By Cheng Ta-chen 鄭大誠, translated by Anna Stiggelbout
On March 3, the US Department of Defense published its annual report Military Power of the People's Republic of China. Apart from a few figures that have changed, the content of the report is largely the same as previous editions.
Chapter Six, which is of the most interest to Taiwan, describes possible courses of action that China's military might take against Taiwan. The possible contingencies are the same as in last year's report: China could move against Taiwan with limited force, in an air and missile campaign, with quarantines and blockades or through an amphibious invasion.
Like last year's report, it says that using limited force and carrying out an air and missile campaign might affect Taiwan's defensive systems and the willingness of the Taiwanese to fight, but when analyzed more closely, these two actions are only a part of, or perhaps a prelude to, a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
If there were no successful follow-up to these military actions, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) wouldn't be able to attain its goal of "reunification" or "liberating Taiwan."
But the authors of this year's report clearly are of the opinion that China's military capability to carry out either of those courses of action has not improved significantly in the past year and has possibly even weakened.
The authors of the report believe that using a blockade or quarantine against Taiwan would be very taxing on the PLA's capabilities.
Also, China is clearly underestimating the international pressure and the possibility of military escalation that could result from a blockade of the Taiwan Strait.
As in previous years, the US Department of Defense is of the opinion that if China chose to launch an amphibious invasion against Taiwan, its main strategy would still be the "Joint Island Landing Campaign." But the report also says an amphibious invasion is still too complicated for the PLA to carry out.
Last year's report was still only hinting that an amphibious invasion would constitute too big of a risk for the Chinese leaders in Zhongnanhai, both politically and militarily, and so China might lack the capability to successfully launch an attack on Taiwan.
This year's report clearly states that if China were to invade Taiwan's outlying islands, this would show its military capability and political resolve, but it could also turn the Taiwanese public against China.
Moreover, this year's report boldly states that it would be beyond the routine training of the PLA to take over an outlying island like Kinmen or Matsu, let alone invade Taiwan itself. Taiwan would only need to implement some "modest target investments" in defense facilities and equipment to be able to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
In the past years, the US army has paid close attention to the actions the PLA is taking in regard to its anti-access forces, which would be used to deter the US army from coming to Taiwan's aid in the case of an invasion.
Some analysts think that by around 2010, China may have sufficient power to launch an anti-access war. But according to this most recent report of the US Department of Defense on China's military power, an anti-access force that could stop the US army from coming to Taiwan's rescue is one thing, but actually invading Taiwan and succeeding in taking over the country is something else entirely.
Cheng Ta-chen is an independent defense analyst.
2008年3月11日 星期二
Taiwan Must Review Security Risks
The recent US Department of Defense report on PRC military modernization is a useful reminder of the challenges posed by China's rise as a major regional power. This year's report is the most detailed and insightful to date and a number of issues are worthy of consideration for Taiwan.
First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.
Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.
For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.
Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.
Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.
Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.
To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?
While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.
With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.
Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?
Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?
An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.
Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.
While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.
As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.
But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.
One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?
In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.
Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.
In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.
For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?
Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.
Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.
Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.
In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.
Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.
In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.
As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.
Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.
The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.
In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.
Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.
Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.
First, the exclusive focus on the dangers of China's military modernization risks diverting attention away from other important security challenges that Taiwan faces.
Most noteworthy is economic security. Given the risks inherent in overreliance on China for sustained economic growth and prosperity, much more could be done to integrate the economy of Taiwan with those of the US, Japan and other Asian countries.
For example, Taiwan could be encouraged to leverage its competitive advantages in information technology and participate in the globalization of the US defense industry through a bilateral defense procurement memorandum of understanding.
Natural disasters, epidemics and terrorism and other extremism, just to name a few, also pose significant challenges to Taiwan's security. While the military challenges are serious, these non-traditional threats may be more imminent and possibly just as lethal to life and prosperity.
Secondly, as China's military becomes more skilled and innovative, defenses become increasingly important. While assessing a stronger Chinese military, the most important considerations are worst-case scenarios and what the responses to those cases would be.
Here are a few ideas that could serve as starting points for further debate.
To begin with, should Taiwan assume US intervention as the basis for strategic and operational planning?
While there is good reason to hope and plan for potential ad hoc coalition operations with intervening US forces, the Taiwan Relations Act is no substitute for a mutual defense treaty.
With this in mind, and in the absence of a formal alliance commitment, prudence seems to suggest that independent defense should serve as a formal planning assumption. Hope for the best, yet plan for the worst.
Another important question: What is the best way to ensure that the perceived and real costs to the individuals in Beijing making an ill-advised decision to use military force outweigh any perceived benefit?
Put another way, and with independent defense as a guiding principle, how could one ensure that a future Chinese leadership understands that it would be unsuccessful in any attempt to forcibly oust a democratically elected leadership, physically occupy an entire island and rule through proxies at the central and local levels?
An amphibious invasion is the least likely yet most dangerous scenario.
Chinese decision makers could resort to coercive uses of force, short of a full scale invasion, in order to achieve limited political objectives. However, the outcome of coercive campaigns can not be predicted with any degree of certainty.
While gradual annexation through peaceful means may be preferable, annihilation and occupation could one day be perceived as the only means to victory.
As time goes on, China's ability to physically occupy Taiwan and force a regime change may become easier. And if it is easier, such a course of action could become more tempting.
But victory could still be elusive, regardless of how strong China's military is. History is replete with examples of militarily superior powers losing to weaker ones.
One question worth asking is why. What strategies led to the Davids of the world overcoming the Goliaths and how can they be applied to Taiwan's defense?
In light of China's one-child policy, parents may not be as willing as they used to be to sacrifice their sons for peripheral interests.
Taking Switzerland's defense strategy as an example, the ultimate solution to ensuring national will -- the center of gravity in any future cross-strait conflict -- may lie in being confident that China would never be able to take and hold the island.
In light of China's growing military power, there are a range of other questions that could be asked.
For example, how could Taiwan best ensure that its people, including those responsible for defending the island, would be able to maintain situational awareness and communicate with others on the island and with those abroad in the face of a dedicated campaign to shut down sensors and means of communication?
Perhaps no other issue is worthy of more attention. Just as a human's cognitive and central nervous system is critical for sensing and responding to threats, the ability to know what's going on and communicate is fundamental.
Yet this ability is often taken for granted until it is lost.
Second, how can the People's Liberation Army (PLA) be denied unimpeded control of the skies over Taiwan and adjacent waters? While it may be difficult to sustain operations indefinitely, air and air/missile defense assets may be critical in resolving a conflict in its early stages.
In a protracted resistance, it may be within Taiwan's ability to hold PLA pilots at bay for an extended period of time. Elements in China controlling offensive air and missile operations against Taiwan, if they could be found, may also be targeted.
Retaining the ability to strike such targets in China is necessary for sufficient self-defense, and US release of systems capable of this mission would be consistent with the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act.
Third, how can sea lines of communication linking key harbors with international waters be maintained? Given the PLA's growing maritime power, including submarines and advanced mines, such a task appears daunting.
In addition to survivable command, control and communications, there is no substitute for advanced diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare architecture.
As this much-needed naval capability is developed and deployed, consideration also could be given to fielding a large fleet of small, multi-purpose civilian submersibles for commercial, scientific and surveillance purposes.
Finally, the growing PRC military threat suggests that further adjustments may be necessary to the US-Taiwan defense relationship, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Abrogation of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty and withdrawal of the US military presence on the island were premised upon China's commitment to a peaceful approach to resolving differences with Taiwan.
The most visible demonstration of a peaceful commitment is its force posture. Therefore, as the threat to the people of Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership grows, so should the depth and breadth of US defense and security relations with Taiwan. A congressionally mandated policy review group should assess and recommend a range of new initiatives that could further assist Taiwan in its self-defense and enhance the ability of the US military, should it be called upon to do so, to operate with Taiwan's defense establishment as ad hoc coalition partners.
In addition, if Taiwan's formal requests for defense articles and services are not being given proper attention, resurrecting the annual Arms Sales Talks may be justified.
Finally, in order to remain aware of other important security needs, and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, congressionally mandated reporting on Taiwan's economic security is worth considering.
Mark Stokes is a former senior director for China, Mongolia and Taiwan at the US Department of Defense. He is currently the executive director of The Project 2049 Institute and a member of the Taiwan Policy Working Group.
2008年2月18日 星期一
Are Private Arms Firms a Concern?
The revelation last week that Taiwan Goal, a private arms company, had been created with an initial investment of NT$200 million (US$6.3 million) -- NT$90 million of which came from the Ministry of National Defense -- raised alarm in some quarters. Why the hush-hush business, some asked, while others seemed shocked to learn that the private sector could get involved in national defense.
But more ink was spilled on the matter than was necessary. A quick look at the US defense establishment, to use one example, shows us that the private sector in democratic societies has always played a role in weapons manufacturing. The private sector's distance from government bureaucracy, for one, as well as the dynamics of the market, gives it more flexibility and effectiveness in the development of weapons.
From Crown Corporations in Canada to the RAND Corp think tank in the US (created by the US Air Force, then a division of Douglas Aircraft), governments have a long history of farming out their work to private companies. Even consumer appliance manufacturers like GE are major weapons manufacturers, a fact that most Americans are unaware of.
Given Taiwan's unusual political situation and how this affects its ability to acquire the weapons it needs to defend itself, the creation of a private firm makes a lot of sense. Such an arrangement will, for one, facilitate contacts at the corporate level and thereby counter the hesitation of states to discuss arms sales with Taiwan at the state level.
The laws of the free market, rather than pure politics, will decide if, when and from whom Taiwan acquires weapons.
This, however, does not mean that all of a sudden Taiwan will be able to acquire whatever weapons it desires, as sensitive technology, even that which is developed by foreign private companies, remains subject to arms control mechanisms that are the remit of governments. Nor does it mean that Beijing will not pressure governments into preventing their private sector from cooperating with Taiwan. Nevertheless, given the greater independence of the private sector and the pull of business interests, it should facilitate Taiwan's efforts to acquire weapons and give it more flexibility as to where it buys them. In other words, it would diminish Taiwan's reliance on US-made weapons.
Where Taiwan Goal promises to be of the greatest benefit to Taiwan, however, is in development, as this will help it circumvent arms control mechanisms altogether, because Taiwan itself would be involved in the development. Such was the case with the "Ching Kuo" Indigenous Defense Fighter -- whose development in Taiwan (a joint US-Taiwan venture) was a compromise, as Washington was loath to sell Taipei the advanced F-20 aircraft it wanted. It will also help it to customize weapons to meet its specific needs.
Still, this new endeavor is not without risks, and the appropriate oversights must be put in place to ensure that a nascent private defense industry in Taiwan does not see arms exports as its raison d'etre, as would a military-industrial complex. There is enough proliferation out there without Taiwan adding to it.
In other words, as long as Taiwan Goal retains the goal of helping Taiwan defend itself, it will be welcome. That the government has a hand in the company could ensure the company doesn't lose sight of that goal.
Taipei Times Editorial, February 19, 2008.
But more ink was spilled on the matter than was necessary. A quick look at the US defense establishment, to use one example, shows us that the private sector in democratic societies has always played a role in weapons manufacturing. The private sector's distance from government bureaucracy, for one, as well as the dynamics of the market, gives it more flexibility and effectiveness in the development of weapons.
From Crown Corporations in Canada to the RAND Corp think tank in the US (created by the US Air Force, then a division of Douglas Aircraft), governments have a long history of farming out their work to private companies. Even consumer appliance manufacturers like GE are major weapons manufacturers, a fact that most Americans are unaware of.
Given Taiwan's unusual political situation and how this affects its ability to acquire the weapons it needs to defend itself, the creation of a private firm makes a lot of sense. Such an arrangement will, for one, facilitate contacts at the corporate level and thereby counter the hesitation of states to discuss arms sales with Taiwan at the state level.
The laws of the free market, rather than pure politics, will decide if, when and from whom Taiwan acquires weapons.
This, however, does not mean that all of a sudden Taiwan will be able to acquire whatever weapons it desires, as sensitive technology, even that which is developed by foreign private companies, remains subject to arms control mechanisms that are the remit of governments. Nor does it mean that Beijing will not pressure governments into preventing their private sector from cooperating with Taiwan. Nevertheless, given the greater independence of the private sector and the pull of business interests, it should facilitate Taiwan's efforts to acquire weapons and give it more flexibility as to where it buys them. In other words, it would diminish Taiwan's reliance on US-made weapons.
Where Taiwan Goal promises to be of the greatest benefit to Taiwan, however, is in development, as this will help it circumvent arms control mechanisms altogether, because Taiwan itself would be involved in the development. Such was the case with the "Ching Kuo" Indigenous Defense Fighter -- whose development in Taiwan (a joint US-Taiwan venture) was a compromise, as Washington was loath to sell Taipei the advanced F-20 aircraft it wanted. It will also help it to customize weapons to meet its specific needs.
Still, this new endeavor is not without risks, and the appropriate oversights must be put in place to ensure that a nascent private defense industry in Taiwan does not see arms exports as its raison d'etre, as would a military-industrial complex. There is enough proliferation out there without Taiwan adding to it.
In other words, as long as Taiwan Goal retains the goal of helping Taiwan defend itself, it will be welcome. That the government has a hand in the company could ensure the company doesn't lose sight of that goal.
Taipei Times Editorial, February 19, 2008.
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