries."
And here Taiwan fits into the Chinese scheme of things, if Beijing were to consider a military option.
Even if the military option is not exercised, it nevertheless has to be pretty serious and credible to have the desired effect, as with the massing of hundreds of missiles aimed at Taiwan.
China would like to avoid military confrontation with the US over Taiwan or anywhere else, with the US being by far the strongest military power.
Hence it has a mix of other strategies. Within Taiwan, for instance, it has managed to create important political and business constituencies that favor accommodation with Beijing regarding Taiwan's political status.
These groups, like the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), do not necessarily want to abandon Taiwan's identity but might explore an arrangement to maintain autonomy within the "one China" principle.
Beijing has often maintained that it is prepared for talks within the "one China" formula. And if China, and a KMT government in Taipei, were to work out a formula that rules out a separate Taiwan, any US commitment to defend Taiwan might become redundant.
But it might not be all that simple because any working arrangement between Beijing and Taipei will have a long time frame. And a new government in Taiwan will not be all that keen to abjure US protection during a long transitional relationship between Beijing and Taipei.
At the same time, there is also the "little" matter of considering the popular opinion in Taiwan. The Taiwanese do not want confrontation with China.
But, at the same time, they don't seem keen to be absorbed into it. With Taiwan's vibrant democracy, any ruling political party rash enough to embed with China might not have long to rule.
While China might find living with a new KMT government (if voted into power) congenial, it cannot count on a smooth political trajectory. And the US commitment to defend Taiwan is likely to remain relevant.
Beijing is aware of this, and hence is continuing to build its military capability designed, in the short and medium term, to deter the US from taking on China.
In other words, the US might find the cost of confronting China prohibitive.
And here China's rapid buildup of its submarine fleet is quite instructive. In a recent report from Beijing, New York Times correspondent David Lague wrote: "American and other Western military analysts estimate that China now has more than 30 advanced and increasingly stealthy submarines, and dozens of older obsolete types."
They believe that "by the end of the decade ? China will have more submarines than the United States, although it will still lag behind in overall ability," Lague said.
Another way by which China seeks to manage the US is by creating political leverage on international issues that are important to Washington.
So much so that a view is gaining in some quarters in Washington that Beijing could be a useful partner in managing some of these issues.
This view is reflected in a recent Foreign Affairs article. Authors Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small wrote: "In just two years, China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the developing world to an attempt to balance its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power."
"And so when Washington and its allies formulate their policies toward pariah states, they should assume that China, although in some respects an obstacle, is now also a critical partner," they wrote.
With the US looking to Beijing for support on international issues at a time when Washington is overstretched, Taiwan tends to become a side issue.
The problem, though, is any sign of appeasement on Taiwan would be read by China as the US' faltering resolve to keep actively engaged in the Asia-Pacific.
Some of the regional countries are already factoring this into their policy formulations by seeking political accommodation with China as the pre-eminent regional power.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
China's leadership has tended to largely follow Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) advice to "hide our capacities and bide our time." What it means is that Beijing should avoid confrontation with the West, principally the US, until it is in a position to prevail.
And its priority area to prevail is Taiwan. Since the US is committed to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a Chinese attack, it would mean having to confront the US.
A virtual showdown in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, with two US warships cruising in that direction, had a sobering effect on China.
Since then Beijing has followed a mixture of strategies, including legislative annexation of Taiwan and declaring in essence that any declaration of independence in Taiwan would require China, under its domestic legislation, to take military action.
And to impress its seriousness, Beijing is building up a huge arsenal of missiles targeted at Taiwan by reportedly adding "more than 100 missiles a year to the 1,000 already aimed across the Taiwan Strait."
The context for this new evaluation of the Chinese threat is the Pentagon's annual report to the US Congress on China's military buildup, with another double-digit increase of about 18 percent in its military budget.
China's military spending, according to official figures, recorded an average annual rise of close to 15.8 percent between 2003 and last year.
The official figures, in any case, are a gross underestimation and the real annual defense spending is likely to have been double the official figure, or US$150 billion.
The People's Liberation Army is being transformed, according to the Pentagon evaluation, from a mass army "designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration wars along its periphery against high-tech adversaries."
And here Taiwan fits into the Chinese scheme of things, if Beijing were to consider a military option.
Even if the military option is not exercised, it nevertheless has to be pretty serious and credible to have the desired effect, as with the massing of hundreds of missiles aimed at Taiwan.
China would like to avoid military confrontation with the US over Taiwan or anywhere else, with the US being by far the strongest military power.
Hence it has a mix of other strategies. Within Taiwan, for instance, it has managed to create important political and business constituencies that favor accommodation with Beijing regarding Taiwan's political status.
These groups, like the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), do not necessarily want to abandon Taiwan's identity but might explore an arrangement to maintain autonomy within the "one China" principle.
Beijing has often maintained that it is prepared for talks within the "one China" formula. And if China, and a KMT government in Taipei, were to work out a formula that rules out a separate Taiwan, any US commitment to defend Taiwan might become redundant.
But it might not be all that simple because any working arrangement between Beijing and Taipei will have a long time frame. And a new government in Taiwan will not be all that keen to abjure US protection during a long transitional relationship between Beijing and Taipei.
At the same time, there is also the "little" matter of considering the popular opinion in Taiwan. The Taiwanese do not want confrontation with China.
But, at the same time, they don't seem keen to be absorbed into it. With Taiwan's vibrant democracy, any ruling political party rash enough to embed with China might not have long to rule.
While China might find living with a new KMT government (if voted into power) congenial, it cannot count on a smooth political trajectory. And the US commitment to defend Taiwan is likely to remain relevant.
Beijing is aware of this, and hence is continuing to build its military capability designed, in the short and medium term, to deter the US from taking on China.
In other words, the US might find the cost of confronting China prohibitive.
And here China's rapid buildup of its submarine fleet is quite instructive. In a recent report from Beijing, New York Times correspondent David Lague wrote: "American and other Western military analysts estimate that China now has more than 30 advanced and increasingly stealthy submarines, and dozens of older obsolete types."
They believe that "by the end of the decade ? China will have more submarines than the United States, although it will still lag behind in overall ability," Lague said.
Another way by which China seeks to manage the US is by creating political leverage on international issues that are important to Washington.
So much so that a view is gaining in some quarters in Washington that Beijing could be a useful partner in managing some of these issues.
This view is reflected in a recent Foreign Affairs article. Authors Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small wrote: "In just two years, China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the developing world to an attempt to balance its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power."
"And so when Washington and its allies formulate their policies toward pariah states, they should assume that China, although in some respects an obstacle, is now also a critical partner," they wrote.
With the US looking to Beijing for support on international issues at a time when Washington is overstretched, Taiwan tends to become a side issue.
The problem, though, is any sign of appeasement on Taiwan would be read by China as the US' faltering resolve to keep actively engaged in the Asia-Pacific.
Some of the regional countries are already factoring this into their policy formulations by seeking political accommodation with China as the pre-eminent regional power.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
2008年3月11日 星期二
US Report Shows PLA Could Not Take Taiwan
By Cheng Ta-chen 鄭大誠, translated by Anna Stiggelbout
On March 3, the US Department of Defense published its annual report Military Power of the People's Republic of China. Apart from a few figures that have changed, the content of the report is largely the same as previous editions.
Chapter Six, which is of the most interest to Taiwan, describes possible courses of action that China's military might take against Taiwan. The possible contingencies are the same as in last year's report: China could move against Taiwan with limited force, in an air and missile campaign, with quarantines and blockades or through an amphibious invasion.
Like last year's report, it says that using limited force and carrying out an air and missile campaign might affect Taiwan's defensive systems and the willingness of the Taiwanese to fight, but when analyzed more closely, these two actions are only a part of, or perhaps a prelude to, a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
If there were no successful follow-up to these military actions, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) wouldn't be able to attain its goal of "reunification" or "liberating Taiwan."
But the authors of this year's report clearly are of the opinion that China's military capability to carry out either of those courses of action has not improved significantly in the past year and has possibly even weakened.
The authors of the report believe that using a blockade or quarantine against Taiwan would be very taxing on the PLA's capabilities.
Also, China is clearly underestimating the international pressure and the possibility of military escalation that could result from a blockade of the Taiwan Strait.
As in previous years, the US Department of Defense is of the opinion that if China chose to launch an amphibious invasion against Taiwan, its main strategy would still be the "Joint Island Landing Campaign." But the report also says an amphibious invasion is still too complicated for the PLA to carry out.
Last year's report was still only hinting that an amphibious invasion would constitute too big of a risk for the Chinese leaders in Zhongnanhai, both politically and militarily, and so China might lack the capability to successfully launch an attack on Taiwan.
This year's report clearly states that if China were to invade Taiwan's outlying islands, this would show its military capability and political resolve, but it could also turn the Taiwanese public against China.
Moreover, this year's report boldly states that it would be beyond the routine training of the PLA to take over an outlying island like Kinmen or Matsu, let alone invade Taiwan itself. Taiwan would only need to implement some "modest target investments" in defense facilities and equipment to be able to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In the past years, the US army has paid close attention to the actions the PLA is taking in regard to its anti-access forces, which would be used to deter the US army from coming to Taiwan's aid in the case of an invasion.
Some analysts think that by around 2010, China may have sufficient power to launch an anti-access war. But according to this most recent report of the US Department of Defense on China's military power, an anti-access force that could stop the US army from coming to Taiwan's rescue is one thing, but actually invading Taiwan and succeeding in taking over the country is something else entirely.
Cheng Ta-chen is an independent defense analyst.
On March 3, the US Department of Defense published its annual report Military Power of the People's Republic of China. Apart from a few figures that have changed, the content of the report is largely the same as previous editions.
Chapter Six, which is of the most interest to Taiwan, describes possible courses of action that China's military might take against Taiwan. The possible contingencies are the same as in last year's report: China could move against Taiwan with limited force, in an air and missile campaign, with quarantines and blockades or through an amphibious invasion.
Like last year's report, it says that using limited force and carrying out an air and missile campaign might affect Taiwan's defensive systems and the willingness of the Taiwanese to fight, but when analyzed more closely, these two actions are only a part of, or perhaps a prelude to, a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
If there were no successful follow-up to these military actions, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) wouldn't be able to attain its goal of "reunification" or "liberating Taiwan."
But the authors of this year's report clearly are of the opinion that China's military capability to carry out either of those courses of action has not improved significantly in the past year and has possibly even weakened.
The authors of the report believe that using a blockade or quarantine against Taiwan would be very taxing on the PLA's capabilities.
Also, China is clearly underestimating the international pressure and the possibility of military escalation that could result from a blockade of the Taiwan Strait.
As in previous years, the US Department of Defense is of the opinion that if China chose to launch an amphibious invasion against Taiwan, its main strategy would still be the "Joint Island Landing Campaign." But the report also says an amphibious invasion is still too complicated for the PLA to carry out.
Last year's report was still only hinting that an amphibious invasion would constitute too big of a risk for the Chinese leaders in Zhongnanhai, both politically and militarily, and so China might lack the capability to successfully launch an attack on Taiwan.
This year's report clearly states that if China were to invade Taiwan's outlying islands, this would show its military capability and political resolve, but it could also turn the Taiwanese public against China.
Moreover, this year's report boldly states that it would be beyond the routine training of the PLA to take over an outlying island like Kinmen or Matsu, let alone invade Taiwan itself. Taiwan would only need to implement some "modest target investments" in defense facilities and equipment to be able to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In the past years, the US army has paid close attention to the actions the PLA is taking in regard to its anti-access forces, which would be used to deter the US army from coming to Taiwan's aid in the case of an invasion.
Some analysts think that by around 2010, China may have sufficient power to launch an anti-access war. But according to this most recent report of the US Department of Defense on China's military power, an anti-access force that could stop the US army from coming to Taiwan's rescue is one thing, but actually invading Taiwan and succeeding in taking over the country is something else entirely.
Cheng Ta-chen is an independent defense analyst.
Taiwan Must Review Security Risks
The recent US Department of Defense report on PRC military modernization is a useful reminder of the challenges posed by China's rise as a major regional power. This year's report is the most detailed and insightful to date and a number of issues are worthy of consideration for Taiwan.
First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.
Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.
For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.
Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.
Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.
Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.
To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?
While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.
With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.
Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?
Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?
An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.
Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.
While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.
As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.
But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.
One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?
In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.
Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.
In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.
For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?
Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.
Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.
Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.
In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.
Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.
In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.
As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.
Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.
The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.
In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.
Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.
Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.
First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.
Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.
For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.
Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.
Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.
Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.
To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?
While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.
With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.
Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?
Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?
An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.
Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.
While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.
As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.
But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.
One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?
In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.
Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.
In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.
For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?
Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.
Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.
Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.
In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.
Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.
In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.
As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.
Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.
The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.
In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.
Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.
Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.
2008年3月10日 星期一
How Would Democracy in China Play Out?
By Wang Dan 王丹, translated by Ted Yang
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
The results of the presidential election will have a significant impact on the development of cross-state relations. But regardless of whether Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) counterpart Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) wins the election, both candidates should pay attention to the effect on Chinese democratization and cross-strait relations.
The next 10 years will be a critical period in China's development. A couple factors are especially important.
First, as nationalism continues to ferment, the authorities will engage in the careful manipulation of public opinion.
Second, the strength of China, and especially its military, will continue to grow.
If it keeps growing at the current speed, the risk that China will attack Taiwan will increase.
However, a factor that cannot be determined is the nature of the change of the Chinese state over the next 10 years.
Even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) insists on highly centralized rule, modern governments will make such rule more difficult, weakening state control of society.
Thus it is important to note to what degree civil society in China will influence the Chinese government in the next 10 years.
The question of whether or not China will democratize is key for cross-strait relations.
It therefore is logical for Chinese democratization to be at the center of Taiwan's policy on China.
This focus provides a long term view of the situation and is in the best interests of the nation.
First, pushing for Chinese democracy helps improve Taiwan's international image.
Taiwan is inferior to China economically, militarily and diplomatically.
Taiwan is only superior to China in its form of government. By upholding democracy, Taiwan can manifest its unique value and gain support and sympathy from the international community -- a strategic advantage over China.
Second, the US would also support a push for Chinese democracy. Since US President George W. Bush took office, and especially during US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's term, the US has put a heavy emphasis on promoting democracy all over the world. If Taiwan actively promotes the democratization of China, there will only be praise from the US.
Finally, a push for democracy in China could also gain the support of the Chinese people.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
Visionary politicians should focus on the budding civil society in China. If Taiwan can offer support for China's democratization, it might win over public opinion there.
No matter where Taiwan is headed, it is vital that it wins the goodwill of the Chinese people.
Wang Dan is a member of the Chinese democracy movement.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
The results of the presidential election will have a significant impact on the development of cross-state relations. But regardless of whether Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) counterpart Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) wins the election, both candidates should pay attention to the effect on Chinese democratization and cross-strait relations.
The next 10 years will be a critical period in China's development. A couple factors are especially important.
First, as nationalism continues to ferment, the authorities will engage in the careful manipulation of public opinion.
Second, the strength of China, and especially its military, will continue to grow.
If it keeps growing at the current speed, the risk that China will attack Taiwan will increase.
However, a factor that cannot be determined is the nature of the change of the Chinese state over the next 10 years.
Even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) insists on highly centralized rule, modern governments will make such rule more difficult, weakening state control of society.
Thus it is important to note to what degree civil society in China will influence the Chinese government in the next 10 years.
The question of whether or not China will democratize is key for cross-strait relations.
It therefore is logical for Chinese democratization to be at the center of Taiwan's policy on China.
This focus provides a long term view of the situation and is in the best interests of the nation.
First, pushing for Chinese democracy helps improve Taiwan's international image.
Taiwan is inferior to China economically, militarily and diplomatically.
Taiwan is only superior to China in its form of government. By upholding democracy, Taiwan can manifest its unique value and gain support and sympathy from the international community -- a strategic advantage over China.
Second, the US would also support a push for Chinese democracy. Since US President George W. Bush took office, and especially during US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's term, the US has put a heavy emphasis on promoting democracy all over the world. If Taiwan actively promotes the democratization of China, there will only be praise from the US.
Finally, a push for democracy in China could also gain the support of the Chinese people.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
Visionary politicians should focus on the budding civil society in China. If Taiwan can offer support for China's democratization, it might win over public opinion there.
No matter where Taiwan is headed, it is vital that it wins the goodwill of the Chinese people.
Wang Dan is a member of the Chinese democracy movement.
2008年3月6日 星期四
House Gives Taiwan Full Backing
By Charles Snyder, staff reporter in Washington, D.C.
OUTSHINING THE TORCH: One clause criticizing China's oppression of Taiwan was removed from the final wording of a resolution, sparking heated debate on the floor
The US House of Representatives on Tuesday gave landslide approval to a resolution praising Taiwan's democracy and upcoming presidential election, urging the countries of the world to send delegations to Taiwan to witness the election.
QUESTION: On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree, as Amended
BILL TITLE: Supporting Taiwan’s fourth direct and democratic presidential elections in March 2008
The URL for the bill/resolution is http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll092.xml
OUTSHINING THE TORCH: One clause criticizing China's oppression of Taiwan was removed from the final wording of a resolution, sparking heated debate on the floor
The US House of Representatives on Tuesday gave landslide approval to a resolution praising Taiwan's democracy and upcoming presidential election, urging the countries of the world to send delegations to Taiwan to witness the election.
By a 490-1 vote, the House endorsed the resolution that was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee late last month in the committee's first legislative vote this year.
The only vote against the proposal came from Ron Paul, a libertarian who until recently was a candidate for the Republican nomination for US president.
Five House members rose to speak in favor of the resolution, including two co-chairpersons of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, Steve Chabot and Shelley Berkley.
"This resolution sends the right message at the right time," Chabot said. "As one of a very few democracies in Asia, Taiwan should be recognized for its courage and commitment to allow its citizens to choose its future."
He contrasted Taiwan with undemocratic China, citing Beijing's "abysmal human rights record, flouting of the rule of law, religious persecution and warehous[ing of] political prisoners."
Howard Berman, the chairman of the foreign affairs committee, said while introducing the resolution on the floor that "Taiwan's political system has evolved into one of the strongest democratic systems in Asia," following the demise of martial law and one-party "authoritarian dictatorship that failed to respect basic human rights."
"Today, Taiwan is a flourishing, multiparty democracy that respects human rights, upholds the rule of law and holds competitive elec-tions," he said.
"The United States' relationship with Taiwan speaks to the great importance of democracy in our foreign policy ... it is Taiwan's development of democracy that underpins the strong US-Taiwan friendship that we enjoy today," he said.
Michael Bilirakis, speaking for the opposition Republicans, called Taiwan "a shining example for other Asian states struggling with the introduction of representative forms of government and the rule of law. Taiwan's free elections, however, have the greatest impact on those who are still yearning to breathe free in the vast Chinese mainland."
He called Taiwan's democracy a "beacon of hope for those still suffering under the oppression on the communist Chinese mainland."
"Taiwan's democracy is a torch which shines ever brighter, far outshining the Olympic torch of the Chinese regime, which hopes this year to use sports to achieve propaganda victory," he said.
A dispute broke out during the deliberation on the Foreign Affairs Committee's decision to remove from the original resolution a clause that asserts that Taiwan "faces threat and intimidation from neighboring China."
That clause was deleted at the insistence of the chairman of the committee's Asia and Pacific subcommittee, delegate Eni Faleo-mavega of American Samoa.
Chabot bemoaned the committee's action, saying: "I'm disappointed that the strong language contained in the introduced version of the bill, which referenced the acts of intimidation and pressure by China, was eliminated. It is unrealistic to believe that these elections are not of concern to China."
Bilirakis agreed.
"Taiwan's young democracy faces constant military threat and intimidation from neighboring China," he said, echoing the deleted clause's language.
"Yet, in spite of these belligerent threats and the constant saber-rattling by Beijing, Taipei has continued to stand tall for freedom," he said.
Faleomavega, who has often taken a pro-Beijing stance in committee matters, defended his action.
Noting his two trips to Taipei over the past year, he said: "I can assure my colleagues that elections are in full swing in Taiwan, with no intimidation from the People's Republic of China."
"I think it is important for [congressional] members to observe first-hand the [Taiwanese electoral] process and meet the leaders in Taiwan and Beijing before being so quick in condemning the People's Republic of China," he said.
He said the resolution did not address the issue of the referendum on UN membership, adding: "I do not believe it would be in the best interest of our country to support the position of Taiwan's current administration, which has attempted to push for independence, which is contrary to the US position on one-country-two-systems [sic]."
It should be 409-1, with 1 Present and 17 NV (Not Voting). The bill/resolution is:
H CON RES 278 2/3 YEA-AND-NAY 5-Mar-2008 12:18 PMQUESTION: On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree, as Amended
BILL TITLE: Supporting Taiwan’s fourth direct and democratic presidential elections in March 2008
The URL for the bill/resolution is http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll092.xml
2008年3月3日 星期一
The KMT is Killing National Defense
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has struck again. After years of successfully blocking arms appropriation bills in the legislature, the party has now managed to shoot down, before it could even take off, a venture that could have been of tremendous benefit to the nation's ability to defend itself.
As this newspaper has argued before, Taiwan Goal, the semi-private arms manufacturer at the heart of a recent controversy, could have provided the military with the means to develop weapons systems that would have best suited the nation's defense needs and allow it to circumvent many of the barriers to procurement that the nation faces because of its international isolation.
But as a result of the KMT's smear campaign and threat to launch an investigation should the company not be disbanded, that project is now dead.
This raises a number of issues about KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) promise, made in his speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security last month, to strengthen the nation's deterrence capabilities.
First, Ma argues that the "offensive defense" philosophy espoused by the Democratic Progressive Party administration -- in which, rather than taking place on Taiwan proper, battle is pushed "offshore" -- is counterproductive. Ma says that the KMT would instead work to strengthen the nation's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to ensure that a first strike would not cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
While strengthening one's defenses is a sound strategy, reliance on that alone speaks of a lack of understanding of the concept of deterrence, which involves the threat of force to dissuade an opponent from launching an attack in the first place. This cannot exist if the strategy, as proposed by Ma, is one of homeland defense alone. In other words, deterrence is the promise of punitive action, not merely passive resistance. Security specialists are unanimous on this point: Taking the fight "offshore" is the wisest course for Taiwan.
Second, Ma's defense plan reiterates the need to obtain F-16C/Ds to modernize the Air Force. Again, this makes sense, but it is symptomatic of a policy of reliance on US systems that will be costlier than one of indigenous or semi-indigenous development. The dependence on US weapons is, at best, a short-term palliative and drains national resources that could be better spent elsewhere. One wonders, therefore, if the KMT perhaps does not stand to gain from ensuring that Taiwan continues to buy weapons from the US alone.
Taiwan Goal, while no panacea, would have been a step in the right direction, and unlike what some critics have argued, it would have tapped into the nation's world-class private technology industries -- with or without help from the government.
By shutting it down and by opposing a deterrence strategy, the KMT has demonstrated a total ignorance of what the cost of a Chinese invasion would be for Taiwan. By closing the door on new possibilities for weapons development and acquisition, the KMT has revealed an inability to move beyond the unhealthy reliance on the US as a patron for the nation's defenses, which also imposes a needless financial burden on the taxpayer.
Such an approach to defense could only have been dreamed up by a party that does not believe that China would resort to force to settle cross-strait tensions. But as we saw from the manner in which Taipei's envoys to Seoul were treated last week -- a delegation that included Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) of the KMT -- the pan-blue camp has a rare talent for misreading Beijing's intentions.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 4, 2008.
As this newspaper has argued before, Taiwan Goal, the semi-private arms manufacturer at the heart of a recent controversy, could have provided the military with the means to develop weapons systems that would have best suited the nation's defense needs and allow it to circumvent many of the barriers to procurement that the nation faces because of its international isolation.
But as a result of the KMT's smear campaign and threat to launch an investigation should the company not be disbanded, that project is now dead.
This raises a number of issues about KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) promise, made in his speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security last month, to strengthen the nation's deterrence capabilities.
First, Ma argues that the "offensive defense" philosophy espoused by the Democratic Progressive Party administration -- in which, rather than taking place on Taiwan proper, battle is pushed "offshore" -- is counterproductive. Ma says that the KMT would instead work to strengthen the nation's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to ensure that a first strike would not cripple Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
While strengthening one's defenses is a sound strategy, reliance on that alone speaks of a lack of understanding of the concept of deterrence, which involves the threat of force to dissuade an opponent from launching an attack in the first place. This cannot exist if the strategy, as proposed by Ma, is one of homeland defense alone. In other words, deterrence is the promise of punitive action, not merely passive resistance. Security specialists are unanimous on this point: Taking the fight "offshore" is the wisest course for Taiwan.
Second, Ma's defense plan reiterates the need to obtain F-16C/Ds to modernize the Air Force. Again, this makes sense, but it is symptomatic of a policy of reliance on US systems that will be costlier than one of indigenous or semi-indigenous development. The dependence on US weapons is, at best, a short-term palliative and drains national resources that could be better spent elsewhere. One wonders, therefore, if the KMT perhaps does not stand to gain from ensuring that Taiwan continues to buy weapons from the US alone.
Taiwan Goal, while no panacea, would have been a step in the right direction, and unlike what some critics have argued, it would have tapped into the nation's world-class private technology industries -- with or without help from the government.
By shutting it down and by opposing a deterrence strategy, the KMT has demonstrated a total ignorance of what the cost of a Chinese invasion would be for Taiwan. By closing the door on new possibilities for weapons development and acquisition, the KMT has revealed an inability to move beyond the unhealthy reliance on the US as a patron for the nation's defenses, which also imposes a needless financial burden on the taxpayer.
Such an approach to defense could only have been dreamed up by a party that does not believe that China would resort to force to settle cross-strait tensions. But as we saw from the manner in which Taipei's envoys to Seoul were treated last week -- a delegation that included Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) of the KMT -- the pan-blue camp has a rare talent for misreading Beijing's intentions.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 4, 2008.
2008年2月26日 星期二
But Are They Really Friends of Taiwan?
By J. Michael Cole 寇謚將
Time and again, a handful of individuals in US academia have accused the Bush administration of either abandoning Taiwan or not doing enough to protect it. Again last week, the same pundits issued a report, Strengthening Freedom in Asia: A Twenty-First Century Agenda for the US-Taiwan Partnership, that at first glance seemed to indicate that Taiwan has friends in high places.
But are they really friends? Is the "freedom" they refer to the universal human right, or is it instead the word cynically used by the Bush administration to justify wars in the Middle East and elsewhere? To put it differently, do these experts really care about a democratic Taiwan, or is their penultimate goal rather the containment of China to ensure that, as envisioned by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992, no power ever manages to rival US hegemony?
For the most part, these "defenders" of Taiwan are hawks at think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, the Project for a New American Century and Armitage International. One thing these organizations have in common is their intimate ties to the US defense establishment. In their view, international security is best served through further militarization -- greater investment in weapons, more reliance on force to solve problems and preemptive military action. All, furthermore, tend to ridicule the UN and have served as proponents of a "Pax Americana."
Case in point was former US Air Force officer and current president of the Project 2049 Institute Mark Stokes' contention, during an AEI forum last week, that Taiwan must tap into its technological base and turn fully private firms into global security companies based on the "US defense supply chain" model. In other words, what was best for Taiwan was a military-industrial complex of the kind that has led to the very military adventurism that, in the opinion of many, has made the world more dangerous for all and would likely result in an arms race with China, out of which no good can come.
We must remember that it was AEI (where Wolfowitz now works after being forced to leave the World Bank) and its likes that orchestrated the invasion of Iraq and the disastrous occupation that followed. It was their reliance on biased intelligence that supported their preconceptions, their support for the long-discredited Ahmed Chalabi and their indifference to the suffering of Iraqis that allowed the occupation to sink into a deadly insurgency. It is also they who are calling for Iran to be next.
These hawks do not really care about democracy; what matters to them, rather, is preserving US hegemony. If that means supporting Taiwan as a hedge -- or an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" -- against China, so be it. But it is hard to imagine these same experts clamoring for Taiwan's democracy absent a China that, at some point in the future, could threaten US primacy.
AEI and its kind are nothing more than poster boys for the US arms industry and the hardliners who seek to contain China. To them, Taiwan provides a convenient cover. Nothing more.
We cannot, however, blame the hawks for getting so much air time. The liberal think tanks in the US, such as the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, have largely failed to engage the public or to publicize their views to the extent AEI and others have.
Until left-leaning think tanks add their voices to the chorus and come to Taiwan's assistance for principles that are truly based on a belief in the value of democracy, hawks in China and experts the world over will have good reason to doubt that US voices pretending to care for Taiwan are not doing this for cynical, if not more obscure, reasons.
J. Michael Cole is a writer based in Taipei.
Time and again, a handful of individuals in US academia have accused the Bush administration of either abandoning Taiwan or not doing enough to protect it. Again last week, the same pundits issued a report, Strengthening Freedom in Asia: A Twenty-First Century Agenda for the US-Taiwan Partnership, that at first glance seemed to indicate that Taiwan has friends in high places.
But are they really friends? Is the "freedom" they refer to the universal human right, or is it instead the word cynically used by the Bush administration to justify wars in the Middle East and elsewhere? To put it differently, do these experts really care about a democratic Taiwan, or is their penultimate goal rather the containment of China to ensure that, as envisioned by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992, no power ever manages to rival US hegemony?
For the most part, these "defenders" of Taiwan are hawks at think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, the Project for a New American Century and Armitage International. One thing these organizations have in common is their intimate ties to the US defense establishment. In their view, international security is best served through further militarization -- greater investment in weapons, more reliance on force to solve problems and preemptive military action. All, furthermore, tend to ridicule the UN and have served as proponents of a "Pax Americana."
Case in point was former US Air Force officer and current president of the Project 2049 Institute Mark Stokes' contention, during an AEI forum last week, that Taiwan must tap into its technological base and turn fully private firms into global security companies based on the "US defense supply chain" model. In other words, what was best for Taiwan was a military-industrial complex of the kind that has led to the very military adventurism that, in the opinion of many, has made the world more dangerous for all and would likely result in an arms race with China, out of which no good can come.
We must remember that it was AEI (where Wolfowitz now works after being forced to leave the World Bank) and its likes that orchestrated the invasion of Iraq and the disastrous occupation that followed. It was their reliance on biased intelligence that supported their preconceptions, their support for the long-discredited Ahmed Chalabi and their indifference to the suffering of Iraqis that allowed the occupation to sink into a deadly insurgency. It is also they who are calling for Iran to be next.
These hawks do not really care about democracy; what matters to them, rather, is preserving US hegemony. If that means supporting Taiwan as a hedge -- or an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" -- against China, so be it. But it is hard to imagine these same experts clamoring for Taiwan's democracy absent a China that, at some point in the future, could threaten US primacy.
AEI and its kind are nothing more than poster boys for the US arms industry and the hardliners who seek to contain China. To them, Taiwan provides a convenient cover. Nothing more.
We cannot, however, blame the hawks for getting so much air time. The liberal think tanks in the US, such as the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, have largely failed to engage the public or to publicize their views to the extent AEI and others have.
Until left-leaning think tanks add their voices to the chorus and come to Taiwan's assistance for principles that are truly based on a belief in the value of democracy, hawks in China and experts the world over will have good reason to doubt that US voices pretending to care for Taiwan are not doing this for cynical, if not more obscure, reasons.
J. Michael Cole is a writer based in Taipei.
2008年2月18日 星期一
China's Rise Will Mean Turbulence
By Sushil Seth of Australia
China seems to be everywhere these days. Apart from Japan which is seeking to counter it with the US alliance, China's geo-political pre-eminence in Asia-Pacific is now well-established.
True, the US is still the dominant military power regionally and globally. But the Asia-Pacific region is quietly accommodating itself to China's new and rising status.
China is not only looming large in its Asian neighborhood, it is also establishing its presence in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and South America, hunting for resources (oil, gas and raw materials) to fuel its economy, selling its wares, making investments and accumulating political capital.
It has emerged as the US' biggest foreign lender, buying its treasury bonds and securities with its more than US$1 trillion in foreign currency reserves (and rising), amassed, in large part, from the US' growing trade deficit.
In other words, it is lending a good part of what it earns from its US exports back to the US, thus enabling its consumers to continue buying Chinese goods.
China is now in a position to bring down the mighty US dollar by shifting its dollar holdings into other currencies, and create panic in international markets.
In practice, it might not do this for fear of losing heavily on its dollars assets. There is no way it can dispose of its dollar assets quickly enough to escape heavy losses.
Besides, a significant depreciation of the US dollar will affect China's exports into the US market by making them dearer.
But that is another story.
The point is that China's rise is a great challenge for the world, especially the US, as the former has ambitions to overtake the latter as the world's only superpower.
With the US mired in Iraq and elsewhere, China has used its time and resources well to expand its political and economic clout, even right into the US backyard of South America.
One would hope that the US is aware of China's rearguard action. But being already over-stretched, the US is keen to maximize the area of political cooperation on Iran, North Korea and elsewhere.
Washington is, therefore, inclined to overstate the mutuality of interest, and underplay differences and concerns from China.
But this situation is unlikely to last as China becomes even more ambitious and the US starts to clearly see the danger.
China believes it can carve out a new role with new strategies to overcome strife and conflict, both internally and externally. In a Foreign Affairs article, Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅) called these strategies China's "three transcendences."
The first strategy, as he puts it, "is to transcend the old model of industrialization and to advance a new one ? based on technology, economic efficiency, low consumption of natural resources ? low environmental pollution, and the optimal allocation of human resources."
Going by the state of China's environmental degradation, this strategy is apparently not working.
The second strategy "is to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge [like Germany and Japan in the past], as well as the Cold War mentality."
China, on the other hand, "will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development and cooperation with all countries of the world."
However, if the grab for islands in the South China Sea (the Spratlys, for instance) is any indication, China is behaving no different from the ways of the old powers (Germany and Japan) by seeking to use a mix of coercive strategies to have its way.
The only difference is that China has been relatively successful so far in not having to use military means.
But as its power grows and it faces resistance to its coercive diplomacy, China will be as ruthless in pushing its way (even including the projection and use of power) as the old powers.
Which is already happening with Taiwan, with hundreds of Chinese missiles targeted in that direction.
The third strategy, according to Zheng, "is to transcend outmoded models of social control and to construct a harmonious socialist society."
Again, going by the reports of recurring unrest in different parts of China, the so-called harmonious society is either sheer propaganda or sheer delusion, which is even more disturbing.
Therefore, all these claims that China has somehow found the Holy Grail of peaceful rise and development are fanciful -- to say the least.
In other words, China's rise is bound to cause turbulence and strife in the years to come, with the US seeking to hold its position as the reigning superpower.
There is, however, a view that China can be accommodated peacefully in the world order, because the existing system has been kind to it as evidenced by its economic growth and growing political status. Therefore, it will have no reason to subvert or sabotage it.
But with China's growing ambitions, it is unlikely to be satisfied with incremental benefits accruing to it from a system that was devised by others to maintain and sustain their supremacy.
Beijing will want to put its own stamp on the system and to maximize its own goals and ambitions of global supremacy.
In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Professor G. John Ikenberry argues: "The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its [European] partners have crafted over the last century."
He adds, "The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century."
This is based on two implicit assumptions. First, China will continue to see the existing international order as largely to its advantage.
Second, if it doesn't and seeks radical transformation, it will find the US-European order strong enough, by virtue of its combined power, to deter China from challenging it.
As Ikenberry puts it, "The key thing for US leaders to remember is that it may be possible for China to overtake the US, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order."
This is assuming that the Western order will generally act together, which is a tall order to make over any period of time.
If China manages to remain stable and continues to grow? (a big if, considering its multiple problems), it will also have the potential to play power politics with the global system, including between the US and Europe.
The idea that China will play its role within an existing international order crafted and controlled by dominant Western powers seems a bit overdrawn, if not an outright case of wishful thinking.
It would make more sense to treat China as a power keen to reshape the global order by putting itself in the center. China will take this directrion as its power grows.
And this will mean strife and turbulence. And countries like the US and others with high stakes in the existing international order will have no option but to confront the new danger from a resurgent China.
China seems to be everywhere these days. Apart from Japan which is seeking to counter it with the US alliance, China's geo-political pre-eminence in Asia-Pacific is now well-established.
True, the US is still the dominant military power regionally and globally. But the Asia-Pacific region is quietly accommodating itself to China's new and rising status.
China is not only looming large in its Asian neighborhood, it is also establishing its presence in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and South America, hunting for resources (oil, gas and raw materials) to fuel its economy, selling its wares, making investments and accumulating political capital.
It has emerged as the US' biggest foreign lender, buying its treasury bonds and securities with its more than US$1 trillion in foreign currency reserves (and rising), amassed, in large part, from the US' growing trade deficit.
In other words, it is lending a good part of what it earns from its US exports back to the US, thus enabling its consumers to continue buying Chinese goods.
China is now in a position to bring down the mighty US dollar by shifting its dollar holdings into other currencies, and create panic in international markets.
In practice, it might not do this for fear of losing heavily on its dollars assets. There is no way it can dispose of its dollar assets quickly enough to escape heavy losses.
Besides, a significant depreciation of the US dollar will affect China's exports into the US market by making them dearer.
But that is another story.
The point is that China's rise is a great challenge for the world, especially the US, as the former has ambitions to overtake the latter as the world's only superpower.
With the US mired in Iraq and elsewhere, China has used its time and resources well to expand its political and economic clout, even right into the US backyard of South America.
One would hope that the US is aware of China's rearguard action. But being already over-stretched, the US is keen to maximize the area of political cooperation on Iran, North Korea and elsewhere.
Washington is, therefore, inclined to overstate the mutuality of interest, and underplay differences and concerns from China.
But this situation is unlikely to last as China becomes even more ambitious and the US starts to clearly see the danger.
China believes it can carve out a new role with new strategies to overcome strife and conflict, both internally and externally. In a Foreign Affairs article, Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅) called these strategies China's "three transcendences."
The first strategy, as he puts it, "is to transcend the old model of industrialization and to advance a new one ? based on technology, economic efficiency, low consumption of natural resources ? low environmental pollution, and the optimal allocation of human resources."
Going by the state of China's environmental degradation, this strategy is apparently not working.
The second strategy "is to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge [like Germany and Japan in the past], as well as the Cold War mentality."
China, on the other hand, "will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development and cooperation with all countries of the world."
However, if the grab for islands in the South China Sea (the Spratlys, for instance) is any indication, China is behaving no different from the ways of the old powers (Germany and Japan) by seeking to use a mix of coercive strategies to have its way.
The only difference is that China has been relatively successful so far in not having to use military means.
But as its power grows and it faces resistance to its coercive diplomacy, China will be as ruthless in pushing its way (even including the projection and use of power) as the old powers.
Which is already happening with Taiwan, with hundreds of Chinese missiles targeted in that direction.
The third strategy, according to Zheng, "is to transcend outmoded models of social control and to construct a harmonious socialist society."
Again, going by the reports of recurring unrest in different parts of China, the so-called harmonious society is either sheer propaganda or sheer delusion, which is even more disturbing.
Therefore, all these claims that China has somehow found the Holy Grail of peaceful rise and development are fanciful -- to say the least.
In other words, China's rise is bound to cause turbulence and strife in the years to come, with the US seeking to hold its position as the reigning superpower.
There is, however, a view that China can be accommodated peacefully in the world order, because the existing system has been kind to it as evidenced by its economic growth and growing political status. Therefore, it will have no reason to subvert or sabotage it.
But with China's growing ambitions, it is unlikely to be satisfied with incremental benefits accruing to it from a system that was devised by others to maintain and sustain their supremacy.
Beijing will want to put its own stamp on the system and to maximize its own goals and ambitions of global supremacy.
In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Professor G. John Ikenberry argues: "The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its [European] partners have crafted over the last century."
He adds, "The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century."
This is based on two implicit assumptions. First, China will continue to see the existing international order as largely to its advantage.
Second, if it doesn't and seeks radical transformation, it will find the US-European order strong enough, by virtue of its combined power, to deter China from challenging it.
As Ikenberry puts it, "The key thing for US leaders to remember is that it may be possible for China to overtake the US, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order."
This is assuming that the Western order will generally act together, which is a tall order to make over any period of time.
If China manages to remain stable and continues to grow? (a big if, considering its multiple problems), it will also have the potential to play power politics with the global system, including between the US and Europe.
The idea that China will play its role within an existing international order crafted and controlled by dominant Western powers seems a bit overdrawn, if not an outright case of wishful thinking.
It would make more sense to treat China as a power keen to reshape the global order by putting itself in the center. China will take this directrion as its power grows.
And this will mean strife and turbulence. And countries like the US and others with high stakes in the existing international order will have no option but to confront the new danger from a resurgent China.
2008年2月12日 星期二
Europe Not to be Underestimated
By Joseph Nye
Global power is not limited to military might, and Europe still has the economic weight and soft power to effect changes
At this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, the buzz was about Asia's growing power. One Asian analyst argued that by 2050, there will be three world powers: the US, China and India. He did not mention Europe, but underestimating Europe's power is a mistake.
Yes, Europe currently punches below its weight. It is fragmented, peaceful and normative in a world of hard power, but part of the world is not about military power. The use of force among advanced industrial democracies is virtually unthinkable. In their relations with each other, such countries are all from Venus, to paraphrase Robert Kagan, and here Europe's focus on law and institutions is an asset.
As for other parts of the world, a recent Pew poll found that many Europeans would like Europe to play a larger role, but to balance US military power would require a doubling or tripling of defense spending, and few Europeans are interested in such an increase. Nevertheless, a smart strategy for Europe will require greater investments in hard power.
The picture for Europe, however, is not as bleak as pessimists assume. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce such behavior depend upon the context. In functional terms, power is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game. On the top board are military relations among states, with the US the world's only superpower with global reach. Here the world is unipolar.
On the middle board are economic relations, where the world is already multipolar. Here, Europe acts as a union, and countries like Japan and China play big roles. The US cannot reach a trade agreement or settle anti-trust cases without the approval of the EU. Or, to take another example, Europe was able to lead the drive to remove Paul Wolfowitz from his position as president of the World Bank.
The bottom chessboard includes transnational relations outside the control of governments -- everything from drugs to infectious diseases to climate change to terrorism. On this board, power is chaotically distributed among non-state actors, and it makes no sense to call this world either unipolar or multipolar. Here, close civilian cooperation is important, for which Europe is well endowed. European countries' success in overcoming centuries of animosity and the development of a large internal market have given them a great deal of soft power. At the Cold War's end, East European countries did not try to form local alliances, as they did in the 1920's, but looked toward Brussels to secure their future. Similarly, countries like Turkey and Ukraine have adjusted their policies in response to their attraction to Europe.
Recently, the US National Intelligence Council published four widely different scenarios for the world in 2020: "Davos World," in which economic globalization continues, but with a more Asian face; "Pax Americana," where the US continues to dominate the global order; "New Caliphate," where Islamic religious identity challenges the dominance of Western norms; and "Cycle of Fear," in which non-state forces create shocks to security that produce Orwellian societies. Like any exercises in futurology, such scenarios have their limits, but they help us ask which three or four major political factors will help shape the outcome.
The first is the rise of Asia. The big question will be China and its internal evolution. China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million still live on less than US$2 per day. Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation. If China replaces its eroded communism with nationalism or ensure social cohesion, the result could be a more aggressive foreign policy and unwillingness to deal with issues like climate change. Or it may deal with its problems and become a "responsible stakeholder" in world politics.
Europe can contribute significantly to China's integration into global norms and institutions. In general, Europe and the US have more to fear from a weak China than they do from a wealthy China. Political Islam and how it develops will be the second factor. The struggle against extreme Islamist terrorism is not a "clash of civilizations," but a civil war within Islam. A radical minority is using violence to impose a simplified and ideological version on a mainstream with more diverse views.
Another major determinant of which scenario prevails will be US power and how it is used. The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but, paradoxically, the strongest state since the days of Rome will be unable to protect its citizens acting alone.
US military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism and international crime. These issues require cooperation in the provision of global public goods and the soft power of attracting support. No part of the world shares more values or has a greater capacity to influence US attitudes and power than does Europe. That suggests that the fourth political determinant of the future will be the evolution of European policies and power.
Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard.
Global power is not limited to military might, and Europe still has the economic weight and soft power to effect changes
At this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, the buzz was about Asia's growing power. One Asian analyst argued that by 2050, there will be three world powers: the US, China and India. He did not mention Europe, but underestimating Europe's power is a mistake.
Yes, Europe currently punches below its weight. It is fragmented, peaceful and normative in a world of hard power, but part of the world is not about military power. The use of force among advanced industrial democracies is virtually unthinkable. In their relations with each other, such countries are all from Venus, to paraphrase Robert Kagan, and here Europe's focus on law and institutions is an asset.
As for other parts of the world, a recent Pew poll found that many Europeans would like Europe to play a larger role, but to balance US military power would require a doubling or tripling of defense spending, and few Europeans are interested in such an increase. Nevertheless, a smart strategy for Europe will require greater investments in hard power.
The picture for Europe, however, is not as bleak as pessimists assume. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce such behavior depend upon the context. In functional terms, power is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game. On the top board are military relations among states, with the US the world's only superpower with global reach. Here the world is unipolar.
On the middle board are economic relations, where the world is already multipolar. Here, Europe acts as a union, and countries like Japan and China play big roles. The US cannot reach a trade agreement or settle anti-trust cases without the approval of the EU. Or, to take another example, Europe was able to lead the drive to remove Paul Wolfowitz from his position as president of the World Bank.
The bottom chessboard includes transnational relations outside the control of governments -- everything from drugs to infectious diseases to climate change to terrorism. On this board, power is chaotically distributed among non-state actors, and it makes no sense to call this world either unipolar or multipolar. Here, close civilian cooperation is important, for which Europe is well endowed. European countries' success in overcoming centuries of animosity and the development of a large internal market have given them a great deal of soft power. At the Cold War's end, East European countries did not try to form local alliances, as they did in the 1920's, but looked toward Brussels to secure their future. Similarly, countries like Turkey and Ukraine have adjusted their policies in response to their attraction to Europe.
Recently, the US National Intelligence Council published four widely different scenarios for the world in 2020: "Davos World," in which economic globalization continues, but with a more Asian face; "Pax Americana," where the US continues to dominate the global order; "New Caliphate," where Islamic religious identity challenges the dominance of Western norms; and "Cycle of Fear," in which non-state forces create shocks to security that produce Orwellian societies. Like any exercises in futurology, such scenarios have their limits, but they help us ask which three or four major political factors will help shape the outcome.
The first is the rise of Asia. The big question will be China and its internal evolution. China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since 1990, but another 400 million still live on less than US$2 per day. Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation. If China replaces its eroded communism with nationalism or ensure social cohesion, the result could be a more aggressive foreign policy and unwillingness to deal with issues like climate change. Or it may deal with its problems and become a "responsible stakeholder" in world politics.
Europe can contribute significantly to China's integration into global norms and institutions. In general, Europe and the US have more to fear from a weak China than they do from a wealthy China. Political Islam and how it develops will be the second factor. The struggle against extreme Islamist terrorism is not a "clash of civilizations," but a civil war within Islam. A radical minority is using violence to impose a simplified and ideological version on a mainstream with more diverse views.
Another major determinant of which scenario prevails will be US power and how it is used. The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but, paradoxically, the strongest state since the days of Rome will be unable to protect its citizens acting alone.
US military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism and international crime. These issues require cooperation in the provision of global public goods and the soft power of attracting support. No part of the world shares more values or has a greater capacity to influence US attitudes and power than does Europe. That suggests that the fourth political determinant of the future will be the evolution of European policies and power.
Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard.
2008年1月22日 星期二
Common Yet Different Democracies
By Kurt Campbell
Last week, newspapers in New Hampshire and Taiwan -- thousands of kilometers apart and meant for vastly different audiences with completely different cultures and political traditions -- carried eerily familiar pictures. In one, a despondent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporter was seen somewhat in shock after the results of the legislative elections were announced, which saw a rout of the DPP at the hands of rival Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidates. The picture was accompanied by a story of what this would mean for the presidential election in March.
At the same time, a Nashua, New Hampshire, newspaper carried a very similar picture of a deflated supporter of Representative Barack Obama trudging dejectedly through the thick snow after Hillary Clinton's surprise upset in the Democratic primary.
While there is much that separates the US and Taiwan -- very different histories, national aspirations and worldviews -- there are still important things that unite them. The US and Taiwan each possesses among the most active and participatory democracies in the world and the intensity of the two presidential campaigns are cases in point.
There has been extensive discussion of late of a worrisome drift in the US-Taiwan relationship and there are indeed signs of discord and clear areas for worry.
President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) seemingly insatiable push for a referendum on joining the UN has drawn particular ire from the Bush administration. So too have persistent disagreements about defense spending and participation in international institutions created occasional tensions between Washington and Taipei.
These instances of disagreement and discord take place amid the background of China's dramatic rise to great power status. It is undeniable that China now plays a much larger role in Washington's calculation on virtually every matter of global importance, from North Korean nuclear weapons to currency woes to energy anxieties to unrest in Pakistan.
The US now needs a constructive partnership with China as never before, which has resulted in Taiwan feeling increasingly squeezed by the growing weight of China in all matters of international diplomacy and commerce.
Nevertheless, what is often forgotten behind the banal bromides that celebrate the vibrancy of Taiwanese democracy is that the US and Taiwan share a common experience of democracy, including all its many disappointments, difficulties and dilemmas that cannot be easily ignored.
Indeed, national leaders who are regularly subjected to the difficult discipline of polling stations and voting booths understand each other at some very basic, core level.
While US officials often claim to be mystified by a Taiwanese move or maneuver on an issue related to identity or national character, the truth is that deep down, Americans of virtually every stripe understand the motivations behind initiatives that at the same time are seen as disruptive or even dangerous.
What is sometimes forgotten in the occasionally tense to and fro between Washington and Taipei is that unlike the previous era of US-Taiwanese diplomacy, when national authorities could act with much less concern about public scrutiny or opposition, the current leaders must be much more responsive to public sentiment and criticism.
While it is true that, on occasion, Taiwanese leaders have taken steps that went against the advice given by Washington, these initiatives were usually undertaken with a specific domestic group of supporters in mind. In a sense, this is the essence of democracy.
The challenge for this and the next generation of US and Taiwanese leaders will be to better appreciate the pressures and interests of the other. For the US president, it will mean a simultaneous desire to maintain a stable and durable understanding with China while at the same time seeking to preserve Taiwan's security and democracy.
For the Taiwanese president, it will mean negotiating a complex path between domestic expectations for greater national identity and international standing, while taking account of the obvious desires of both Beijing and Washington to avoid actions that could trigger a crisis.
Clearly, Washington and Taipei will have their hands full, but in the complex trilateral dialogue and diplomacy between Washington, Taipei and Beijing, it is clear that the common experience of democracy has created inevitable and undeniable connections between Taiwan and the US that cannot and should not be ignored. Indeed, it is these values, along with other strategic interests, that keep the US so closely engaged in the Western Pacific.
So, as presidential campaigning continues in the US and Taiwan, it is important to keep these common political experiences in mind while both sides negotiate a complex future together.
Kurt Campbell is the chief executive officer and cofounder of the Center for a New American Security.
Last week, newspapers in New Hampshire and Taiwan -- thousands of kilometers apart and meant for vastly different audiences with completely different cultures and political traditions -- carried eerily familiar pictures. In one, a despondent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporter was seen somewhat in shock after the results of the legislative elections were announced, which saw a rout of the DPP at the hands of rival Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidates. The picture was accompanied by a story of what this would mean for the presidential election in March.
At the same time, a Nashua, New Hampshire, newspaper carried a very similar picture of a deflated supporter of Representative Barack Obama trudging dejectedly through the thick snow after Hillary Clinton's surprise upset in the Democratic primary.
While there is much that separates the US and Taiwan -- very different histories, national aspirations and worldviews -- there are still important things that unite them. The US and Taiwan each possesses among the most active and participatory democracies in the world and the intensity of the two presidential campaigns are cases in point.
There has been extensive discussion of late of a worrisome drift in the US-Taiwan relationship and there are indeed signs of discord and clear areas for worry.
President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) seemingly insatiable push for a referendum on joining the UN has drawn particular ire from the Bush administration. So too have persistent disagreements about defense spending and participation in international institutions created occasional tensions between Washington and Taipei.
These instances of disagreement and discord take place amid the background of China's dramatic rise to great power status. It is undeniable that China now plays a much larger role in Washington's calculation on virtually every matter of global importance, from North Korean nuclear weapons to currency woes to energy anxieties to unrest in Pakistan.
The US now needs a constructive partnership with China as never before, which has resulted in Taiwan feeling increasingly squeezed by the growing weight of China in all matters of international diplomacy and commerce.
Nevertheless, what is often forgotten behind the banal bromides that celebrate the vibrancy of Taiwanese democracy is that the US and Taiwan share a common experience of democracy, including all its many disappointments, difficulties and dilemmas that cannot be easily ignored.
Indeed, national leaders who are regularly subjected to the difficult discipline of polling stations and voting booths understand each other at some very basic, core level.
While US officials often claim to be mystified by a Taiwanese move or maneuver on an issue related to identity or national character, the truth is that deep down, Americans of virtually every stripe understand the motivations behind initiatives that at the same time are seen as disruptive or even dangerous.
What is sometimes forgotten in the occasionally tense to and fro between Washington and Taipei is that unlike the previous era of US-Taiwanese diplomacy, when national authorities could act with much less concern about public scrutiny or opposition, the current leaders must be much more responsive to public sentiment and criticism.
While it is true that, on occasion, Taiwanese leaders have taken steps that went against the advice given by Washington, these initiatives were usually undertaken with a specific domestic group of supporters in mind. In a sense, this is the essence of democracy.
The challenge for this and the next generation of US and Taiwanese leaders will be to better appreciate the pressures and interests of the other. For the US president, it will mean a simultaneous desire to maintain a stable and durable understanding with China while at the same time seeking to preserve Taiwan's security and democracy.
For the Taiwanese president, it will mean negotiating a complex path between domestic expectations for greater national identity and international standing, while taking account of the obvious desires of both Beijing and Washington to avoid actions that could trigger a crisis.
Clearly, Washington and Taipei will have their hands full, but in the complex trilateral dialogue and diplomacy between Washington, Taipei and Beijing, it is clear that the common experience of democracy has created inevitable and undeniable connections between Taiwan and the US that cannot and should not be ignored. Indeed, it is these values, along with other strategic interests, that keep the US so closely engaged in the Western Pacific.
So, as presidential campaigning continues in the US and Taiwan, it is important to keep these common political experiences in mind while both sides negotiate a complex future together.
Kurt Campbell is the chief executive officer and cofounder of the Center for a New American Security.
2008年1月17日 星期四
Voting Democracy Away
There is a saying that has long circulated in circles like Washington that "Chinese are too busy making money to worry about democracy."
Author James Mann, however, contends in his book The China Fantasy that this is a fallacy and just a convenient sound bite for foreign businesspeople and politicians who wish to ignore the authoritarian nature of China's current regime while taking advantage of its cheap labor.
The frequent demonstrations seen in Hong Kong opposing Beijing's heavy-handed rule and the lack of democratic progress since its handover to China lend credence to Mann's theory. Just last Sunday, about 20,000 Hong Kongers took to the streets in the latest protest calling for universal suffrage in the territory. The protesters were upset at Beijing's announcement last month that they might be able to elect their leader by 2017. Hong Kongers had been pushing for the right to elect their government by 2012.
It is a safe bet that given the chance, millions of people in China would also help prove Mann right.
Contrast this with events here last Saturday, when Taiwanese voted for a new legislature. The outcome saw the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) gain a two-thirds majority in the legislature, giving the party's presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), a huge boost ahead of the March presidential poll.
The KMT backs increasing cross-strait economic ties, arguing that more business with China will help solve what they term "Taiwan's economic malaise."
But despite promises from Ma that he will not talk unification if elected president, the increased business and cultural contact that would occur under a Beijing-friendly KMT government and the sacrifices of sovereignty the KMT will have to make to achieve this will make future expressions of Taiwan's current independent status even more difficult and the drift toward some kind of unification agreement all the more unavoidable.
This could eventually pose a threat to the full democratic rights Taiwanese now enjoy.
Increasing cross-strait business ties and investment will only give China more control over Taiwan's prosperity and will likely result in more wealthy and influential Taiwanese tying their colors to Beijing's mast. People like former United Microelectronics Corp chairman Robert Tsao (曹興誠) bear testament to this.
When Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, tried to institutionalize democratic ideals in the territory ahead of its return to China, some of his most vociferous opponents were the billionaire business barons who considered democracy an unnecessary and unwanted obstacle to their continued wealth accumulation.
Mann points out that a similar phenomenon could occur in China's ruling and newly wealthy middle class. This could prevent the move toward democracy in China that US officials seem convinced increased trade relations will eventually bring.
Taking this into account, Taiwanese could also one day find themselves in the same situation as Hong Kongers, where tycoons who hold influence in Taipei and have a vested interest in China continue to oppose democracy.
Of course, Taiwan's already established democratic system would be difficult for China to dismantle, but with Beijing's relentless arms build-up showing no sign of slowing and its burgeoning economic might bringing other powerful countries to heel, 20 years from now Taiwan may be in no position to resist.
How ironic it would be if Taiwan, the first and only true democracy in an ethnic Chinese country, were to buck the global trend and give its hard-won freedom away.
Taipei Times Editorial, January 18, 2008
"How ironic it would be if Taiwan, the first and only true democracy in an ethnic Chinese country, were to buck the global trend and give its hard-won freedom away."
ironic indeed...
Author James Mann, however, contends in his book The China Fantasy that this is a fallacy and just a convenient sound bite for foreign businesspeople and politicians who wish to ignore the authoritarian nature of China's current regime while taking advantage of its cheap labor.
The frequent demonstrations seen in Hong Kong opposing Beijing's heavy-handed rule and the lack of democratic progress since its handover to China lend credence to Mann's theory. Just last Sunday, about 20,000 Hong Kongers took to the streets in the latest protest calling for universal suffrage in the territory. The protesters were upset at Beijing's announcement last month that they might be able to elect their leader by 2017. Hong Kongers had been pushing for the right to elect their government by 2012.
It is a safe bet that given the chance, millions of people in China would also help prove Mann right.
Contrast this with events here last Saturday, when Taiwanese voted for a new legislature. The outcome saw the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) gain a two-thirds majority in the legislature, giving the party's presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), a huge boost ahead of the March presidential poll.
The KMT backs increasing cross-strait economic ties, arguing that more business with China will help solve what they term "Taiwan's economic malaise."
But despite promises from Ma that he will not talk unification if elected president, the increased business and cultural contact that would occur under a Beijing-friendly KMT government and the sacrifices of sovereignty the KMT will have to make to achieve this will make future expressions of Taiwan's current independent status even more difficult and the drift toward some kind of unification agreement all the more unavoidable.
This could eventually pose a threat to the full democratic rights Taiwanese now enjoy.
Increasing cross-strait business ties and investment will only give China more control over Taiwan's prosperity and will likely result in more wealthy and influential Taiwanese tying their colors to Beijing's mast. People like former United Microelectronics Corp chairman Robert Tsao (曹興誠) bear testament to this.
When Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, tried to institutionalize democratic ideals in the territory ahead of its return to China, some of his most vociferous opponents were the billionaire business barons who considered democracy an unnecessary and unwanted obstacle to their continued wealth accumulation.
Mann points out that a similar phenomenon could occur in China's ruling and newly wealthy middle class. This could prevent the move toward democracy in China that US officials seem convinced increased trade relations will eventually bring.
Taking this into account, Taiwanese could also one day find themselves in the same situation as Hong Kongers, where tycoons who hold influence in Taipei and have a vested interest in China continue to oppose democracy.
Of course, Taiwan's already established democratic system would be difficult for China to dismantle, but with Beijing's relentless arms build-up showing no sign of slowing and its burgeoning economic might bringing other powerful countries to heel, 20 years from now Taiwan may be in no position to resist.
How ironic it would be if Taiwan, the first and only true democracy in an ethnic Chinese country, were to buck the global trend and give its hard-won freedom away.
Taipei Times Editorial, January 18, 2008
"How ironic it would be if Taiwan, the first and only true democracy in an ethnic Chinese country, were to buck the global trend and give its hard-won freedom away."
ironic indeed...
2008年1月16日 星期三
Chinese Predators and Local Ennui
China has done it again, buying a Taiwanese ally with a very large sum of money. It is highly regrettable that 42 years of Taiwanese-Malawi relations apparently meant little to a Malawian government in thrall of US$6 billion. And it is laughable that China continues to attack Taiwanese diplomatic interests with not so much as a response from supporters of the cross-strait "status quo" in the US.
This circus was designed to embarrass the Taiwanese government and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in particular. China signed a memorandum of understanding with Malawi on Dec. 28 in which Malawi said it would adhere to the "one China" principle, but it seems that Malawi was asked to wait until Taiwan's legislative elections were over before announcing the switch -- conveniently, it was also the day Chen embarked on a trip to cement ties with Taiwan's Central American allies.
This is a near replay of July 2002 when Nauru, in a convenient coincidence, announced it would recognize China on the day Chen was sworn in as Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chairman.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) should receive kudos for -- unusually -- speaking with one voice with the DPP government in condemning China's predatory strategy.
However, the KMT is living in a fantasy land of Chinese benevolence judging from his claim yesterday that his "three noes" pledge -- promising no move toward unification or independence and no use of force -- would pave the way for long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait and satisfy Beijing.
In a world of genuine benevolence, Taiwan would have gained international space following the agreement reached between former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) during Lien's visit to China in May 2005.
We're still waiting for any sign of it.
Beijing could also have ended its hunt for Taiwan's allies as a sign of goodwill following KMT Legislator John Chiang's (蔣孝嚴) remarks last August that China would leave the allies alone if Taipei established better relations with Beijing.
In March, two referendums will be held in tandem with the presidential election. One is a DPP-initiated referendum on joining the UN under the name "Taiwan," and the other is a KMT-proposed referendum on "rejoining" the world body using the official name of the Republic of China, or any other "practical" title that would uphold the nation's dignity.
Regardless of which version the public supports, the referendum questions offer Taiwanese a fine opportunity to let the world know that their country wants to be treated with respect and recognized as part of the world community.
If neither referendum passes -- a grave possibility given the KMT's penchant for boycotting plebiscites -- the message would be bleak and difficult to undo: If Taiwanese can't assert themselves and claim a place on the world map, then how can they denounce others for swapping allegiances?
China can and should be criticized for poaching Taiwan's allies, but so should those Taiwanese who can't be bothered to stand up for themselves.
Taipei Times Editorial, January 17, 2008.
This circus was designed to embarrass the Taiwanese government and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in particular. China signed a memorandum of understanding with Malawi on Dec. 28 in which Malawi said it would adhere to the "one China" principle, but it seems that Malawi was asked to wait until Taiwan's legislative elections were over before announcing the switch -- conveniently, it was also the day Chen embarked on a trip to cement ties with Taiwan's Central American allies.
This is a near replay of July 2002 when Nauru, in a convenient coincidence, announced it would recognize China on the day Chen was sworn in as Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chairman.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) should receive kudos for -- unusually -- speaking with one voice with the DPP government in condemning China's predatory strategy.
However, the KMT is living in a fantasy land of Chinese benevolence judging from his claim yesterday that his "three noes" pledge -- promising no move toward unification or independence and no use of force -- would pave the way for long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait and satisfy Beijing.
In a world of genuine benevolence, Taiwan would have gained international space following the agreement reached between former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) during Lien's visit to China in May 2005.
We're still waiting for any sign of it.
Beijing could also have ended its hunt for Taiwan's allies as a sign of goodwill following KMT Legislator John Chiang's (蔣孝嚴) remarks last August that China would leave the allies alone if Taipei established better relations with Beijing.
In March, two referendums will be held in tandem with the presidential election. One is a DPP-initiated referendum on joining the UN under the name "Taiwan," and the other is a KMT-proposed referendum on "rejoining" the world body using the official name of the Republic of China, or any other "practical" title that would uphold the nation's dignity.
Regardless of which version the public supports, the referendum questions offer Taiwanese a fine opportunity to let the world know that their country wants to be treated with respect and recognized as part of the world community.
If neither referendum passes -- a grave possibility given the KMT's penchant for boycotting plebiscites -- the message would be bleak and difficult to undo: If Taiwanese can't assert themselves and claim a place on the world map, then how can they denounce others for swapping allegiances?
China can and should be criticized for poaching Taiwan's allies, but so should those Taiwanese who can't be bothered to stand up for themselves.
Taipei Times Editorial, January 17, 2008.
2008年1月7日 星期一
What's Really Bothering Beijing?
By Gerrit van der Wees
Almost every day, Taiwan is feeling the heat of China's aggression: Beijing's military threat and intimidation, more than 1,000 missiles aimed its way, constant attempts to isolate it internationally and a failure to accept Taiwan as a friendly neighbor.
What is China fighting against? What is driving China's leaders in their obsession with Taiwan? When we go back in history, we see three main reasons.
One is the Chinese Civil War, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fought against the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). This struggle was deeply ingrained in the minds of older leaders of the CCP, and still plays an important role in the thinking of the present leadership. But as the international power and influence of the KMT waned in the 1970s and 1980s, the old hostility was refocused on the new "threat": Taiwan's democracy.
While Taiwan considered its transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s a momentous achievement, the leaders of the PRC perceived it as a threat to the authoritarian system they had built in China.
If the Chinese had ideas similar to those of the Taiwanese, then the rule of the CCP would be finished.
China is thus not fighting Taiwan because the latter wants to remain separate: History shows that most Chinese leaders don't care much whether Taiwan is separate or not. It is an outlying place -- very much like the Northwest Territories for the US -- and not crucial to China's "center of civilization."
The real reason China is fighting Taiwan is because it represents a successful democracy right next door, undermining the CCP's authoritarian "stability."
The second reason that seems to be prevalent in Chinese thinking is to "right the wrongs" caused by two centuries of "humiliation"at the hands of Western countries.
This may have been a factor in the 19th century, after the Opium Wars, when Western states established enclaves along the Chinese coast, but the trials and tribulations of the 20th century were of China's own making: The Chinese Civil War, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were internal Chinese affairs with which the West had little to do.
The third reason for China's hardheaded attitude toward Taiwan is that it thinks Taiwan's close association with the US and the West stands in the way of China becoming a "great power."
The leaders in Beijing have set an ambitious course for China to become a "superpower" along the lines of the US: wielding economic and political influence and power across the globe.
For China's leaders, "possession" of Taiwan is a key element in their geostrategic competition with the US -- and to a lesser extent in their regional competition with Japan.
This is because of Taiwan's strategic location -- straddling the important sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia while keeping China from unfettered access to the deep oceans of the Pacific.
China's threats to Taiwan are thus not caused by Taiwan's efforts to seek its rightful place under the sun, but rather by geostrategic competition with the US. This argument is made eloquently in a recent book titled Why Taiwan? by Alan Wachman of Tufts University. As long as "Taiwan's people seek the dignity of sovereignty and the assurance that so long as they do no harm to the PRC, Beijing will regard the island with neighborly comity," Wachman writes.
He argues that if, on the other hand, one views the issue through the lens of Beijing's geostrategic ambitions, one might come to a very different conclusion. If it sees Taiwan as essential to its security and even more importantly as part of a broader geostrategic competition with the US and Japan, the chance of Beijing resorting to the use of force is much greater.
This has important implications for the US. Another US East Asia researcher, Don Rodgers, recently wrote: "In the United States, policymakers must be careful not to view increasing tensions between China and Taiwan as the outcome of a `trouble-making' government in Taiwan (as they seem far too inclined to do), but rather as one manifestation of an intensifying geostrategic competition between China and the US and Japan."
Let us hope that Washington pays heed.
Gerrit van der Wees is editor at the Washington-based Taiwan Communique.
Almost every day, Taiwan is feeling the heat of China's aggression: Beijing's military threat and intimidation, more than 1,000 missiles aimed its way, constant attempts to isolate it internationally and a failure to accept Taiwan as a friendly neighbor.
What is China fighting against? What is driving China's leaders in their obsession with Taiwan? When we go back in history, we see three main reasons.
One is the Chinese Civil War, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fought against the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). This struggle was deeply ingrained in the minds of older leaders of the CCP, and still plays an important role in the thinking of the present leadership. But as the international power and influence of the KMT waned in the 1970s and 1980s, the old hostility was refocused on the new "threat": Taiwan's democracy.
While Taiwan considered its transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s a momentous achievement, the leaders of the PRC perceived it as a threat to the authoritarian system they had built in China.
If the Chinese had ideas similar to those of the Taiwanese, then the rule of the CCP would be finished.
China is thus not fighting Taiwan because the latter wants to remain separate: History shows that most Chinese leaders don't care much whether Taiwan is separate or not. It is an outlying place -- very much like the Northwest Territories for the US -- and not crucial to China's "center of civilization."
The real reason China is fighting Taiwan is because it represents a successful democracy right next door, undermining the CCP's authoritarian "stability."
The second reason that seems to be prevalent in Chinese thinking is to "right the wrongs" caused by two centuries of "humiliation"at the hands of Western countries.
This may have been a factor in the 19th century, after the Opium Wars, when Western states established enclaves along the Chinese coast, but the trials and tribulations of the 20th century were of China's own making: The Chinese Civil War, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were internal Chinese affairs with which the West had little to do.
The third reason for China's hardheaded attitude toward Taiwan is that it thinks Taiwan's close association with the US and the West stands in the way of China becoming a "great power."
The leaders in Beijing have set an ambitious course for China to become a "superpower" along the lines of the US: wielding economic and political influence and power across the globe.
For China's leaders, "possession" of Taiwan is a key element in their geostrategic competition with the US -- and to a lesser extent in their regional competition with Japan.
This is because of Taiwan's strategic location -- straddling the important sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia while keeping China from unfettered access to the deep oceans of the Pacific.
China's threats to Taiwan are thus not caused by Taiwan's efforts to seek its rightful place under the sun, but rather by geostrategic competition with the US. This argument is made eloquently in a recent book titled Why Taiwan? by Alan Wachman of Tufts University. As long as "Taiwan's people seek the dignity of sovereignty and the assurance that so long as they do no harm to the PRC, Beijing will regard the island with neighborly comity," Wachman writes.
He argues that if, on the other hand, one views the issue through the lens of Beijing's geostrategic ambitions, one might come to a very different conclusion. If it sees Taiwan as essential to its security and even more importantly as part of a broader geostrategic competition with the US and Japan, the chance of Beijing resorting to the use of force is much greater.
This has important implications for the US. Another US East Asia researcher, Don Rodgers, recently wrote: "In the United States, policymakers must be careful not to view increasing tensions between China and Taiwan as the outcome of a `trouble-making' government in Taiwan (as they seem far too inclined to do), but rather as one manifestation of an intensifying geostrategic competition between China and the US and Japan."
Let us hope that Washington pays heed.
Gerrit van der Wees is editor at the Washington-based Taiwan Communique.
2007年12月19日 星期三
Those Underhanded Secret Deals
By Jerome Keating
The more they protest, the more time and verbiage they expend and the more they insist that they respect Taiwan's democracy, the more obvious it becomes. The US State Department, its officials and henchmen seem to have made another secret deal with China to limit and control the democracy and freedom of Taiwan.
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Chairman Raymond Burghardt recently finished up a special trip to Taiwan to talk to both presidential candidates; he also sought reassurances from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) that he would honor his past pledges and do nothing drastic in his last months in office. Earlier, AIT Director Stephen Young visited Chen to also obtain similar assurances. During a round table with reporters on Dec. 6, US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen replayed the worn record of how much the US needed to make its position clear, very clear. We had heard the same lines from US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, NSC Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder and Christensen in September.
Any rational person must wonder at the overkill, concern and effort to clarify ad nauseam that the US cares deeply about Taiwan's democracy -- except that it doesn't want Taiwan to practice it. The issue is Taiwan's UN referendum, a referendum that everyone agrees will have no binding power or consequence. So why all the effort? Shades of US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the sellout king par excellence: Has the US made another secret deal with China and let China define the terms?
Credibility Ranking Zero: Will someone please throw these US officials more straws to grasp at. The lady doth protest too much. While they try to place the burden of sincerity and responsibility on Chen, the spotlight instead focuses on them.
These are the people who repeatedly insist that they have not changed their "one China" policy.
But they have. These are the people who justified war by insisting that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But there weren't. These are the same people who insist that they have always done what is best for Taiwan. But they haven't.
Have you ever wondered why Taiwan is the only country that seems capable of upsetting the fictitious "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait? Have you ever wondered why Taiwan is the only country of the three (China, Taiwan and the US) that is bound to honor its pledges, that Taiwan is the only country that has had to spell out its pledges?
Can anyone clearly state what the US is obligated to do regarding Taiwan and the "status quo"? Can anyone clearly state what China is obligated to do regarding Taiwan and the "status quo"? The burden only falls on Taiwan and evidence shows that this burden comes from a secret deal that Taiwan was not privy to.
US policy on Taiwan and China is vacuous, vague and vapid. It has purposely been kept this way for more than half a century so that no one can clearly define the US' obligations. China, on the other hand, has always insisted that it has no obligations except the right to declare war when it feels offended and that it can move the goal posts that determine what offends it when it so pleases.
That so much effort has been expended over such minutia as Taiwan's UN referendum can only point to one thing: a secret deal with China in which the US contains Taiwan in the ways and minutiae that China wants Taiwan contained.
What exactly could or does the US gain from such a secret deal with China? Could it be a host of cheap products? Port privileges for its navy? Token help with North Korea? A promise of help with Iran after China finishes selling Iran what it needs to build nuclear weapons? What exactly is the US getting out of jumping through these hoops for China and why does it always let China define the terms and limits of the agreements?
This is the same US that does not hesitate to support Kosovo's independence in opposition to Russia. This is the same US that continues to force feed democracy on three disparate groups in Iraq. This is the same US that made secret deals with China prior to the Shanghai Communique.
Burghardt's message ended with the words that new leaders present a new opportunity to solve problems on important issues.
He did not want Chen to cause problems for his successor. It is no wonder that the US shows favoritism for wishy-washy KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who is also China's favorite in the upcoming elections.
However, the US is also going to have a new leadership soon. Will its new president be bound by the secret deals of the past? Will he or she have a new opportunity to solve problems and deal with the important issues of the Taiwan Strait in a new way? Will we even see some new faces in the State Department?
Jerome Keating is a Taiwan-based writer.
The more they protest, the more time and verbiage they expend and the more they insist that they respect Taiwan's democracy, the more obvious it becomes. The US State Department, its officials and henchmen seem to have made another secret deal with China to limit and control the democracy and freedom of Taiwan.
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Chairman Raymond Burghardt recently finished up a special trip to Taiwan to talk to both presidential candidates; he also sought reassurances from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) that he would honor his past pledges and do nothing drastic in his last months in office. Earlier, AIT Director Stephen Young visited Chen to also obtain similar assurances. During a round table with reporters on Dec. 6, US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen replayed the worn record of how much the US needed to make its position clear, very clear. We had heard the same lines from US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, NSC Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder and Christensen in September.
Any rational person must wonder at the overkill, concern and effort to clarify ad nauseam that the US cares deeply about Taiwan's democracy -- except that it doesn't want Taiwan to practice it. The issue is Taiwan's UN referendum, a referendum that everyone agrees will have no binding power or consequence. So why all the effort? Shades of US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the sellout king par excellence: Has the US made another secret deal with China and let China define the terms?
Credibility Ranking Zero: Will someone please throw these US officials more straws to grasp at. The lady doth protest too much. While they try to place the burden of sincerity and responsibility on Chen, the spotlight instead focuses on them.
These are the people who repeatedly insist that they have not changed their "one China" policy.
But they have. These are the people who justified war by insisting that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But there weren't. These are the same people who insist that they have always done what is best for Taiwan. But they haven't.
Have you ever wondered why Taiwan is the only country that seems capable of upsetting the fictitious "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait? Have you ever wondered why Taiwan is the only country of the three (China, Taiwan and the US) that is bound to honor its pledges, that Taiwan is the only country that has had to spell out its pledges?
Can anyone clearly state what the US is obligated to do regarding Taiwan and the "status quo"? Can anyone clearly state what China is obligated to do regarding Taiwan and the "status quo"? The burden only falls on Taiwan and evidence shows that this burden comes from a secret deal that Taiwan was not privy to.
US policy on Taiwan and China is vacuous, vague and vapid. It has purposely been kept this way for more than half a century so that no one can clearly define the US' obligations. China, on the other hand, has always insisted that it has no obligations except the right to declare war when it feels offended and that it can move the goal posts that determine what offends it when it so pleases.
That so much effort has been expended over such minutia as Taiwan's UN referendum can only point to one thing: a secret deal with China in which the US contains Taiwan in the ways and minutiae that China wants Taiwan contained.
What exactly could or does the US gain from such a secret deal with China? Could it be a host of cheap products? Port privileges for its navy? Token help with North Korea? A promise of help with Iran after China finishes selling Iran what it needs to build nuclear weapons? What exactly is the US getting out of jumping through these hoops for China and why does it always let China define the terms and limits of the agreements?
This is the same US that does not hesitate to support Kosovo's independence in opposition to Russia. This is the same US that continues to force feed democracy on three disparate groups in Iraq. This is the same US that made secret deals with China prior to the Shanghai Communique.
Burghardt's message ended with the words that new leaders present a new opportunity to solve problems on important issues.
He did not want Chen to cause problems for his successor. It is no wonder that the US shows favoritism for wishy-washy KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who is also China's favorite in the upcoming elections.
However, the US is also going to have a new leadership soon. Will its new president be bound by the secret deals of the past? Will he or she have a new opportunity to solve problems and deal with the important issues of the Taiwan Strait in a new way? Will we even see some new faces in the State Department?
Jerome Keating is a Taiwan-based writer.
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