By Bruce Jacobs 家博
'If Ma pushes a Taiwan-centric, reformist agenda, the people of Taiwan will unite behind him. If, on the other hand, he is weak toward China and relies on Beijing's good will, the future of Taiwan will be bleak.'
Chinese Nationalist Party presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) landslide victory confirms Taiwan's democracy is thriving. Many citizens who voted for President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in 2000 and 2004 blamed Chen and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the perceived failures of the past eight years. Thus, they quite rationally decided to vote for Ma. In many ways, this voter dissatisfaction with the DPP government continues the trends shown in the legislative election two months ago.
Ma must realize that his massive victory does not come from his cross-strait policies such as the "cross-strait common market." In fact, the most successful part of DPP candidate Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) campaign was his dismantling of vice-presidential candidate Vincent Siew's (蕭萬長) "cross-strait common market" idea, a fact Ma realized as he repeatedly retreated on the common market policy. Tibet also showed the naivete of Ma's cross-strait policy.
Rather, Ma's victory was a defeat for the DPP's economic policies and for its perceived corruption. Ma must bear this in mind as he goes forward.
Ma faces some difficult decisions ahead of his inauguration date on May 20. His most difficult heritage is his reputation for making contradictory statements at different times. For example, when running for re-election as mayor of Taipei in 2002, he told me personally and then said in a major press conference that Taiwan's future should be decided by the 23 million people of Taiwan. Recently, he reiterated this stance. Yet, on Feb. 12, 2006, and at other times, he said the future of Taiwan should be decided by the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Ma has also emphasized the threats posed by China and has even declared that the withdrawal of China's missiles is a precondition for cross-strait talks. Yet, at other times, he has expressed the opinion that if Taiwan is friendly to China, Beijing will in turn demonstrate friendship for Taiwan and give Taiwan more international space.
Clearly, China's repeated repression in Tibet, including the recent crackdown, has made a mockery of its original 1951 Treaty of Amity with Tibet. This clearly has lessons for Taiwan.
The KMT that Ma leads is very divided. On one hand there are the old, China-centric conservatives, many of whom go back to the dictatorial period. On the other hand, there are the more Taiwan-centric reformers. Ma is a bridge between these groups and frequently leaves both unhappy. Thus, the old conservatives refused to accept Ma's suggestion that the KMT publicly accept defeat in 2004 and they criticized him when he sold the old KMT party headquarters and old party-run enterprises.
So far, he has also proved insufficiently reformist for the younger members of the KMT. Bringing People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) back into the KMT is not a reform move. Neither is giving prominence to former vice president and KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰). And putting such recent criminals as KMT Legislator Chiu Yi (邱毅) high on the party ticket for the legislature does not send a reform message either
I recommend to Ma that he ally with the reformers in the KMT. Thus, for example, he should not appoint KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kun (江丙坤), a former minister of economic affairs, as premier. Chiang, who is already 75 years old, lacks a reformist spirit. As deputy speaker of the legislature, he had a military honor guard snap to attention every time he or his guests entered his chambers. Such behavior belongs in a dictatorship, not a democracy. In addition, Chiang lacks any notion of reform or of a global world.
Rather, Ma should appoint a younger Taiwan-centric, reformist administrator as premier. One such person would be Taoyuan County Commissioner Chu Li-lun (朱立倫), who has led a large county and implemented a reformist strategy. Chu speaks excellent English, has traveled widely and would present an excellent face for Taiwan to the world. In addition, domestically he would push reform in Taiwan's bureaucratic administrative system. Provided he is healthy, Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強) might be another possible premier.
In the KMT itself, Ma must also push reform. For example, he must implement separation of the party and government. Thus, the president and Cabinet ministers should not be members of the KMT's Central Standing Committee. Such reforms are essential to reforming the KMT and turning it into a genuine democratic party.
Ma should remember his statement in the second TV debate, when he said he regretted that the KMT in its eight years in opposition had failed to reform. This statement was never followed up in the campaign, but he should also make party reform a matter of priority.
If Ma pushes a Taiwan-centric, reformist agenda, the people of Taiwan will unite behind him. If, on the other hand, he is weak toward China and relies on Beijing's goodwill, the future of Taiwan will be bleak. Only with a genuinely reformist agenda can Ma fulfill his major campaign slogan of "going forward."
Bruce Jacobs is professor of Asian languages and studies and director of the Taiwan Research Unit at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.
2008年3月23日 星期日
2008年3月20日 星期四
Two Rivers, Two Mayors and A Very Clear Choice
By Matthew Lien
The recent election of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak was attributed in part to his restoration of a river running through Seoul. When Lee was elected mayor of Seoul in 2001, one of his key campaign promises was to remove the freeway covering the Cheonggyecheon River and to restore the waterway as a symbol of the city's beauty.
This caused me to reflect on Taiwan's presidential election and the first time I met Kaohsiung environmental activists and academics involved in the clean-up of the Kaoping River.
In 1999, I was appointed "Ambassador to the Aboriginal Cultures of the Kaoping River" by the Kaohsiung County Government and was given a tour of the most beautiful and most polluted sections of the river. I was also shown what efforts were being made to improve it and Kaohsiung City's Love River.
Years later, the results are impressive and the credit must go partly to the commitment of Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), who was at the time mayor of Kaohsiung.
Both of these rivers are widely known success stories, illustrating the importance of environmentalism and community development.
By contrast, I was invited several years ago by the Taipei City Government when Chinese Nationalist Party presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was mayor to tour the Tamsui River. The Department of Cultural Affairs director at the time, Lung Ying-tai (龍應台), and I took a one-hour tour of the river. Infamous for its severe pollution, a stench rose from the water as we climbed into small boats.
Accompanied by reporters, we saw dead pigs float by in the water, which can fairly be described as toxic. This was clearly an atrocity against the environment and allowing it to continue unchecked was a grievous failure of government at all levels.
Lung asked for my recommendations, which I enthusiastically provided based on my river conservation work in Canada with the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS), Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the Yukon Conservation Society and Friends of Yukon Rivers.
I described in detail an annual river festival that should be held on the banks of the Tamsui River, featuring original music and works by local artists portraying their impressions of the river. A CD and a coffee-table book could be published annually to help fund the festival and educate more people about the issue.
I also suggested that academics and water specialists be involved in the festival, updating the public on the pollution and its causes and documenting any changes in water quality.
They would also suggest which government departments should take responsibility for enforcing laws that penalize offenders and correct the problem. They could issue "report cards" to those departments.
I felt this would bring media attention, increase government accountability and inspire government action.
Lung supported my proposals and we presented the plan to the media.
Years later, the Tamsui River remains one of the most polluted in the country. All the talk of improvements seem to have been nothing more than a media exercise. It looked great on TV, but it resulted in little or nothing being done by Ma's administration.
As Taiwan goes to the polls, I can't help but recall my personal experiences with the two candidates and the adage: "By their fruits will you know them."
As one who believes that government officials bear the responsibility for the entire community and environment in their jurisdiction, I trust in the rivers to endorse the candidate who is best to navigate the currents of change facing Taiwan.
Matthew Lien is an environmentalist and musician from Canada.
The recent election of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak was attributed in part to his restoration of a river running through Seoul. When Lee was elected mayor of Seoul in 2001, one of his key campaign promises was to remove the freeway covering the Cheonggyecheon River and to restore the waterway as a symbol of the city's beauty.
This caused me to reflect on Taiwan's presidential election and the first time I met Kaohsiung environmental activists and academics involved in the clean-up of the Kaoping River.
In 1999, I was appointed "Ambassador to the Aboriginal Cultures of the Kaoping River" by the Kaohsiung County Government and was given a tour of the most beautiful and most polluted sections of the river. I was also shown what efforts were being made to improve it and Kaohsiung City's Love River.
Years later, the results are impressive and the credit must go partly to the commitment of Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), who was at the time mayor of Kaohsiung.
Both of these rivers are widely known success stories, illustrating the importance of environmentalism and community development.
By contrast, I was invited several years ago by the Taipei City Government when Chinese Nationalist Party presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was mayor to tour the Tamsui River. The Department of Cultural Affairs director at the time, Lung Ying-tai (龍應台), and I took a one-hour tour of the river. Infamous for its severe pollution, a stench rose from the water as we climbed into small boats.
Accompanied by reporters, we saw dead pigs float by in the water, which can fairly be described as toxic. This was clearly an atrocity against the environment and allowing it to continue unchecked was a grievous failure of government at all levels.
Lung asked for my recommendations, which I enthusiastically provided based on my river conservation work in Canada with the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS), Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the Yukon Conservation Society and Friends of Yukon Rivers.
I described in detail an annual river festival that should be held on the banks of the Tamsui River, featuring original music and works by local artists portraying their impressions of the river. A CD and a coffee-table book could be published annually to help fund the festival and educate more people about the issue.
I also suggested that academics and water specialists be involved in the festival, updating the public on the pollution and its causes and documenting any changes in water quality.
They would also suggest which government departments should take responsibility for enforcing laws that penalize offenders and correct the problem. They could issue "report cards" to those departments.
I felt this would bring media attention, increase government accountability and inspire government action.
Lung supported my proposals and we presented the plan to the media.
Years later, the Tamsui River remains one of the most polluted in the country. All the talk of improvements seem to have been nothing more than a media exercise. It looked great on TV, but it resulted in little or nothing being done by Ma's administration.
As Taiwan goes to the polls, I can't help but recall my personal experiences with the two candidates and the adage: "By their fruits will you know them."
As one who believes that government officials bear the responsibility for the entire community and environment in their jurisdiction, I trust in the rivers to endorse the candidate who is best to navigate the currents of change facing Taiwan.
Matthew Lien is an environmentalist and musician from Canada.
It's Use It or Lose It on Saturday
Anyone who believed that China respects Taiwanese people should have been roused from their stupor after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) on Tuesday reiterated Beijing's line that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.
The timing of Wen's comments -- concurrent with Beijing's bloody crackdown on protesting Tibetans -- drives home the need for Taiwanese to vote in Saturday's referendum and make it known that Taiwan is not a province of China.
Whether one supports the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) proposal on joining the UN under the name "Taiwan," or the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) version of rejoining the UN with the official title of the Republic of China or any other "practical" title -- or both -- the public should make its voice heard by participating in the referendum process.
The more Taiwanese democracy draws the attention of the international community, the better it can demonstrate that Taiwan is a sovereign nation.
Wen also said that Taiwan's referendums on UN membership would threaten peace and stability for the Pacific region and deliver a major strike against Taiwan's interests.
Look who's talking. Which government has hundreds of missiles aimed across the Taiwan Strait, creating a situation that has been called a potential flashpoint by international observers? Which government is "threatening peace and stability in the region" with a massive military build-up that draws concern not only from neighboring countries but also from those on the other side of the globe, such as the US and the UK?
And how could a simple exercise in basic human rights in a democratic country constitute a strike against its interests?
Taiwan has come a long way since the days of authoritarian rule. Perhaps some people have started to take democracy for granted, just as one might forget the oxygen in the air. But how miserable it would be if the air of freedom was suddenly sucked away.
Taiwanese know that democracy must be respected, perhaps with the exception of those politicians who urge the public to abandon their privileges and boycott referendums even as people in other corners of the world die for freedom.
Clinging to Wen's coattails, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen also spoke on Tuesday against the referendums, branding them "pointless and destabilizing" and "unnecessary and unhelpful."
Wen and Christensen simply will not concede that Taiwanese democracy is an issue for Taiwanese.
On Saturday, Taiwan has the opportunity to show the world just how different it is from autocratic China.
The issue is all the more important after the UN Office of Legal Affairs on Tuesday again snubbed an expression of support by Taiwan's allies for the nation's admission into the world body.
The new government to be formed on May 20 may very well give up on the UN bid if neither referendum succeeds. Indeed, how can Taiwan ask its allies to speak for it if the nation doesn't stand up for itself on Saturday?
Taipei Times Editorial, March 20, 2008.
The timing of Wen's comments -- concurrent with Beijing's bloody crackdown on protesting Tibetans -- drives home the need for Taiwanese to vote in Saturday's referendum and make it known that Taiwan is not a province of China.
Whether one supports the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) proposal on joining the UN under the name "Taiwan," or the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) version of rejoining the UN with the official title of the Republic of China or any other "practical" title -- or both -- the public should make its voice heard by participating in the referendum process.
The more Taiwanese democracy draws the attention of the international community, the better it can demonstrate that Taiwan is a sovereign nation.
Wen also said that Taiwan's referendums on UN membership would threaten peace and stability for the Pacific region and deliver a major strike against Taiwan's interests.
Look who's talking. Which government has hundreds of missiles aimed across the Taiwan Strait, creating a situation that has been called a potential flashpoint by international observers? Which government is "threatening peace and stability in the region" with a massive military build-up that draws concern not only from neighboring countries but also from those on the other side of the globe, such as the US and the UK?
And how could a simple exercise in basic human rights in a democratic country constitute a strike against its interests?
Taiwan has come a long way since the days of authoritarian rule. Perhaps some people have started to take democracy for granted, just as one might forget the oxygen in the air. But how miserable it would be if the air of freedom was suddenly sucked away.
Taiwanese know that democracy must be respected, perhaps with the exception of those politicians who urge the public to abandon their privileges and boycott referendums even as people in other corners of the world die for freedom.
Clinging to Wen's coattails, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen also spoke on Tuesday against the referendums, branding them "pointless and destabilizing" and "unnecessary and unhelpful."
Wen and Christensen simply will not concede that Taiwanese democracy is an issue for Taiwanese.
On Saturday, Taiwan has the opportunity to show the world just how different it is from autocratic China.
The issue is all the more important after the UN Office of Legal Affairs on Tuesday again snubbed an expression of support by Taiwan's allies for the nation's admission into the world body.
The new government to be formed on May 20 may very well give up on the UN bid if neither referendum succeeds. Indeed, how can Taiwan ask its allies to speak for it if the nation doesn't stand up for itself on Saturday?
Taipei Times Editorial, March 20, 2008.
2008年3月18日 星期二
Ma Unclear on Chinese Diplomas
By Tung Chen-yuan 童振源, translated by Angela Hong
With only a few days to the presidential election, we're still seeing Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) dodge and deny various important policies that he had previously proposed, including the "cross-strait common market" and recognition of Chinese diplomas.
As election day arrives, Ma is purposefully distorting his own proposals and does not dare to stand up for or defend his own policies -- to the point of accusing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) of discrediting him.
Take the issue of whether the government should recognize Chinese diplomas for example: This is a serious public policy concern, and Ma should give a clear explanation to the voters.
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Hsieh have both clearly said that they are unwilling to recognize Chinese diplomas. KMT and People First Party legislators have repeatedly demanded that the government do otherwise. They have done all they can to pressure the government and they often encourage Taiwanese students to seek education in China.
In April 2006, after the Chinese Communist Party-KMT economic forums, Lai Shyh-bao (賴士葆), a KMT legislator and an important member of the Ma camp, immediately pushed for a petition in the legislature and successfully changed Article 22 of the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (兩岸人民關係條例), demanding that the government recognize Chinese diplomas obtained by Taiwanese students so that they can qualify for professional and government examinations and be allowed to work in the Taiwanese education system.
On April 26, 2006, Ma, as the chairman of the KMT, promised that the party would push for the recognition of Chinese diplomas and complimented Cheng Kung University president Wu Jing (吳京) for daring to recommend the recognition of Chinese diplomas while minister of education.
On April 28, Ma went so far as to say that if the future chair of the Mainland Affairs Council had a diploma from Beijing University, then the two sides could better communicate, and cited this as a supporting argument for his proposal of diploma recognition.
After becoming the KMT's presidential candidate, Ma, in a speech at National Chung Hsing University on June 18 last year, criticized the DPP government's refusal to recognize Chinese diplomas as an isolationist policy.
Regardless of whether one supports recognizing Chinese diplomas or not, as a presidential candidate, Ma should explain himself clearly to Taiwanese voters.
When Hsieh criticized the potential impact of Ma's proposal to recognize Chinese diplomas, Ma responded that Hsieh was twisting the truth.
On Feb. 29, after three years of openly proposing that Taiwan recognize Chinese diplomas, Ma amended the proposal for the first time, claiming that while Chinese diplomas would be recognized, people with Chinese diplomas would not be allowed to take examinations for professional qualifications. This obscures the focus of the policy debate and goes against Ma's original intent.
On March 8, Ma changed tack again and said that his proposal to recognize Chinese diplomas was aimed at facilitating cross-strait academic exchange, since otherwise it would be unreasonable to have to consider professors of Beijing University as uneducated if they came to Taiwan. Then Ma altered the focus further by emphasizing that he would not allow Chinese nationals to take qualification exams in Taiwan.
From demanding that the government recognize Chinese diplomas, to not allowing holders of Chinese diplomas to take professional examinations, to claiming that Chinese professors need to have diplomas to conduct academic exchanges in Taiwan, to not allowing Chinese nationals to take professional examinations in Taiwan -- Ma is constantly changing his position.
The pan-blue camp already controls almost three quarters of the legislature. If Ma becomes president, no one would be able to stop the government from recognizing Chinese diplomas.
Mr. Ma, please demonstrate your accountability and character by explaining and defending your policies: What is the purpose, and what would be the result of recognizing Chinese diplomas? Don't obscure and redirect the focus, and don't lie to voters just to become president.
Tung Chen-yuan is an assistant professor at the Sun Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities at National Chengchi University.
With only a few days to the presidential election, we're still seeing Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) dodge and deny various important policies that he had previously proposed, including the "cross-strait common market" and recognition of Chinese diplomas.
As election day arrives, Ma is purposefully distorting his own proposals and does not dare to stand up for or defend his own policies -- to the point of accusing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) of discrediting him.
Take the issue of whether the government should recognize Chinese diplomas for example: This is a serious public policy concern, and Ma should give a clear explanation to the voters.
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Hsieh have both clearly said that they are unwilling to recognize Chinese diplomas. KMT and People First Party legislators have repeatedly demanded that the government do otherwise. They have done all they can to pressure the government and they often encourage Taiwanese students to seek education in China.
In April 2006, after the Chinese Communist Party-KMT economic forums, Lai Shyh-bao (賴士葆), a KMT legislator and an important member of the Ma camp, immediately pushed for a petition in the legislature and successfully changed Article 22 of the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (兩岸人民關係條例), demanding that the government recognize Chinese diplomas obtained by Taiwanese students so that they can qualify for professional and government examinations and be allowed to work in the Taiwanese education system.
On April 26, 2006, Ma, as the chairman of the KMT, promised that the party would push for the recognition of Chinese diplomas and complimented Cheng Kung University president Wu Jing (吳京) for daring to recommend the recognition of Chinese diplomas while minister of education.
On April 28, Ma went so far as to say that if the future chair of the Mainland Affairs Council had a diploma from Beijing University, then the two sides could better communicate, and cited this as a supporting argument for his proposal of diploma recognition.
After becoming the KMT's presidential candidate, Ma, in a speech at National Chung Hsing University on June 18 last year, criticized the DPP government's refusal to recognize Chinese diplomas as an isolationist policy.
Regardless of whether one supports recognizing Chinese diplomas or not, as a presidential candidate, Ma should explain himself clearly to Taiwanese voters.
When Hsieh criticized the potential impact of Ma's proposal to recognize Chinese diplomas, Ma responded that Hsieh was twisting the truth.
On Feb. 29, after three years of openly proposing that Taiwan recognize Chinese diplomas, Ma amended the proposal for the first time, claiming that while Chinese diplomas would be recognized, people with Chinese diplomas would not be allowed to take examinations for professional qualifications. This obscures the focus of the policy debate and goes against Ma's original intent.
On March 8, Ma changed tack again and said that his proposal to recognize Chinese diplomas was aimed at facilitating cross-strait academic exchange, since otherwise it would be unreasonable to have to consider professors of Beijing University as uneducated if they came to Taiwan. Then Ma altered the focus further by emphasizing that he would not allow Chinese nationals to take qualification exams in Taiwan.
From demanding that the government recognize Chinese diplomas, to not allowing holders of Chinese diplomas to take professional examinations, to claiming that Chinese professors need to have diplomas to conduct academic exchanges in Taiwan, to not allowing Chinese nationals to take professional examinations in Taiwan -- Ma is constantly changing his position.
The pan-blue camp already controls almost three quarters of the legislature. If Ma becomes president, no one would be able to stop the government from recognizing Chinese diplomas.
Mr. Ma, please demonstrate your accountability and character by explaining and defending your policies: What is the purpose, and what would be the result of recognizing Chinese diplomas? Don't obscure and redirect the focus, and don't lie to voters just to become president.
Tung Chen-yuan is an assistant professor at the Sun Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities at National Chengchi University.
Time to End the Media's Distortion of the Truth
By Lillian Wang 王泰俐, translated by Eddy Chang
The economy has been the main focus of the presidential campaign. In addition to the unfavorable domestic and global economic situation, this is the result of the "relative deprivation" created by some media outlets in recent years.
They have used the public's enthusiasm for comparison to generate a sense of envy if others have something that they do not; or a sense of frustration if people believe they deserve something that they do not have.
The manipulation of "relative deprivation" has successfully dominated the campaign, crowding out other issues. The influence of the media on this issue should not be underestimated.
By controlling the social atmosphere, the media is able to shape public opinion in such a way that it can achieve predictable results.
Even voters who aren't particularly interested in the economy -- preferring to focus on Taiwan's democratic development, sovereignty and future direction -- also suffer deeply from "relative deprivation." The issues they value have been overlooked by much of the media, as if they don't exist. This is also why the Intellectuals' Alliance has attempted to provide diverse options for thought to voters before the election.
Much of the public has a sense of "relative deprivation" because of the media's unbalanced reporting, which has been lacking in diversity since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000.
Take the major political events and social conflicts for example. Certain media channels report only parts of such stories to create a so-called "social reality" that meets their own objectives.
The public has been deprived of its right to know the truth. The biased coverage of the intrusion into DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) campaign headquarters by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers last Wednesday was an excellent example of this kind of manipulation.
Judging from the media's preset issues, the interpretation of both political and economic events, the partial reporting of certain news and political commentary shows, there appears to be a large gap between the supporters of the two camps in terms of access to media information, an important social resource.
Taiwan will elect a new president on Saturday. Some media outlets are portraying the political situation as the coming of a "new dawn."
However, given the prevailing media bias, we can hardly be so optimistic. If KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is elected, the media's practice of "what we say counts" will only worsen. Media resource distribution may even become more uneven.
But if Hsieh is elected, couldn't such uneven distribution be improved in the face of a ruling minority and an opposition majority?
Now is the time to keep such "relative deprivation" by the media from being employed again in the next election, causing even more social conflict.
Lillian Wang is an associate professor of journalism at National Chengchi University.
The economy has been the main focus of the presidential campaign. In addition to the unfavorable domestic and global economic situation, this is the result of the "relative deprivation" created by some media outlets in recent years.
They have used the public's enthusiasm for comparison to generate a sense of envy if others have something that they do not; or a sense of frustration if people believe they deserve something that they do not have.
The manipulation of "relative deprivation" has successfully dominated the campaign, crowding out other issues. The influence of the media on this issue should not be underestimated.
By controlling the social atmosphere, the media is able to shape public opinion in such a way that it can achieve predictable results.
Even voters who aren't particularly interested in the economy -- preferring to focus on Taiwan's democratic development, sovereignty and future direction -- also suffer deeply from "relative deprivation." The issues they value have been overlooked by much of the media, as if they don't exist. This is also why the Intellectuals' Alliance has attempted to provide diverse options for thought to voters before the election.
Much of the public has a sense of "relative deprivation" because of the media's unbalanced reporting, which has been lacking in diversity since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000.
Take the major political events and social conflicts for example. Certain media channels report only parts of such stories to create a so-called "social reality" that meets their own objectives.
The public has been deprived of its right to know the truth. The biased coverage of the intrusion into DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) campaign headquarters by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers last Wednesday was an excellent example of this kind of manipulation.
Judging from the media's preset issues, the interpretation of both political and economic events, the partial reporting of certain news and political commentary shows, there appears to be a large gap between the supporters of the two camps in terms of access to media information, an important social resource.
Taiwan will elect a new president on Saturday. Some media outlets are portraying the political situation as the coming of a "new dawn."
However, given the prevailing media bias, we can hardly be so optimistic. If KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is elected, the media's practice of "what we say counts" will only worsen. Media resource distribution may even become more uneven.
But if Hsieh is elected, couldn't such uneven distribution be improved in the face of a ruling minority and an opposition majority?
Now is the time to keep such "relative deprivation" by the media from being employed again in the next election, causing even more social conflict.
Lillian Wang is an associate professor of journalism at National Chengchi University.
2008年3月17日 星期一
Has Ma Ying-Jeou Seen the Light?
It seemed like a welcome shift last week when Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said that the fate of Taiwan should be decided by Taiwanese alone. Ma reiterated that position in newspaper ads and signed a declaration condemning the "Anti-Secession" Law enacted by China in 2005 or any other policies that would "hurt the Taiwanese people's feelings."
Even Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) has applauded Ma's apparent turnaround, the same Ma who, in 2006, had argued that the future of Taiwan should be decided by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Whether this rhetorical shift is heartfelt -- a coming out of sorts, a la former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) in the 1990s -- or mere politicking has yet to be clarified, but the fact remains that Ma is saying these things publicly and within earshot of Beijing. It wouldn't be the first time in the history of democratic politics that, as election day looms, parties drift toward the center.
And in Taiwan, the center is the "status quo." However uncomfortable it is, the "status quo" is, ironically, quite comfortable. It is the invisible enemy we know rather than the unknown of a sudden shift. It's also a vote-winner, as maintaining that comfortable level of uncertainty seems to be what Taiwanese of all stripes want most.
Welcome as Ma's "determination to defend Taiwan's sovereignty" might be -- and let us assume, for the sake of argument, that he means what he said -- his vow to create friendly cross-strait relations might be more difficult to achieve than he thinks. For upon hearing his comments, Beijing could be forgiven for accusing Ma of himself "heightening cross-strait tensions," in similar fashion to what Ma in the same breath accused the DPP of doing over the past eight years.
Should Ma decide to go down this path, he would soon find -- as every other president before him has found -- that peace across the Taiwan Strait, or its absence, is not in the hands of Taiwanese and their leaders, but in those of the regime in Beijing, which seems to think that time is on its side and that the annexation of Taiwan is inevitable.
In recent years, Beijing had placed its hopes in the KMT, which it saw as a surrogate, a backdoor entry to Taiwan. If Ma shuts that door, it will be 1996 all over again, with the additional layer of 12 years of budding Taiwanese consciousness. Should that happen, all that talk about a common market, of small, medium and big links and friendlier ties will mean very little.
If Ma becomes president, he will soon find out why his predecessors Lee and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) were so reviled in Beijing.
And soon enough, following his rude awakening, life would go back to normal, back to the "status quo." The economy would be no better, no worse, and the main question Ma would need to answer would be the one Lee and Chen had to juggle: How to defend Taiwan against a giant whose pride has yet again been hurt, and who is realizing that the longer the "status quo" prevails, the more time is on Taiwan's side.
Ultimately, Beijing's eyesight is blurry. Lee, Chen, Ma -- for all it cares, Taiwanese on Saturday will be voting for "Ma Teng-bian" or "Hsieh Ying-hui." It doesn't care who is in power in Taiwan. What Beijing covets is real estate, all 35,980km2 of it.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 18, 2008.
Even Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) has applauded Ma's apparent turnaround, the same Ma who, in 2006, had argued that the future of Taiwan should be decided by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Whether this rhetorical shift is heartfelt -- a coming out of sorts, a la former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) in the 1990s -- or mere politicking has yet to be clarified, but the fact remains that Ma is saying these things publicly and within earshot of Beijing. It wouldn't be the first time in the history of democratic politics that, as election day looms, parties drift toward the center.
And in Taiwan, the center is the "status quo." However uncomfortable it is, the "status quo" is, ironically, quite comfortable. It is the invisible enemy we know rather than the unknown of a sudden shift. It's also a vote-winner, as maintaining that comfortable level of uncertainty seems to be what Taiwanese of all stripes want most.
Welcome as Ma's "determination to defend Taiwan's sovereignty" might be -- and let us assume, for the sake of argument, that he means what he said -- his vow to create friendly cross-strait relations might be more difficult to achieve than he thinks. For upon hearing his comments, Beijing could be forgiven for accusing Ma of himself "heightening cross-strait tensions," in similar fashion to what Ma in the same breath accused the DPP of doing over the past eight years.
Should Ma decide to go down this path, he would soon find -- as every other president before him has found -- that peace across the Taiwan Strait, or its absence, is not in the hands of Taiwanese and their leaders, but in those of the regime in Beijing, which seems to think that time is on its side and that the annexation of Taiwan is inevitable.
In recent years, Beijing had placed its hopes in the KMT, which it saw as a surrogate, a backdoor entry to Taiwan. If Ma shuts that door, it will be 1996 all over again, with the additional layer of 12 years of budding Taiwanese consciousness. Should that happen, all that talk about a common market, of small, medium and big links and friendlier ties will mean very little.
If Ma becomes president, he will soon find out why his predecessors Lee and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) were so reviled in Beijing.
And soon enough, following his rude awakening, life would go back to normal, back to the "status quo." The economy would be no better, no worse, and the main question Ma would need to answer would be the one Lee and Chen had to juggle: How to defend Taiwan against a giant whose pride has yet again been hurt, and who is realizing that the longer the "status quo" prevails, the more time is on Taiwan's side.
Ultimately, Beijing's eyesight is blurry. Lee, Chen, Ma -- for all it cares, Taiwanese on Saturday will be voting for "Ma Teng-bian" or "Hsieh Ying-hui." It doesn't care who is in power in Taiwan. What Beijing covets is real estate, all 35,980km2 of it.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 18, 2008.
2008年3月16日 星期日
Colonialism in Taiwan
By Samuel Yang of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan
For many Taiwanese, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime was another unfriendly foreign colonial power.
When President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected in 2000, the people of Taiwan celebrated a major breakthrough in their struggle for democracy. Unfortunately,Taiwan's democracy has been sabotaged by the KMT.
Despite the election of a DPP administration, the KMT has been able to control the schools, local governments and military with unfair distribution of governmental funds and privileges.
The guaranteed 18 percent interest offered specifically to those privileged groups is just one of the many examples.
Such undemocratic tactics have been supported by the KMT-dominated legislature, judiciary and the media. The resounding defeat of the DPP in the January legislative election attests to the KMT's continued influence.
Nonetheless, Taiwan's democracy has been able to prevent the KMT from perpetrating its autocracy. Therefore, the party is now cooperating with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and advocates eventual unification with China.
Taiwanese should be alert to not only the rising political power of the KMT, which might lead to a resurrection of the old autocracy, but also to the possibility of annexation by China, the colonial rule of which would be worse than that of the past KMT regime or Japan.
Both the KMT and CCP have made a show of becoming more democratic to deflect criticisms of their autocracy and rampant corruption.
The inability of the KMT and CCP to embrace democracy is deeply rooted in Chinese culture, which instills the virtue of citizens' loyalty to the rulers but grossly neglects the fact that the citizens are the masters of the government -- the fundamental principle of modern civilized governance.
The KMT's autocracy and undemocratic disregard of law and order is largely responsible for the recurrent political turmoil in Taiwan since World War II. It is most ironic that media biased in favor of the KMT and CCP have shaped domestic and international opinions that have been detrimental to the democratic development.
The public has been misled to believe that the KMT and CCP are the salvation of Taiwan and China.
While China repeatedly condemns past colonial occupations by foreign powers, it practices the same old colonialism by occupying Tibet with force and repression. It also intends to invade Taiwan against the will of the Taiwanese.
The expectation that China will become a democracy might be the underlying motivation of foreign investors. Unfortunately, China's population is so misled by a biased media that China's democratization is impossible for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the country is a security threat to not only Taiwan, but the entire world.
On March 22, the people of Taiwan must use their votes to reject the undemocratic KMT, and send an unequivocal signal to China that a Tibet-style colonial occupation of Taiwan is not acceptable.
For many Taiwanese, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime was another unfriendly foreign colonial power.
When President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected in 2000, the people of Taiwan celebrated a major breakthrough in their struggle for democracy. Unfortunately,Taiwan's democracy has been sabotaged by the KMT.
Despite the election of a DPP administration, the KMT has been able to control the schools, local governments and military with unfair distribution of governmental funds and privileges.
The guaranteed 18 percent interest offered specifically to those privileged groups is just one of the many examples.
Such undemocratic tactics have been supported by the KMT-dominated legislature, judiciary and the media. The resounding defeat of the DPP in the January legislative election attests to the KMT's continued influence.
Nonetheless, Taiwan's democracy has been able to prevent the KMT from perpetrating its autocracy. Therefore, the party is now cooperating with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and advocates eventual unification with China.
Taiwanese should be alert to not only the rising political power of the KMT, which might lead to a resurrection of the old autocracy, but also to the possibility of annexation by China, the colonial rule of which would be worse than that of the past KMT regime or Japan.
Both the KMT and CCP have made a show of becoming more democratic to deflect criticisms of their autocracy and rampant corruption.
The inability of the KMT and CCP to embrace democracy is deeply rooted in Chinese culture, which instills the virtue of citizens' loyalty to the rulers but grossly neglects the fact that the citizens are the masters of the government -- the fundamental principle of modern civilized governance.
The KMT's autocracy and undemocratic disregard of law and order is largely responsible for the recurrent political turmoil in Taiwan since World War II. It is most ironic that media biased in favor of the KMT and CCP have shaped domestic and international opinions that have been detrimental to the democratic development.
The public has been misled to believe that the KMT and CCP are the salvation of Taiwan and China.
While China repeatedly condemns past colonial occupations by foreign powers, it practices the same old colonialism by occupying Tibet with force and repression. It also intends to invade Taiwan against the will of the Taiwanese.
The expectation that China will become a democracy might be the underlying motivation of foreign investors. Unfortunately, China's population is so misled by a biased media that China's democratization is impossible for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the country is a security threat to not only Taiwan, but the entire world.
On March 22, the people of Taiwan must use their votes to reject the undemocratic KMT, and send an unequivocal signal to China that a Tibet-style colonial occupation of Taiwan is not acceptable.
Referendum Act Must Be Overhauled to Be Valid
By Lin Kien-tsu 林健次, translated by Anna Stiggelbout
The public is the master of the country. When the public elects representatives, this does not change the fact that the public is the master, and the representatives are their servants. If servants turn around and limit the rights of the public to have a choice in resolving public matters, then the servants lose their legitimacy, and the public has the right to tell these servants to step down.
The Referendum Act (公投法) stipulates that for a referendum to be valid, there must be a turnout of more than half of all eligible voters. This threshold is even higher than that of the presidential and legislative elections, and basically limits the right of the public to make policy decisions. In making this law, the legislature violated the fundamental spirit of the representative system and thus lost its legitimacy.
The legislature is now made up of lawmakers who have been elected under the single member district, two vote system. To be elected, they only needed to win more votes than their opponents. For the legislators-at-large, the number of votes cast for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) combined amounted to less than half of the population. If a legislature made up of legislators elected by these amounts of votes doesn't see a problem with the Referendum Act turning the servants into masters, then it has lost its legitimacy.
The KMT has won an almost three-quarter majority in the legislature in an election with conditions far less strict than those in the Referendum Act. Many people, including some KMT supporters, are concerned that absolute power will lead to absolute corruption. These concerns are another indication of the lack of legitimacy of the legislature.
Many people worry that if Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) becomes president, this will bring the KMT even more power and corruption. Ma emphasizes that he respects the will of the public. KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) also says referendums are sacred, and that the KMT would never abuse its power, even if it was the sole ruling party. If this is true, the easiest way to convince the public of the sincerity of Ma and the KMT, and solve the legislature's legitimacy crisis, would be to lower the referendum threshold to the same level as that for the legislative elections.
The KMT is against holding two referendums in tandem with the presidential election; they say this is using the referendum to "hijack" the poll. But in the Jan. 12 legislative elections, the number of votes cast for the DPP and KMT combined was equivalent to less than half of the population. This shows that even if the referendums were held in accordance with the same standards as the elections, and the DPP and KMT worked together, the referendums would still not necessarily obtain the minimum number of votes, let alone if they were held separately.
If the KMT really has misgivings about elections being "hijacked," it should insist on holding the referendums separately, instead of finding excuses to suppress public opinion and referendums. The legislature should amend the Referendum Act. Only in this way can the KMT lend any legitimacy to its position of holding the referendums separately from the presidential election.
Ma is the one in control of the KMT. If he could lead the KMT- controlled legislature to amend the Referendum Act before the elections and show his ability to lead the KMT's legislators, he would eradicate any suspicion among the public that his election would lead to an abuse of power by the KMT.
This article supports the Nuke-4 Referendum Initiative Association, and its hunger strike in front of the legislature, and expresses my respect for the group.
Lin Kien-tsu is a member of Taiwan Heart and the Taiwan Association of University Professors.
The public is the master of the country. When the public elects representatives, this does not change the fact that the public is the master, and the representatives are their servants. If servants turn around and limit the rights of the public to have a choice in resolving public matters, then the servants lose their legitimacy, and the public has the right to tell these servants to step down.
The Referendum Act (公投法) stipulates that for a referendum to be valid, there must be a turnout of more than half of all eligible voters. This threshold is even higher than that of the presidential and legislative elections, and basically limits the right of the public to make policy decisions. In making this law, the legislature violated the fundamental spirit of the representative system and thus lost its legitimacy.
The legislature is now made up of lawmakers who have been elected under the single member district, two vote system. To be elected, they only needed to win more votes than their opponents. For the legislators-at-large, the number of votes cast for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) combined amounted to less than half of the population. If a legislature made up of legislators elected by these amounts of votes doesn't see a problem with the Referendum Act turning the servants into masters, then it has lost its legitimacy.
The KMT has won an almost three-quarter majority in the legislature in an election with conditions far less strict than those in the Referendum Act. Many people, including some KMT supporters, are concerned that absolute power will lead to absolute corruption. These concerns are another indication of the lack of legitimacy of the legislature.
Many people worry that if Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) becomes president, this will bring the KMT even more power and corruption. Ma emphasizes that he respects the will of the public. KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) also says referendums are sacred, and that the KMT would never abuse its power, even if it was the sole ruling party. If this is true, the easiest way to convince the public of the sincerity of Ma and the KMT, and solve the legislature's legitimacy crisis, would be to lower the referendum threshold to the same level as that for the legislative elections.
The KMT is against holding two referendums in tandem with the presidential election; they say this is using the referendum to "hijack" the poll. But in the Jan. 12 legislative elections, the number of votes cast for the DPP and KMT combined was equivalent to less than half of the population. This shows that even if the referendums were held in accordance with the same standards as the elections, and the DPP and KMT worked together, the referendums would still not necessarily obtain the minimum number of votes, let alone if they were held separately.
If the KMT really has misgivings about elections being "hijacked," it should insist on holding the referendums separately, instead of finding excuses to suppress public opinion and referendums. The legislature should amend the Referendum Act. Only in this way can the KMT lend any legitimacy to its position of holding the referendums separately from the presidential election.
Ma is the one in control of the KMT. If he could lead the KMT- controlled legislature to amend the Referendum Act before the elections and show his ability to lead the KMT's legislators, he would eradicate any suspicion among the public that his election would lead to an abuse of power by the KMT.
This article supports the Nuke-4 Referendum Initiative Association, and its hunger strike in front of the legislature, and expresses my respect for the group.
Lin Kien-tsu is a member of Taiwan Heart and the Taiwan Association of University Professors.
Ma Is On the Wrong Side of History
By Gerrit van der Wees
As Taiwan prepares for the presidential election, the people face a choice for their future. This goes beyond a choice for the next four years: It is more than a continuation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government under the new leadership of Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), or a return to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under new leadership, that of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
The choice between the two men also harbors longer-term consequences for the future of the country: continuation of the trend towards increasing emphasis on Taiwan's own identity and treatment of Taiwan as a nation-state in its own right, or closer ties with Beijing, eventually drifting towards absorption by China in one way or another.
Hsieh is an advocate of the former line: Building on the legacy of the fight for democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, and the consolidation of democracy under former president Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian(陳水扁), he will carefully maneuver to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty and expand its international position, while attempting to keep China at bay.
Ma is an advocate of eventual unification, but realizes that he cannot move too swiftly since this would anger the Taiwanese majority and make the US and Japan -- already apprehensive about China's military buildup -- increasingly nervous, so he will emphasize the "status quo" while gradually pushing the envelope toward closer ties with China.
How will they perform if they are elected? How will they stand up to pressure from China -- or from the US for that matter? Are they committed to democracy?
To get a glimpse into their character, it is useful to examine how they acted and reacted in an earlier era: when Taiwan was suffering under martial law in the 1970s and 1980s, and when they rose to prominence, each in his own right.
Both Hsieh and Ma were educated to be lawyers. But there the similarity ends.
Hsieh is a native Taiwanese, who became well-known in Taiwan in 1980, when -- together with a number of other lawyers including Chen -- he voluntarily took up the defense of eight prominent leaders of the tangwai (outside-the-party) democracy movement (including Vice President Annette Lu [呂秀蓮] and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu [陳菊]), who had been arrested and imprisoned by the KMT regime on spurious political charges.
Hsieh was thus willing to stick his neck out and stand up for justice when it counted -- and when few others dared to do so. In the 1980s he became a member of the Taipei City Council, and later was elected to the Legislative Yuan. He was a founding member of the DPP in 1986. Ten years later, in 1996, he was the DPP's vice presidential candidate in Taiwan's first-ever democratic presidential elections (together with Peng Ming-min), but lost to Lee.
Ma, on the other hand, is a Mainlander, who was born in Hong Kong and whose parents came over to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石). His father was a high-ranking KMT official, and young Ma grew up in the political elite of the Chinese Nationalists. In the 1970s he went to Harvard for his graduate studies, but several of his Taiwanese fellow students complained that Ma was a "student spy" who collected data for the secret police in Taiwan.
After his return to Taiwan In 1981, he quickly rose to prominence within the KMT. He started as an aide and personal translator for then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), and in 1984 became deputy-secretary general of the KMT. In 1993 he was appointed minister of justice by Lee and served in that position until 1996.
Let us examine what his position was during the crucial moments in Taiwan's transition to democracy: In 1985-1986, when Taiwan was still under martial law, he was an ardent defender of martial law, arguing that it enhanced "stability" on the island. He also defended the long prison sentences given to proponents of democracy and human rights.
In lengthy letters to foreign governments and political parties which expressed concern about the lack of democracy in Taiwan, Ma waxed eloquently in defense of the indefensible.
Finally, after many hearings and resolutions in the US Congress by senators such as Ted Kennedy and Claiborne Pell and representatives Jim Leach and Steven Solarz, and after increasing pressure from the bottom up in Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo relented and lifted martial law in 1987. Ma had been on the wrong side of history.
Almost the same thing happened in 1991 and 1992, when the democratic movement started to push for abolishment of the "eternal" legislators who had been elected in China in 1947, and who were in their 80s and 90s still representing "China" in the legislature and National Assembly. Again, Ma came out against such changes and wanted to maintain a semblance of "China" representation in the legislature.
Fortunately, Lee had vision and pushed through the legislative reforms. Again, Ma was on the wrong side of history.
Fascinatingly, three years later, the same pattern occurred: Lee started to push for direct presidential elections -- to replace the anachronistic system in which the KMT-controlled National Assembly had rubberstamped the KMT choice for president.
Ma was one of the KMT opponents of this move toward full-fledged democracy. Again, his instincts had been to preserve an outdated status quo, and oppose democratic change.
Ma was a follower, who went along with developments when they became inevitable, while Hsieh stood up when it counted, and defended his principles.
The choice for the people of Taiwan is thus between someone who has opposed democratic change, and wants to edge closer to a repressive, undemocratic China, and someone who has been at the forefront of democratic change, and wants to propel Taiwan forwards in the international family of nations.
It will be a decisive moment in Taiwan's history.
Gerrit van der Wees is editor of Taiwan Communique, a publication based in Washington.
As Taiwan prepares for the presidential election, the people face a choice for their future. This goes beyond a choice for the next four years: It is more than a continuation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government under the new leadership of Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), or a return to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under new leadership, that of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
The choice between the two men also harbors longer-term consequences for the future of the country: continuation of the trend towards increasing emphasis on Taiwan's own identity and treatment of Taiwan as a nation-state in its own right, or closer ties with Beijing, eventually drifting towards absorption by China in one way or another.
Hsieh is an advocate of the former line: Building on the legacy of the fight for democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, and the consolidation of democracy under former president Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian(陳水扁), he will carefully maneuver to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty and expand its international position, while attempting to keep China at bay.
Ma is an advocate of eventual unification, but realizes that he cannot move too swiftly since this would anger the Taiwanese majority and make the US and Japan -- already apprehensive about China's military buildup -- increasingly nervous, so he will emphasize the "status quo" while gradually pushing the envelope toward closer ties with China.
How will they perform if they are elected? How will they stand up to pressure from China -- or from the US for that matter? Are they committed to democracy?
To get a glimpse into their character, it is useful to examine how they acted and reacted in an earlier era: when Taiwan was suffering under martial law in the 1970s and 1980s, and when they rose to prominence, each in his own right.
Both Hsieh and Ma were educated to be lawyers. But there the similarity ends.
Hsieh is a native Taiwanese, who became well-known in Taiwan in 1980, when -- together with a number of other lawyers including Chen -- he voluntarily took up the defense of eight prominent leaders of the tangwai (outside-the-party) democracy movement (including Vice President Annette Lu [呂秀蓮] and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu [陳菊]), who had been arrested and imprisoned by the KMT regime on spurious political charges.
Hsieh was thus willing to stick his neck out and stand up for justice when it counted -- and when few others dared to do so. In the 1980s he became a member of the Taipei City Council, and later was elected to the Legislative Yuan. He was a founding member of the DPP in 1986. Ten years later, in 1996, he was the DPP's vice presidential candidate in Taiwan's first-ever democratic presidential elections (together with Peng Ming-min), but lost to Lee.
Ma, on the other hand, is a Mainlander, who was born in Hong Kong and whose parents came over to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石). His father was a high-ranking KMT official, and young Ma grew up in the political elite of the Chinese Nationalists. In the 1970s he went to Harvard for his graduate studies, but several of his Taiwanese fellow students complained that Ma was a "student spy" who collected data for the secret police in Taiwan.
After his return to Taiwan In 1981, he quickly rose to prominence within the KMT. He started as an aide and personal translator for then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), and in 1984 became deputy-secretary general of the KMT. In 1993 he was appointed minister of justice by Lee and served in that position until 1996.
Let us examine what his position was during the crucial moments in Taiwan's transition to democracy: In 1985-1986, when Taiwan was still under martial law, he was an ardent defender of martial law, arguing that it enhanced "stability" on the island. He also defended the long prison sentences given to proponents of democracy and human rights.
In lengthy letters to foreign governments and political parties which expressed concern about the lack of democracy in Taiwan, Ma waxed eloquently in defense of the indefensible.
Finally, after many hearings and resolutions in the US Congress by senators such as Ted Kennedy and Claiborne Pell and representatives Jim Leach and Steven Solarz, and after increasing pressure from the bottom up in Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo relented and lifted martial law in 1987. Ma had been on the wrong side of history.
Almost the same thing happened in 1991 and 1992, when the democratic movement started to push for abolishment of the "eternal" legislators who had been elected in China in 1947, and who were in their 80s and 90s still representing "China" in the legislature and National Assembly. Again, Ma came out against such changes and wanted to maintain a semblance of "China" representation in the legislature.
Fortunately, Lee had vision and pushed through the legislative reforms. Again, Ma was on the wrong side of history.
Fascinatingly, three years later, the same pattern occurred: Lee started to push for direct presidential elections -- to replace the anachronistic system in which the KMT-controlled National Assembly had rubberstamped the KMT choice for president.
Ma was one of the KMT opponents of this move toward full-fledged democracy. Again, his instincts had been to preserve an outdated status quo, and oppose democratic change.
Ma was a follower, who went along with developments when they became inevitable, while Hsieh stood up when it counted, and defended his principles.
The choice for the people of Taiwan is thus between someone who has opposed democratic change, and wants to edge closer to a repressive, undemocratic China, and someone who has been at the forefront of democratic change, and wants to propel Taiwan forwards in the international family of nations.
It will be a decisive moment in Taiwan's history.
Gerrit van der Wees is editor of Taiwan Communique, a publication based in Washington.
2008年3月12日 星期三
Ma's China Policy Lacks A Sense of Realpolitik
By Liu Kuan-teh 劉冠德
Sunday's presidential debate rarely touched upon foreign policy. The main reason lies in the fact that China's diplomatic suppression and international isolation of Taipei is not contingent upon any "blue or green" policy.
During the debate, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continued to criticize what he called the Democratic Progressive Party's(DPP) "fire-setting diplomacy" and blamed it for Taiwan's loss of diplomatic allies under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Ma also blamed the DPP's bids to use the name "Taiwan" to apply for memberships in the WHO and the UN for creating distrust between Taiwan and many allies, including the US.
Since China is behind Taiwan's diplomatic difficulties, Ma promised to start negotiating with China over international space.
For Ma to characterize the DPP government with what he called a "confrontational approach" to Beijing and to overlook the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the real threat to Taiwan's international recognition and security was not surprising.
What concerns most voters is Ma's theory of using the so-called "1992 consensus" as the starting point to resume talks with Beijing. There are inherent contradictions to Ma's approach.
Ma seems to assume that seeking an improvement in cross-strait relations will automatically make China give Taiwan more international space and better treatment. Therefore he argues that both Taiwan and China should stop talking about "mutual recognition" and focus on "no mutual denial."
Ma's idea is wishful thinking and fails to address the question of the different definitions of "one China" made by the KMT and Beijing.
Even though there is no such thing as the "1992 consensus," the KMT advocates the "Republic of China [ROC]" as "one China," while the Chinese Communist Party insists the "People's Republic of China" represents "one China" and that "Taiwan is a part of the PRC."
Beijing does not accept the "Republic of China" as "one China" and has been excluding the ROC's participation in almost every international arena under the KMT's rule.
The then-KMT government enacted the so-called National Unification Guidelines and established the National Unification Council in 1991. Both governments engaged in political dialogue in 1992 and 1993.
The political atmosphere between Taipei and Beijing should have been moderate. However, between 1992 and 1998, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea, Saint Lucia, South Africa and the Central Africa Republic. The diplomatic warfare continued even though cross-strait relations seemed relaxed.
How can Ma insist that he is for maintaining Taiwan's sovereignty while engaging Beijing with "no mutual denial?"
The assumption that Beijing would give Taiwan more international respect and space if Taiwan improves cross-strait relations is not realistic.
The most inconvenient truth is: If Ma is elected, Beijing will still not allow Taiwan to have observer status during the World Health Assembly in May.
The newly-elected president of Taiwan will be rejected a transit stop in Washington en route to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America.
Even with a new electoral mandate, Beijing will not accept Ma's attendance at the APEC leadership summit in October.
Unless of course Ma plans to wait until his counterparts accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and then starts to perform his duty as a democratically-elected president of Taiwan. In that case, why would the voters waste their ballots and chose such a coward?
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Sunday's presidential debate rarely touched upon foreign policy. The main reason lies in the fact that China's diplomatic suppression and international isolation of Taipei is not contingent upon any "blue or green" policy.
During the debate, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continued to criticize what he called the Democratic Progressive Party's(DPP) "fire-setting diplomacy" and blamed it for Taiwan's loss of diplomatic allies under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Ma also blamed the DPP's bids to use the name "Taiwan" to apply for memberships in the WHO and the UN for creating distrust between Taiwan and many allies, including the US.
Since China is behind Taiwan's diplomatic difficulties, Ma promised to start negotiating with China over international space.
For Ma to characterize the DPP government with what he called a "confrontational approach" to Beijing and to overlook the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the real threat to Taiwan's international recognition and security was not surprising.
What concerns most voters is Ma's theory of using the so-called "1992 consensus" as the starting point to resume talks with Beijing. There are inherent contradictions to Ma's approach.
Ma seems to assume that seeking an improvement in cross-strait relations will automatically make China give Taiwan more international space and better treatment. Therefore he argues that both Taiwan and China should stop talking about "mutual recognition" and focus on "no mutual denial."
Ma's idea is wishful thinking and fails to address the question of the different definitions of "one China" made by the KMT and Beijing.
Even though there is no such thing as the "1992 consensus," the KMT advocates the "Republic of China [ROC]" as "one China," while the Chinese Communist Party insists the "People's Republic of China" represents "one China" and that "Taiwan is a part of the PRC."
Beijing does not accept the "Republic of China" as "one China" and has been excluding the ROC's participation in almost every international arena under the KMT's rule.
The then-KMT government enacted the so-called National Unification Guidelines and established the National Unification Council in 1991. Both governments engaged in political dialogue in 1992 and 1993.
The political atmosphere between Taipei and Beijing should have been moderate. However, between 1992 and 1998, Taiwan severed diplomatic relations with South Korea, Saint Lucia, South Africa and the Central Africa Republic. The diplomatic warfare continued even though cross-strait relations seemed relaxed.
How can Ma insist that he is for maintaining Taiwan's sovereignty while engaging Beijing with "no mutual denial?"
The assumption that Beijing would give Taiwan more international respect and space if Taiwan improves cross-strait relations is not realistic.
The most inconvenient truth is: If Ma is elected, Beijing will still not allow Taiwan to have observer status during the World Health Assembly in May.
The newly-elected president of Taiwan will be rejected a transit stop in Washington en route to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America.
Even with a new electoral mandate, Beijing will not accept Ma's attendance at the APEC leadership summit in October.
Unless of course Ma plans to wait until his counterparts accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and then starts to perform his duty as a democratically-elected president of Taiwan. In that case, why would the voters waste their ballots and chose such a coward?
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
Making "Referendum" A Dirty Word
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Po-hsiung's (吳伯雄) announcement yesterday that his party would boycott the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) referendum on UN entry using the name "Taiwan" and back the KMT's own on "returning to the UN" would appear to be the final nail in the coffin of the DPP's plebiscite.
Taking into account that previous KMT boycotts have ensured the failure of all four referendums staged since the Referendum Law was promulgated in November 2003, it signals that the DPP version now has very little chance of passing.
Passage of the KMT's referendum, however, also remains uncertain. Despite Wu's support of the party's plebiscite, several party legislators have already gone public with their intention to boycott both referendums.
The KMT is obviously split along its China-Taiwan divide on the issue and the party's spat can only add to the public's sense of confusion, which has resulted in the term "referendum" almost becoming a dirty word among Taiwanese.
The KMT must take the lion's share of the blame for this phenomenon because from day one they have treated the issue of referendums -- with the initiation of "smokescreen" rival plebiscites and irrational arguments about extra ballots "confusing" voters -- with disdain.
The KMT had no qualms about dumping the sham "corruption" referendum it proposed during January's legislative elections, but there was no practical way that it could have done the same this time around, as a boycott of its UN referendum would have put presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his running mate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) in an extremely difficult position.
Ma's "flexible diplomacy" platform is more or less identical to the KMT's referendum question and he had publicly backed the plebiscite on more than one occasion, while Siew was the referendum's initiator.
But the KMT does not deserve all the blame, as the DPP, having waited too long for referendums to become a reality, is equally guilty of damaging what it terms "the sanctity" of the plebiscite.
As polls have repeatedly shown throughout the years, the majority of people in Taiwan are happy with the current state of affairs in cross-strait relations and they do not want to vote on issues that are likely to anger China.
The DPP, however, with its provocative choices for referendum topics, ignored this fact, as well as the concerns of the nation's main security guarantor -- the US -- in the hope of deepening Taiwan consciousness while rallying partisan support on election day.
The DPP would have done better to hold polls on less controversial issues to help the concept of the plebiscite become ingrained in the minds of the electorate, as this would eventually lead to a situation where no political party -- no matter how big its legislative majority -- would be able to make decisions concerning issues of national importance without first putting it to the people.
As it stands now, a huge chunk of the population have been turned off by the idea of referendums, despite the fact that the issue at stake on this occasion is of extreme importance to the nation's future.
Let's hope that a week from Saturday these people can overcome their apathy and come out in support of the referendums, as at least this would send a message, however muddled, to the world that despite all Taiwan's problems, its people are at least united on one issue.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 13, 2008.
Taking into account that previous KMT boycotts have ensured the failure of all four referendums staged since the Referendum Law was promulgated in November 2003, it signals that the DPP version now has very little chance of passing.
Passage of the KMT's referendum, however, also remains uncertain. Despite Wu's support of the party's plebiscite, several party legislators have already gone public with their intention to boycott both referendums.
The KMT is obviously split along its China-Taiwan divide on the issue and the party's spat can only add to the public's sense of confusion, which has resulted in the term "referendum" almost becoming a dirty word among Taiwanese.
The KMT must take the lion's share of the blame for this phenomenon because from day one they have treated the issue of referendums -- with the initiation of "smokescreen" rival plebiscites and irrational arguments about extra ballots "confusing" voters -- with disdain.
The KMT had no qualms about dumping the sham "corruption" referendum it proposed during January's legislative elections, but there was no practical way that it could have done the same this time around, as a boycott of its UN referendum would have put presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his running mate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) in an extremely difficult position.
Ma's "flexible diplomacy" platform is more or less identical to the KMT's referendum question and he had publicly backed the plebiscite on more than one occasion, while Siew was the referendum's initiator.
But the KMT does not deserve all the blame, as the DPP, having waited too long for referendums to become a reality, is equally guilty of damaging what it terms "the sanctity" of the plebiscite.
As polls have repeatedly shown throughout the years, the majority of people in Taiwan are happy with the current state of affairs in cross-strait relations and they do not want to vote on issues that are likely to anger China.
The DPP, however, with its provocative choices for referendum topics, ignored this fact, as well as the concerns of the nation's main security guarantor -- the US -- in the hope of deepening Taiwan consciousness while rallying partisan support on election day.
The DPP would have done better to hold polls on less controversial issues to help the concept of the plebiscite become ingrained in the minds of the electorate, as this would eventually lead to a situation where no political party -- no matter how big its legislative majority -- would be able to make decisions concerning issues of national importance without first putting it to the people.
As it stands now, a huge chunk of the population have been turned off by the idea of referendums, despite the fact that the issue at stake on this occasion is of extreme importance to the nation's future.
Let's hope that a week from Saturday these people can overcome their apathy and come out in support of the referendums, as at least this would send a message, however muddled, to the world that despite all Taiwan's problems, its people are at least united on one issue.
Taipei Times Editorial, March 13, 2008.
2008年3月10日 星期一
How Would Democracy in China Play Out?
By Wang Dan 王丹, translated by Ted Yang
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
The results of the presidential election will have a significant impact on the development of cross-state relations. But regardless of whether Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) counterpart Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) wins the election, both candidates should pay attention to the effect on Chinese democratization and cross-strait relations.
The next 10 years will be a critical period in China's development. A couple factors are especially important.
First, as nationalism continues to ferment, the authorities will engage in the careful manipulation of public opinion.
Second, the strength of China, and especially its military, will continue to grow.
If it keeps growing at the current speed, the risk that China will attack Taiwan will increase.
However, a factor that cannot be determined is the nature of the change of the Chinese state over the next 10 years.
Even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) insists on highly centralized rule, modern governments will make such rule more difficult, weakening state control of society.
Thus it is important to note to what degree civil society in China will influence the Chinese government in the next 10 years.
The question of whether or not China will democratize is key for cross-strait relations.
It therefore is logical for Chinese democratization to be at the center of Taiwan's policy on China.
This focus provides a long term view of the situation and is in the best interests of the nation.
First, pushing for Chinese democracy helps improve Taiwan's international image.
Taiwan is inferior to China economically, militarily and diplomatically.
Taiwan is only superior to China in its form of government. By upholding democracy, Taiwan can manifest its unique value and gain support and sympathy from the international community -- a strategic advantage over China.
Second, the US would also support a push for Chinese democracy. Since US President George W. Bush took office, and especially during US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's term, the US has put a heavy emphasis on promoting democracy all over the world. If Taiwan actively promotes the democratization of China, there will only be praise from the US.
Finally, a push for democracy in China could also gain the support of the Chinese people.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
Visionary politicians should focus on the budding civil society in China. If Taiwan can offer support for China's democratization, it might win over public opinion there.
No matter where Taiwan is headed, it is vital that it wins the goodwill of the Chinese people.
Wang Dan is a member of the Chinese democracy movement.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
The results of the presidential election will have a significant impact on the development of cross-state relations. But regardless of whether Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) counterpart Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) wins the election, both candidates should pay attention to the effect on Chinese democratization and cross-strait relations.
The next 10 years will be a critical period in China's development. A couple factors are especially important.
First, as nationalism continues to ferment, the authorities will engage in the careful manipulation of public opinion.
Second, the strength of China, and especially its military, will continue to grow.
If it keeps growing at the current speed, the risk that China will attack Taiwan will increase.
However, a factor that cannot be determined is the nature of the change of the Chinese state over the next 10 years.
Even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) insists on highly centralized rule, modern governments will make such rule more difficult, weakening state control of society.
Thus it is important to note to what degree civil society in China will influence the Chinese government in the next 10 years.
The question of whether or not China will democratize is key for cross-strait relations.
It therefore is logical for Chinese democratization to be at the center of Taiwan's policy on China.
This focus provides a long term view of the situation and is in the best interests of the nation.
First, pushing for Chinese democracy helps improve Taiwan's international image.
Taiwan is inferior to China economically, militarily and diplomatically.
Taiwan is only superior to China in its form of government. By upholding democracy, Taiwan can manifest its unique value and gain support and sympathy from the international community -- a strategic advantage over China.
Second, the US would also support a push for Chinese democracy. Since US President George W. Bush took office, and especially during US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's term, the US has put a heavy emphasis on promoting democracy all over the world. If Taiwan actively promotes the democratization of China, there will only be praise from the US.
Finally, a push for democracy in China could also gain the support of the Chinese people.
China might be under CCP control today, but that does not mean that the party necessarily represents the future of the country.
Visionary politicians should focus on the budding civil society in China. If Taiwan can offer support for China's democratization, it might win over public opinion there.
No matter where Taiwan is headed, it is vital that it wins the goodwill of the Chinese people.
Wang Dan is a member of the Chinese democracy movement.
2008年3月9日 星期日
KMT's Economic Ideas Lack Vision
By Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, translated by Eddy Chang
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) looks over its decades of governing and the so-called "Taiwan miracle" -- the transformation into a strong economy and democracy -- and pats itself on the back.
It has an elitist attitude and deceives itself into believing Taiwan's success story was somehow all the result of its wisdom and foresight.
Based on that view, it has not changed its belief that such a regime is justified. It gives orders from the top and proposes projects with grandiose titles: the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC), an airline hub connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia; the dual purpose operations center for domestic and foreign enterprises; the "cross-strait common market," the global value-added services center; and the global innovation center.
The KMT has dominated the discussion of such issues. But ironically, in spite of a constant string of proposals and impressive project titles, its economic strategy boils down to one principle: complete reliance upon the US and China.
In the years before the KMT lost the presidential office, its economic policies focused on two areas: the development of the electronic information industry with a focus on manufacturing and the APROC.
The latter was a policy proposed by KMT vice presidential candidate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) in 1995.
To bolster the electronics and information technology sectors, the KMT allowed the manufacturing industry to move operations abroad to gain cheaper access to land, capital and laborers. But the industry focused entirely on original equipment manufacturing of hardware, while the innovative integrated-circuit and software sectors, which focused on research and development, were grossly underestimated.
Companies working in these sectors had difficulty listing themselves on the stock market and gaining access to Hsinchu Science Park and were usually excluded from tax incentives.
The government's priorities back then resulted in an economic reliance on technology from upstream companies and orders from downstream companies. There was no effort to promote independent technologies or brands.
As for Siew's APROC, which was copied from Hong Kong, the KMT tried to used Taiwan's location to build a "greater China" economic zone.
KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kun (江丙坤) even suggested to the party's 2004 presidential candidate, former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), that the government allow the entire manufacturing industry to move abroad.
The "greater China" approach was based on the erroneous judgment that the nation had gone from reliance on the US economy to reliance on the Chinese economy. To compete in the Chinese market, the argument went, Taiwan's manufacturing industry must have access to the same cheap Chinese laborers; the service industry must ape Hong Kong and focus on China; and Taiwan must serve as a door for China's imports and exports.
This is the approach that the KMT is promoting even today.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has a different vision for continued economic transformation. That vision is based on creating technology.
From building up brands to developing the service and cultural sectors, the nation's economy must seek its future in innovation. The key is research and development. Industries will gradually gain in independence by innovating and marketing their developments.
The economic policies offered by the DPP and KMT reflect the difference between independence and dependence. They represent two completely different economic maps for the growth of the nation's industries. They are the difference between looking over the horizon to create a global center for logistics and innovation or limiting Taiwan to a "greater China" economic zone.
Hong Kong is an excellent example. It is a door to the Chinese market and some have called it the hub of East Asia. But Hong Kong's success remains limited to taking advantage of its location. It has capitalized on its position to become what it is today, but failed to innovate and grow in other directions. Siew's vision is exactly this: Taiwan, another Asia-Pacific center.
There is no doubt that Siew is right in one aspect. The nation would be foolish not to take advantage of geography to grow. But Taiwan is more than the "city economy" that is Hong Kong. Taiwan has long had global ambitions. Instead of vying to compete within the region, the nation's economy needs to aim for competing globally. Our ambitions should be much higher than simply hoping China and other countries continue to transit their goods through here.
Taiwan and Hong Kong have taken different paths for centuries and should not start mirroring each other now. The pan-blue camp keeps warning against policies it labels as "isolationism," but its strategy would undermine the nation's strides as a global player and turn it into a regional player.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) looks over its decades of governing and the so-called "Taiwan miracle" -- the transformation into a strong economy and democracy -- and pats itself on the back.
It has an elitist attitude and deceives itself into believing Taiwan's success story was somehow all the result of its wisdom and foresight.
Based on that view, it has not changed its belief that such a regime is justified. It gives orders from the top and proposes projects with grandiose titles: the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center (APROC), an airline hub connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia; the dual purpose operations center for domestic and foreign enterprises; the "cross-strait common market," the global value-added services center; and the global innovation center.
The KMT has dominated the discussion of such issues. But ironically, in spite of a constant string of proposals and impressive project titles, its economic strategy boils down to one principle: complete reliance upon the US and China.
In the years before the KMT lost the presidential office, its economic policies focused on two areas: the development of the electronic information industry with a focus on manufacturing and the APROC.
The latter was a policy proposed by KMT vice presidential candidate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) in 1995.
To bolster the electronics and information technology sectors, the KMT allowed the manufacturing industry to move operations abroad to gain cheaper access to land, capital and laborers. But the industry focused entirely on original equipment manufacturing of hardware, while the innovative integrated-circuit and software sectors, which focused on research and development, were grossly underestimated.
Companies working in these sectors had difficulty listing themselves on the stock market and gaining access to Hsinchu Science Park and were usually excluded from tax incentives.
The government's priorities back then resulted in an economic reliance on technology from upstream companies and orders from downstream companies. There was no effort to promote independent technologies or brands.
As for Siew's APROC, which was copied from Hong Kong, the KMT tried to used Taiwan's location to build a "greater China" economic zone.
KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kun (江丙坤) even suggested to the party's 2004 presidential candidate, former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), that the government allow the entire manufacturing industry to move abroad.
The "greater China" approach was based on the erroneous judgment that the nation had gone from reliance on the US economy to reliance on the Chinese economy. To compete in the Chinese market, the argument went, Taiwan's manufacturing industry must have access to the same cheap Chinese laborers; the service industry must ape Hong Kong and focus on China; and Taiwan must serve as a door for China's imports and exports.
This is the approach that the KMT is promoting even today.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has a different vision for continued economic transformation. That vision is based on creating technology.
From building up brands to developing the service and cultural sectors, the nation's economy must seek its future in innovation. The key is research and development. Industries will gradually gain in independence by innovating and marketing their developments.
The economic policies offered by the DPP and KMT reflect the difference between independence and dependence. They represent two completely different economic maps for the growth of the nation's industries. They are the difference between looking over the horizon to create a global center for logistics and innovation or limiting Taiwan to a "greater China" economic zone.
Hong Kong is an excellent example. It is a door to the Chinese market and some have called it the hub of East Asia. But Hong Kong's success remains limited to taking advantage of its location. It has capitalized on its position to become what it is today, but failed to innovate and grow in other directions. Siew's vision is exactly this: Taiwan, another Asia-Pacific center.
There is no doubt that Siew is right in one aspect. The nation would be foolish not to take advantage of geography to grow. But Taiwan is more than the "city economy" that is Hong Kong. Taiwan has long had global ambitions. Instead of vying to compete within the region, the nation's economy needs to aim for competing globally. Our ambitions should be much higher than simply hoping China and other countries continue to transit their goods through here.
Taiwan and Hong Kong have taken different paths for centuries and should not start mirroring each other now. The pan-blue camp keeps warning against policies it labels as "isolationism," but its strategy would undermine the nation's strides as a global player and turn it into a regional player.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
No Time to Dally Over Options For
By Margot Chen 陳麗菊, translated by Angela Hong
The referendums on applying for UN membership face a difficult fate. If neither referendum passes, they will naturally become a tool for Beijing in its mission to undermine Taiwan's independence. Knowing this, it's not surprising that the fate of these two referendums are on the minds of many people.
There are several courses of action that should be considered.
First, the referendums could be moved from the election date and the voter threshold for valid results lowered. Separating the plebiscites from the election would only be significant if the threshold were simultaneously changed. Otherwise the referendums would still fail to pass, rendering the effort to move them from March 22 pointless.
If the referendums were to be moved and the threshold lowered, what would be an appropriate date for them? The Referendum Act (公民投票法) stipulates that the Central Election Commission should hold referendums within one to six months after a referendum proposal has passed the application procedure.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) referendums on applying for UN membership were both formally announced on Feb. 1, which means the referendums must be held before the end of July at the latest. Since the Beijing Olympics are in August, holding the polls sooner rather than later might help avoid fueling tension with China.
Another scenario would be for the referendums and the election to be held in tandem, but with a lower voter threshold. That would increase the chances of the plebiscites passing.
However, the pan-blue camp would oppose such an idea, since it proposed its mirror referendum with the goal of preventing the DPP poll from passing. The KMT rationale was essentially that the pan-green camp would use its referendum to garner votes in the presidential election. To combat this, it proposed its own version.
But now it seems clear that the DPP has not made any electoral strides by touting its plebiscite. Nevertheless, the pan-blue camp will still do what it can to stop the DPP poll from passing to ensure that a poll using the name "Taiwan" doesn't succeed.
The two plebiscites are not just about representation at the UN. The choice of the word "joining" in the DPP version and "rejoining" in the KMT version represents different positions on the core issue of national identity and radically different political ideologies.
As a final scenario, the nation could consider going through with the referendums as planned. No date changes and no changes to the voter threshold. Instead, the legislature could pass a resolution as a sort of "airbag" to minimize the damage caused by the failure of the two referendums.
If the referendums take place on March 22 and the threshold has not been lowered, it seems both will fail, much to the delight of Beijing and to the relief of Washington and Tokyo, as it would rid them of concern over one source of tension between China and Taiwan.
If this happens, a legislative solution could at least offer a patch-up, but the content of the resolution would be extremely important.
Unfortunately, the KMT has no sincere desire to negotiate with the DPP. Once again their behavior is indicative of their approach to politics: pursue party interests over national interests.
The drama surrounding the referendums and election has turned into a tragedy in which a matter of utmost importance has become nothing more than a political tool. That reality is a far cry from the point of the referendum mechanism, which is to give the public a voice.
Margot Chen is a research fellow at Taiwan Advocates, a think tank initiated by former president Lee Teng-hui.
The referendums on applying for UN membership face a difficult fate. If neither referendum passes, they will naturally become a tool for Beijing in its mission to undermine Taiwan's independence. Knowing this, it's not surprising that the fate of these two referendums are on the minds of many people.
There are several courses of action that should be considered.
First, the referendums could be moved from the election date and the voter threshold for valid results lowered. Separating the plebiscites from the election would only be significant if the threshold were simultaneously changed. Otherwise the referendums would still fail to pass, rendering the effort to move them from March 22 pointless.
If the referendums were to be moved and the threshold lowered, what would be an appropriate date for them? The Referendum Act (公民投票法) stipulates that the Central Election Commission should hold referendums within one to six months after a referendum proposal has passed the application procedure.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) referendums on applying for UN membership were both formally announced on Feb. 1, which means the referendums must be held before the end of July at the latest. Since the Beijing Olympics are in August, holding the polls sooner rather than later might help avoid fueling tension with China.
Another scenario would be for the referendums and the election to be held in tandem, but with a lower voter threshold. That would increase the chances of the plebiscites passing.
However, the pan-blue camp would oppose such an idea, since it proposed its mirror referendum with the goal of preventing the DPP poll from passing. The KMT rationale was essentially that the pan-green camp would use its referendum to garner votes in the presidential election. To combat this, it proposed its own version.
But now it seems clear that the DPP has not made any electoral strides by touting its plebiscite. Nevertheless, the pan-blue camp will still do what it can to stop the DPP poll from passing to ensure that a poll using the name "Taiwan" doesn't succeed.
The two plebiscites are not just about representation at the UN. The choice of the word "joining" in the DPP version and "rejoining" in the KMT version represents different positions on the core issue of national identity and radically different political ideologies.
As a final scenario, the nation could consider going through with the referendums as planned. No date changes and no changes to the voter threshold. Instead, the legislature could pass a resolution as a sort of "airbag" to minimize the damage caused by the failure of the two referendums.
If the referendums take place on March 22 and the threshold has not been lowered, it seems both will fail, much to the delight of Beijing and to the relief of Washington and Tokyo, as it would rid them of concern over one source of tension between China and Taiwan.
If this happens, a legislative solution could at least offer a patch-up, but the content of the resolution would be extremely important.
Unfortunately, the KMT has no sincere desire to negotiate with the DPP. Once again their behavior is indicative of their approach to politics: pursue party interests over national interests.
The drama surrounding the referendums and election has turned into a tragedy in which a matter of utmost importance has become nothing more than a political tool. That reality is a far cry from the point of the referendum mechanism, which is to give the public a voice.
Margot Chen is a research fellow at Taiwan Advocates, a think tank initiated by former president Lee Teng-hui.
2008年3月6日 星期四
Just Where Does Ma Draw the Line?
By Yao Jen-to 姚人多, translated by Ted Yang
Recently some pan-green academics and social activists organized a forum to challenge Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) with a wide array of questions on national identity, transitional justice, how Hsieh would distinguish himself from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the tax system. Hsieh was required to come clean on all these questions.
Would Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) participate in the same kind of forum? Would pan-blue intellectuals challenge Ma by following the same strict standards? Judging from the KMT's conservative and feudal history and its current campaign strategies, the possibility is probably very low. However, we feel this is a danger to Taiwan's democratic elections. For a long time, voters have voted for a candidate without knowing much about him or her. Should we allow this phenomenon to continue?
As a presidential candidate at this crucial juncture in Taiwan's history, Ma should accept a challenge in the same way as Hsieh did and clearly answer the following questions.
First, clear the air on the green card issue. A green card is a document that grants lawful permanent residency in the US, a prerequisite to immigrating to that country. That he applied for and received a green card indicates that Ma attempted to immigrate to the US in the 1970s when Taiwan was in a difficult situation.
This may not be a big issue for the general public, but as a possible national leader, we need to know what Ma was thinking at the time. Why did he consider leaving Taiwan? Is Taiwan no good?
Second, after losing power, all authoritarian parties have had to undergo a thorough reform process before regaining power. Ma should tell us how the KMT has changed during its eight years in opposition and what he did during his term as party chairman.
Why were the "black gold exclusion clauses" changed to allow him to run for the presidency? Why has he supported local factions with bad records during so many elections? If he was incapable of reforming the KMT, how could people trust him in managing the transformation of the entire nation?
Third, Ma lacks any outstanding achievement since he entered politics. This is ample evidence that he lacks administrative and executive capabilities. This lack of ability is worrying and causes people to lose faith in him.
The KMT is a 100-year-old party with extremely complex internal interests and conflicts, so how could Ma be sure that he would be running the country? Does he know what has happened to the party's ill-gotten assets or the ins and outs of the party's sale of its media companies -- the China Television Co, the Broadcasting Corp of China and the Central Motion Picture Corp? Can he be sure that he is not just a puppet of some more powerful force?
Fourth, over the past eight years the KMT has accused the DPP of cooperating with business conglomerates, but the KMT's relations with these conglomerates doesn't seem more virtuous.
For example, when Taipei Bank and Fubon Financial Holding Co merged when Ma was Taipei mayor, he illegally dismissed the Taipei Bank labor union chairman who was opposed to the deal. This clearly tells us that Ma will choose powerful business conglomerates over disadvantaged workers.
Worse yet, the draft amendment to the Labor Union Law (工會法) was sent to the legislature for a review during the last legislative session, it was blocked by the KMT. Could Ma explain why? When conflicts of interest arise between workers and business conglomerates, which side would Ma take?
Fifth, Ma has said he is Taiwanese to the death. Despite this, he has repeatedly promoted unification. Isn't there a contradiction in there somewhere? Is the word "Taiwanese" a regional or a national identification to him?
Could it be that his current claim to be a Taiwanese is aimed at eventually achieving his goal of becoming Chinese?
Some may argue that the forum to challenge Hsieh was simply an election ploy, but I am not going to dignify that with a refutation. I only hope Ma could also employ such "election ploys" and resolve these question marks hanging over him.
Yao Jen-to is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of Sociology at National Tsing Hua University.
Recently some pan-green academics and social activists organized a forum to challenge Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) with a wide array of questions on national identity, transitional justice, how Hsieh would distinguish himself from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and the tax system. Hsieh was required to come clean on all these questions.
Would Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) participate in the same kind of forum? Would pan-blue intellectuals challenge Ma by following the same strict standards? Judging from the KMT's conservative and feudal history and its current campaign strategies, the possibility is probably very low. However, we feel this is a danger to Taiwan's democratic elections. For a long time, voters have voted for a candidate without knowing much about him or her. Should we allow this phenomenon to continue?
As a presidential candidate at this crucial juncture in Taiwan's history, Ma should accept a challenge in the same way as Hsieh did and clearly answer the following questions.
First, clear the air on the green card issue. A green card is a document that grants lawful permanent residency in the US, a prerequisite to immigrating to that country. That he applied for and received a green card indicates that Ma attempted to immigrate to the US in the 1970s when Taiwan was in a difficult situation.
This may not be a big issue for the general public, but as a possible national leader, we need to know what Ma was thinking at the time. Why did he consider leaving Taiwan? Is Taiwan no good?
Second, after losing power, all authoritarian parties have had to undergo a thorough reform process before regaining power. Ma should tell us how the KMT has changed during its eight years in opposition and what he did during his term as party chairman.
Why were the "black gold exclusion clauses" changed to allow him to run for the presidency? Why has he supported local factions with bad records during so many elections? If he was incapable of reforming the KMT, how could people trust him in managing the transformation of the entire nation?
Third, Ma lacks any outstanding achievement since he entered politics. This is ample evidence that he lacks administrative and executive capabilities. This lack of ability is worrying and causes people to lose faith in him.
The KMT is a 100-year-old party with extremely complex internal interests and conflicts, so how could Ma be sure that he would be running the country? Does he know what has happened to the party's ill-gotten assets or the ins and outs of the party's sale of its media companies -- the China Television Co, the Broadcasting Corp of China and the Central Motion Picture Corp? Can he be sure that he is not just a puppet of some more powerful force?
Fourth, over the past eight years the KMT has accused the DPP of cooperating with business conglomerates, but the KMT's relations with these conglomerates doesn't seem more virtuous.
For example, when Taipei Bank and Fubon Financial Holding Co merged when Ma was Taipei mayor, he illegally dismissed the Taipei Bank labor union chairman who was opposed to the deal. This clearly tells us that Ma will choose powerful business conglomerates over disadvantaged workers.
Worse yet, the draft amendment to the Labor Union Law (工會法) was sent to the legislature for a review during the last legislative session, it was blocked by the KMT. Could Ma explain why? When conflicts of interest arise between workers and business conglomerates, which side would Ma take?
Fifth, Ma has said he is Taiwanese to the death. Despite this, he has repeatedly promoted unification. Isn't there a contradiction in there somewhere? Is the word "Taiwanese" a regional or a national identification to him?
Could it be that his current claim to be a Taiwanese is aimed at eventually achieving his goal of becoming Chinese?
Some may argue that the forum to challenge Hsieh was simply an election ploy, but I am not going to dignify that with a refutation. I only hope Ma could also employ such "election ploys" and resolve these question marks hanging over him.
Yao Jen-to is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of Sociology at National Tsing Hua University.
2008年3月2日 星期日
Taiwan's Economy is Not Bad Off
By Hwan C. Lin 林環牆, translated by Angela Hong
The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics recently announced that Taiwan's real GDP growth rate reached 6.86 percent in the third quarter of last year and was 6.39 percent in the fourth quarter. This means that the annual economic growth rate increased from 4.89 percent in the previous year to 5.7 percent -- above South Korea's 4.9 percent.
During the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) first four-year term from 2000 to 2003, economic growth averaged 2.9 percent annually, while in its second four-year term, growth rose to 5.3 percent. These changes are significant for several reasons.
First, the accusation that the economy has ground to a halt during the DPP's eight years in office is untrue. Second, the accusation that the DPP has enforced isolationist policies during its terms in office is a lie. If the DPP's policies had been isolationist, the related growth of export and manufacturing could not have become the main driving forces behind Taiwan's economy. Third, the accusation that Taiwan's international competitiveness has fallen behind Singapore's and South Korea's is also unfounded.
On Apr. 24 last year, the Chinese-language Economic Daily News sarcastically called the period between former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "no haste, be patient" policy and the DPP's terms in power the "10 lost years" of Taiwan's economy. I have previously criticized this argument and now that Singapore's and South Korea's statistics have become available, a comparison would be illustrative.
It has been 11 years since the implementation of the "no haste, be patient" policy in 1997. Singapore's real GDP growth rate during that period averaged 5.6 percent a year, South Korea's 4.4 percent and Taiwan's 4.5 percent. Apparently Singapore's was the strongest -- but only on the surface.
During the same period, Singapore's population grew by 2.01 percent annually, while Taiwan's and South Korea's only increased by 0.55 percent and 0.61 percent respectively. If the population growth rate is deducted from real GDP growth rate, then the real GDP growth rate per capita becomes 3.96 percent for Taiwan, ahead of 3.83 percent for South Korea and 3.55 percent for Singapore.
In the eight years of DPP rule, South Korea's real GDP per capita grew by 4.6 percent, ahead of Singapore's at 4.01 percent and Taiwan's at 3.65 percent. Looking at the DPP's second four-year term, Taiwan's real GDP per capita growth rate rose to 4.9 percent. Though this is slightly lower than Singapore's 5.28 percent, it is ahead of South Korea at 4.38 percent. It is difficult to observe any systemic evidence that Taiwan has lagged behind its two rivals.
As for Singapore, its economic growth potential is between 4 percent and 6 percent, data from its trade and industry department shows, equivalent to Taiwan's 5 percent. However, Singapore's distribution of income has worsened considerably: its Gini coefficient, an indicator of distribution of wealth between 0 and 1, where higher numbers indicate greater disparity, outstripped the US in 2006 and reached 0.485 last year.
As for South Korea, its terms of trade has worsened in successive years, causing real income to be grossly overestimated based on GDP. Regarding this issue, I have provided detailed estimates of this in the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times' sister newspaper).
The latest statistics from the Central Bank of South Korea show the terms of trade index for the country continued to deteriorate last year, dropping 4.1 percent below the previous year and dipping to its lowest point since 1988. The reason is that import prices are rising whereas South Korean semiconductor and electronics export prices continue to decline.
On Feb. 18, Chosun Iibo advised the South Korean government to prioritize the problem: in the fourth quarter last year, South Korea's real GDP expanded by 5.5 percent compared to the previous year, but real GDI -- real income -- was only 2.4 percent, after deducting losses from terms of trade.
Both presidential candidates have been admiring Singapore's and South Korea's economic performance. However, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea are all similarly facing the challenge of a development bottleneck.
Hwan C. Lin is a research fellow at the Taiwan Public Policy Council and associate professor of economics at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
Directorate General should be Director-general, according to RDEC, Executive Yuan.
The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics recently announced that Taiwan's real GDP growth rate reached 6.86 percent in the third quarter of last year and was 6.39 percent in the fourth quarter. This means that the annual economic growth rate increased from 4.89 percent in the previous year to 5.7 percent -- above South Korea's 4.9 percent.
During the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) first four-year term from 2000 to 2003, economic growth averaged 2.9 percent annually, while in its second four-year term, growth rose to 5.3 percent. These changes are significant for several reasons.
First, the accusation that the economy has ground to a halt during the DPP's eight years in office is untrue. Second, the accusation that the DPP has enforced isolationist policies during its terms in office is a lie. If the DPP's policies had been isolationist, the related growth of export and manufacturing could not have become the main driving forces behind Taiwan's economy. Third, the accusation that Taiwan's international competitiveness has fallen behind Singapore's and South Korea's is also unfounded.
On Apr. 24 last year, the Chinese-language Economic Daily News sarcastically called the period between former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "no haste, be patient" policy and the DPP's terms in power the "10 lost years" of Taiwan's economy. I have previously criticized this argument and now that Singapore's and South Korea's statistics have become available, a comparison would be illustrative.
It has been 11 years since the implementation of the "no haste, be patient" policy in 1997. Singapore's real GDP growth rate during that period averaged 5.6 percent a year, South Korea's 4.4 percent and Taiwan's 4.5 percent. Apparently Singapore's was the strongest -- but only on the surface.
During the same period, Singapore's population grew by 2.01 percent annually, while Taiwan's and South Korea's only increased by 0.55 percent and 0.61 percent respectively. If the population growth rate is deducted from real GDP growth rate, then the real GDP growth rate per capita becomes 3.96 percent for Taiwan, ahead of 3.83 percent for South Korea and 3.55 percent for Singapore.
In the eight years of DPP rule, South Korea's real GDP per capita grew by 4.6 percent, ahead of Singapore's at 4.01 percent and Taiwan's at 3.65 percent. Looking at the DPP's second four-year term, Taiwan's real GDP per capita growth rate rose to 4.9 percent. Though this is slightly lower than Singapore's 5.28 percent, it is ahead of South Korea at 4.38 percent. It is difficult to observe any systemic evidence that Taiwan has lagged behind its two rivals.
As for Singapore, its economic growth potential is between 4 percent and 6 percent, data from its trade and industry department shows, equivalent to Taiwan's 5 percent. However, Singapore's distribution of income has worsened considerably: its Gini coefficient, an indicator of distribution of wealth between 0 and 1, where higher numbers indicate greater disparity, outstripped the US in 2006 and reached 0.485 last year.
As for South Korea, its terms of trade has worsened in successive years, causing real income to be grossly overestimated based on GDP. Regarding this issue, I have provided detailed estimates of this in the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times' sister newspaper).
The latest statistics from the Central Bank of South Korea show the terms of trade index for the country continued to deteriorate last year, dropping 4.1 percent below the previous year and dipping to its lowest point since 1988. The reason is that import prices are rising whereas South Korean semiconductor and electronics export prices continue to decline.
On Feb. 18, Chosun Iibo advised the South Korean government to prioritize the problem: in the fourth quarter last year, South Korea's real GDP expanded by 5.5 percent compared to the previous year, but real GDI -- real income -- was only 2.4 percent, after deducting losses from terms of trade.
Both presidential candidates have been admiring Singapore's and South Korea's economic performance. However, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea are all similarly facing the challenge of a development bottleneck.
Hwan C. Lin is a research fellow at the Taiwan Public Policy Council and associate professor of economics at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
Directorate General should be Director-general, according to RDEC, Executive Yuan.
First Debate Earns Mixed Review
By Edward Chen 陳一新, translated by Angela Hong
THE FIRST TELEVISED presidential debate left me feeling that the first and second part, with questions from the public, were well designed although more akin to a press conference than a debate. The third part, where the candidates questioned each other, was simply an extension of their usual war of words. Finally, during the concluding remarks in the fourth part, one party continued to question the opponent's issues whereas the other party offered his visions, so that the two were wholly unrelated to each other.
In the first two parts, both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) showed a good grasp of policy, and both appeared at their best.
Hsieh's strong point lay in his analysis of policy trends through references to his achievements as Kaohsiung mayor and as premier, while seizing opportunities to attack his opponent. For instance, Hsieh demanded that the KMT divide its party assets among low-income earners in order to raise the average income.
Ma's strength, on the other hand, was to answer questions clearly within the allotted time, with references integrating his experiences as Taipei mayor and KMT chairman with information prepared by his staff.
Hsieh's strengths were Ma's weaknesses, and vice versa. For instance, on issues dealing with the economy and the standard of living, Hsieh's talent for debate was unquestionable. He was able to strategically avoid questions, point out inconsistencies in his opponent's policy for raising national income or subsidizing low-income earners, and ask him where funds are to be found.
In comparison, Ma answered every question that was asked, emphasizing his frankness and reliability. Also, Hsieh's responses on judicial reform, foreign policy and gay rights appeared to be completely detached from reality. Indeed, on the issue of how he would deal with corruption if elected, he completely missed the point and focused on irrelevancies. In contrast, Ma could hardly wait to deliver the goods to the audience. As for time management, Ma rarely exceeded the allotted time, whereas Hsieh routinely ran over his time so that his answers often were incomplete. Their performance demonstrated Ma's preparation and the need for Hsieh's camp to improve.
During the policy questioning sections, Hsieh won in answering questions about Taiwanese identity -- partially because Hsieh is truly Taiwanese -- although Ma had vastly improved his pro-localization discourse through his "long stays" in the countryside. Although Hsieh had a good grasp on economic and livelihood issues, Ma was most successful in his criticism of the DPP's isolationist attitude, and in his strong faith in his ability to improve cross-strait relations and boost the economy through government investment.
The final question, asking each candidate to list the other's strengths, finally relaxed the previously combative and tense atmosphere. Both candidates were humorous and deserved the applause they received.
I had hoped that both candidates would perform better when questioning each other. However, the results were disappointing. Hsieh's first question was whether Ma held a US green card 20 or 30 years ago. This negative issue may have forced Ma to change tack and turn to criticizing the DPP's failure to fulfill its promise to take care of central and southern Taiwan, small and medium-sized businesses, and low to middle-income earners. Hsieh then attacked Ma for failing to revamp the Tamshui River and Jiancheng Circle.
Finally, the kid gloves came off and the two blasted each other for corruption at the hands of subordinates during their tenure as public officials. Nine minutes was wasted on mud slinging, and not a word about Taiwan's future was mentioned.
Worth noting is the fact that while Ma was forced to stay on the offensive, he only criticized Hsieh on a policy level, and did not mention the controversial tape recording that helped Hsieh win the Kaohsiung mayoral election, or the anti-Hsieh conspiracy theories.
In the last section of the debate, Hsieh relentlessly pursued the green card issue and questioned Ma's capability and trustworthiness. Ma outlined his vision for saving Taiwan's economy, assisting marginalized groups, reducing the difference between rural and urban areas, forming a government without corruption, and constructing a harmonious society.
It is a pity that Hsieh failed to make the best of these precious three minutes by discussing the future. Ma's conclusion was concise and powerful, demonstrating a presidential candidate's breadth of vision and elevated character.
On the whole, Hsieh's debating skills remain undoubted. However, his adeptness at dodging questions makes it difficult the public to probe his character through questions and follow-up questions. There are two ways of improving this situation.
First, questions from the public can be kept secret to prevent candidates from giving prepared responses and questioners should be allowed two follow-up questions.
Second, the debate organizers could invite specialists recommended by both sides to form a question team, so that candidates would have no way of hiding their intentions from the public. In terms of policy, both candidates have their own merits. Yet in regards to specific solutions to problems facing the nation, Ma apparently was more able to grasp the general future direction. While both candidates showed a sense of humor, they maintained their characteristic trademarks: One came off as tactful and smooth, the other as frank and honest.
Being a famed orator, Hsieh's performance was rather disappointing, perhaps a case of underperforming because of pressure. Ma also had many shortcomings that need improving. However, Ma had a clearer vision of the nation's future and many commendable character traits.
Edward Chen is a professor at Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of American Studies.
"....commendable character traits"!?
I guess corruption does pay!
As for "clearer vision of the nation's future", first off, there's this issue regarding the word "nation" that I don't think Ma is too comfortable talking about; and the vision thing, being "clear" does not equal being "better" for Taiwan.
THE FIRST TELEVISED presidential debate left me feeling that the first and second part, with questions from the public, were well designed although more akin to a press conference than a debate. The third part, where the candidates questioned each other, was simply an extension of their usual war of words. Finally, during the concluding remarks in the fourth part, one party continued to question the opponent's issues whereas the other party offered his visions, so that the two were wholly unrelated to each other.
In the first two parts, both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) showed a good grasp of policy, and both appeared at their best.
Hsieh's strong point lay in his analysis of policy trends through references to his achievements as Kaohsiung mayor and as premier, while seizing opportunities to attack his opponent. For instance, Hsieh demanded that the KMT divide its party assets among low-income earners in order to raise the average income.
Ma's strength, on the other hand, was to answer questions clearly within the allotted time, with references integrating his experiences as Taipei mayor and KMT chairman with information prepared by his staff.
Hsieh's strengths were Ma's weaknesses, and vice versa. For instance, on issues dealing with the economy and the standard of living, Hsieh's talent for debate was unquestionable. He was able to strategically avoid questions, point out inconsistencies in his opponent's policy for raising national income or subsidizing low-income earners, and ask him where funds are to be found.
In comparison, Ma answered every question that was asked, emphasizing his frankness and reliability. Also, Hsieh's responses on judicial reform, foreign policy and gay rights appeared to be completely detached from reality. Indeed, on the issue of how he would deal with corruption if elected, he completely missed the point and focused on irrelevancies. In contrast, Ma could hardly wait to deliver the goods to the audience. As for time management, Ma rarely exceeded the allotted time, whereas Hsieh routinely ran over his time so that his answers often were incomplete. Their performance demonstrated Ma's preparation and the need for Hsieh's camp to improve.
During the policy questioning sections, Hsieh won in answering questions about Taiwanese identity -- partially because Hsieh is truly Taiwanese -- although Ma had vastly improved his pro-localization discourse through his "long stays" in the countryside. Although Hsieh had a good grasp on economic and livelihood issues, Ma was most successful in his criticism of the DPP's isolationist attitude, and in his strong faith in his ability to improve cross-strait relations and boost the economy through government investment.
The final question, asking each candidate to list the other's strengths, finally relaxed the previously combative and tense atmosphere. Both candidates were humorous and deserved the applause they received.
I had hoped that both candidates would perform better when questioning each other. However, the results were disappointing. Hsieh's first question was whether Ma held a US green card 20 or 30 years ago. This negative issue may have forced Ma to change tack and turn to criticizing the DPP's failure to fulfill its promise to take care of central and southern Taiwan, small and medium-sized businesses, and low to middle-income earners. Hsieh then attacked Ma for failing to revamp the Tamshui River and Jiancheng Circle.
Finally, the kid gloves came off and the two blasted each other for corruption at the hands of subordinates during their tenure as public officials. Nine minutes was wasted on mud slinging, and not a word about Taiwan's future was mentioned.
Worth noting is the fact that while Ma was forced to stay on the offensive, he only criticized Hsieh on a policy level, and did not mention the controversial tape recording that helped Hsieh win the Kaohsiung mayoral election, or the anti-Hsieh conspiracy theories.
In the last section of the debate, Hsieh relentlessly pursued the green card issue and questioned Ma's capability and trustworthiness. Ma outlined his vision for saving Taiwan's economy, assisting marginalized groups, reducing the difference between rural and urban areas, forming a government without corruption, and constructing a harmonious society.
It is a pity that Hsieh failed to make the best of these precious three minutes by discussing the future. Ma's conclusion was concise and powerful, demonstrating a presidential candidate's breadth of vision and elevated character.
On the whole, Hsieh's debating skills remain undoubted. However, his adeptness at dodging questions makes it difficult the public to probe his character through questions and follow-up questions. There are two ways of improving this situation.
First, questions from the public can be kept secret to prevent candidates from giving prepared responses and questioners should be allowed two follow-up questions.
Second, the debate organizers could invite specialists recommended by both sides to form a question team, so that candidates would have no way of hiding their intentions from the public. In terms of policy, both candidates have their own merits. Yet in regards to specific solutions to problems facing the nation, Ma apparently was more able to grasp the general future direction. While both candidates showed a sense of humor, they maintained their characteristic trademarks: One came off as tactful and smooth, the other as frank and honest.
Being a famed orator, Hsieh's performance was rather disappointing, perhaps a case of underperforming because of pressure. Ma also had many shortcomings that need improving. However, Ma had a clearer vision of the nation's future and many commendable character traits.
Edward Chen is a professor at Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of American Studies.
"....commendable character traits"!?
I guess corruption does pay!
As for "clearer vision of the nation's future", first off, there's this issue regarding the word "nation" that I don't think Ma is too comfortable talking about; and the vision thing, being "clear" does not equal being "better" for Taiwan.
2008年2月26日 星期二
Freedom Must Win on March 22
By Li Thian-hok 李天福
On March 22, the Taiwanese should vote for freedom, not servitude. Vote for hope, do not stay away in despair.
Taiwan's presidential race pitting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) against Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has been sharply negative.
With less than one month to voting day on March 22 there has been no substantive debate on the real issues challenging Taiwan's survival as a de facto independent country. What is at stake in the upcoming presidential election is no less than Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy.
The KMT now controls three-quarters of the Legislative Yuan, giving the party virtually unrestrained power to pass any laws it chooses. If Ma is elected president, he will control the Executive Yuan as well, thus giving the KMT the authority to adopt policies that will deliver Taiwan irretrievably into China's grasp.
On March 22, 2006, Ma gave a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a prestigious think tank in Washington. He promised then that if elected, he would negotiate a peace accord with Beijing right away. The prerequisite is, of course, that the Taiwanese government accepts China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
Yet a great majority of the Taiwanese people reject Beijing rule.
This is evident in the popular support for President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) proposed referendum to apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan." Nevertheless such a referendum is useful in demonstrating the people's desire for an independent, democratic state, which is recognized as a full and equal member of the international community.
Before such a goal can be realized, however, the Taiwanese people must build the foundation of a viable nation including the following six elements: strong national defense, a self-reliant economy, deft diplomacy, a consensus on national identity, a new constitution and finally, when the time is ripe, a formal declaration of independence.
The first four elements are interrelated and must be achieved before the last two steps become feasible.
To bolster national defense, the defense budget should be increased from 2.85 percent of GDP to 5 percent in two years. Israel enjoys military superiority over its Arab neighbors and strong support from the US. Its defense budget is 9.6 percent of GDP. The conscript's service should be lengthened to 18 months. Modern warfare requires longer training periods to master high-tech weapons and joint force operations. Readiness needs to be improved, for example, by stocking at least one month of strategic oil reserve, ammunition and other war materiel. A civil defense system should be established so as to avoid panic and reduce casualties.
To build a self-reliant economy, the Taiwanese government should encourage the return of businesses from China and diversification into other countries, such as Vietnam. Taiwanese investment in China as a percentage of GDP is about 90 times the equivalent figure for the US and Japan. It is excessive and detrimental to Taiwan's national and economic security.
Good relations with the US are vital to Taiwan's survival as a democratic state. There needs to be better high level communication between the two democratic allies and advanced consultation whenever Taipei decides to take any action which Beijing or Washington may perceive as provocative. After new presidents are in the White House and in Taipei, there could be a new beginning to restore mutual trust and to foster closer political and economic and cooperation. The report just published by the AEI and Armitage International Taiwan Policy Working Group contains many helpful proposals.
To build solid relations with the US, Taiwan must demonstrate by deeds that it is serious about national defense and that it loves freedom more than money.
With the pan-blue camp's super majority in the Legislative Yuan, the agenda proposed above may seem beyond reach. This is where national unity based on allegiance to Taiwan becomes relevant. Except for the old guard elements of the pan-blue parties, a great majority of the public identifies with Taiwan. They also prefer democracy and reject autocracy.
The pan-blue minority that pledges allegiance to China and opposes Taiwanese independence actually works against the welfare of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. China is at a crossroads in history. It is pursuing military aggrandizement and territorial expansion, heading ultimately toward conflict with the US, Japan and the Western democracies. Taiwan's capitulation will accelerate China's confrontation with the West.
Alternatively, China can pursue peaceful development, diverting its vast military expenditures to alleviate poverty, improve the badly degraded environment and provide a social safety net for the masses.
China can embark on political reform, by allowing political opposition, a free press and religious freedom and try to end the endemic official corruption. By becoming a responsible stakeholder in the global community, China can earn respect as a great and humane power. Taiwan can help steer China in this direction by serving as a beacon of freedom to the Chinese people.
Hsieh must address the critical issue of how to maintain Taiwan's fragile "status quo" by outlining a concrete agenda. Only by offering his green base and middle-of-the-road voters a vision of Taiwan's future that is firmly anchored in irreconcilable freedom can Hsieh hope to win the presidency. Time is short. Let us hope Hsieh has managed to convey a sense of crisis to voters and make them understand that the choice is between life with freedom and dignity or servitude under the repressive rule of the Chinese Communist Party in the near future.
Regarding Taiwan's future, Ma asserts that the choice between independence and unification is a false issue. He appears to believe his three noes policy -- no independence, no unification and no war -- will maintain the "status quo" indefinitely.
This is a deceptive slogan.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is already capable of launching a multi-pronged assault on Taiwan and occupying the island in a short time, absent US intervention. Beijing has declared that China will resort to nonpeaceful means to annex Taiwan if the island drags its feet in accepting China's terms of surrender. So Ma can guarantee no war only if he is ready to accept unification.
Ma has deeply ingrained anti-democratic instincts as a result of his KMT upbringing.
The 81-day red shirt protest in the fall of 2006 was an attempt to unseat President Chen Shui-bian through the extralegal means of unruly, massive street demonstrations. As mayor of Taipei, Ma not only fanned the flames of the protests, he said at the height of the crisis: "If Chen doesn't resign, he will die an ugly death. The bullet is in the chamber. The gun is cocked. The next step is to pull the trigger."
If Ma wins the presidency, the KMT could install a Singapore-type political system, that is, a one-party autocracy.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
On March 22, the Taiwanese should vote for freedom, not servitude. Vote for hope, do not stay away in despair.
Taiwan's presidential race pitting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) against Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has been sharply negative.
With less than one month to voting day on March 22 there has been no substantive debate on the real issues challenging Taiwan's survival as a de facto independent country. What is at stake in the upcoming presidential election is no less than Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy.
The KMT now controls three-quarters of the Legislative Yuan, giving the party virtually unrestrained power to pass any laws it chooses. If Ma is elected president, he will control the Executive Yuan as well, thus giving the KMT the authority to adopt policies that will deliver Taiwan irretrievably into China's grasp.
On March 22, 2006, Ma gave a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a prestigious think tank in Washington. He promised then that if elected, he would negotiate a peace accord with Beijing right away. The prerequisite is, of course, that the Taiwanese government accepts China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
Yet a great majority of the Taiwanese people reject Beijing rule.
This is evident in the popular support for President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) proposed referendum to apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan." Nevertheless such a referendum is useful in demonstrating the people's desire for an independent, democratic state, which is recognized as a full and equal member of the international community.
Before such a goal can be realized, however, the Taiwanese people must build the foundation of a viable nation including the following six elements: strong national defense, a self-reliant economy, deft diplomacy, a consensus on national identity, a new constitution and finally, when the time is ripe, a formal declaration of independence.
The first four elements are interrelated and must be achieved before the last two steps become feasible.
To bolster national defense, the defense budget should be increased from 2.85 percent of GDP to 5 percent in two years. Israel enjoys military superiority over its Arab neighbors and strong support from the US. Its defense budget is 9.6 percent of GDP. The conscript's service should be lengthened to 18 months. Modern warfare requires longer training periods to master high-tech weapons and joint force operations. Readiness needs to be improved, for example, by stocking at least one month of strategic oil reserve, ammunition and other war materiel. A civil defense system should be established so as to avoid panic and reduce casualties.
To build a self-reliant economy, the Taiwanese government should encourage the return of businesses from China and diversification into other countries, such as Vietnam. Taiwanese investment in China as a percentage of GDP is about 90 times the equivalent figure for the US and Japan. It is excessive and detrimental to Taiwan's national and economic security.
Good relations with the US are vital to Taiwan's survival as a democratic state. There needs to be better high level communication between the two democratic allies and advanced consultation whenever Taipei decides to take any action which Beijing or Washington may perceive as provocative. After new presidents are in the White House and in Taipei, there could be a new beginning to restore mutual trust and to foster closer political and economic and cooperation. The report just published by the AEI and Armitage International Taiwan Policy Working Group contains many helpful proposals.
To build solid relations with the US, Taiwan must demonstrate by deeds that it is serious about national defense and that it loves freedom more than money.
With the pan-blue camp's super majority in the Legislative Yuan, the agenda proposed above may seem beyond reach. This is where national unity based on allegiance to Taiwan becomes relevant. Except for the old guard elements of the pan-blue parties, a great majority of the public identifies with Taiwan. They also prefer democracy and reject autocracy.
The pan-blue minority that pledges allegiance to China and opposes Taiwanese independence actually works against the welfare of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. China is at a crossroads in history. It is pursuing military aggrandizement and territorial expansion, heading ultimately toward conflict with the US, Japan and the Western democracies. Taiwan's capitulation will accelerate China's confrontation with the West.
Alternatively, China can pursue peaceful development, diverting its vast military expenditures to alleviate poverty, improve the badly degraded environment and provide a social safety net for the masses.
China can embark on political reform, by allowing political opposition, a free press and religious freedom and try to end the endemic official corruption. By becoming a responsible stakeholder in the global community, China can earn respect as a great and humane power. Taiwan can help steer China in this direction by serving as a beacon of freedom to the Chinese people.
Hsieh must address the critical issue of how to maintain Taiwan's fragile "status quo" by outlining a concrete agenda. Only by offering his green base and middle-of-the-road voters a vision of Taiwan's future that is firmly anchored in irreconcilable freedom can Hsieh hope to win the presidency. Time is short. Let us hope Hsieh has managed to convey a sense of crisis to voters and make them understand that the choice is between life with freedom and dignity or servitude under the repressive rule of the Chinese Communist Party in the near future.
Regarding Taiwan's future, Ma asserts that the choice between independence and unification is a false issue. He appears to believe his three noes policy -- no independence, no unification and no war -- will maintain the "status quo" indefinitely.
This is a deceptive slogan.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is already capable of launching a multi-pronged assault on Taiwan and occupying the island in a short time, absent US intervention. Beijing has declared that China will resort to nonpeaceful means to annex Taiwan if the island drags its feet in accepting China's terms of surrender. So Ma can guarantee no war only if he is ready to accept unification.
Ma has deeply ingrained anti-democratic instincts as a result of his KMT upbringing.
The 81-day red shirt protest in the fall of 2006 was an attempt to unseat President Chen Shui-bian through the extralegal means of unruly, massive street demonstrations. As mayor of Taipei, Ma not only fanned the flames of the protests, he said at the height of the crisis: "If Chen doesn't resign, he will die an ugly death. The bullet is in the chamber. The gun is cocked. The next step is to pull the trigger."
If Ma wins the presidency, the KMT could install a Singapore-type political system, that is, a one-party autocracy.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
2008年2月20日 星期三
The Parties Are Failing to Deal with a Dark Past
By Yang Wei-chung 楊偉中, translated by Eddy Chang
Professional students and informants were the products of Taiwan's past authoritarian era. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) used to accuse the opposition's young cadres of being professional students for the Chinese Communist Party or the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT also accused the young supporters of the opposition movement of disguising revolution with student status, or carrying out such activities by using schools as bases.
During the student movement in the 1980s, both student leaders and supporters like myself were labeled as professional students by school administrations.
Informants, for their part, were spies placed by the KMT within the opposition camp to "push them in, pull them out." They were feared, worried over and hated by opposition activists. Through this fear of informants, the KMT aroused mutual suspicion among activists in order to create internal conflict.
Such authoritarian products did not completely disappear following Taiwan's superficial democratization. They have, in fact, turned into tools of the pan-blue and plan-green camps to influence elections. The former opposition camp repaid the KMT in kind by labeling presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) a professional student. Even more ridiculously, the former authoritarian rulers have called DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) a KMT informant.
Which begs the question: If being an informant is a sin, then how can the government or a party that created informants justify itself and its activities? If the KMT is basically politically and morally upright, what's wrong with being one of its informants?
The issue of professional students and informants has turned the election campaign into a mud-slinging war. More serious issues, such as the control of government violence and promotion of human rights, have not appeared on the parties' to-do list. Certainly, Ma and Hsieh's pasts should be exposed. But even if they really were professional students or informants, the whole thing is merely a selective exposure of the political darkness that characterized the nation's past. From the public's perspective, none of them should avoid the following questions.
For the KMT: If being an informant should be condemned, why does the party avoid discussing the past crimes committed by the intelligence service? Shouldn't the great number of files in the KMT cabinets be made public? Since the KMT claims to be "establishing links to Taiwan," why doesn't it link itself to historical responsibility as well?
The DPP, on the other hand, has always used "transitional justice" and the KMT's dark history as electoral tools. Yet, in its eight years in office, the party never released the intelligence service's records of public surveillance and human rights abuses. A reform of the intelligence apparatus has yet to be made, and government-sponsored violence continues.
To the Ma and Hsieh camps, we could ask whether they are ready to pledge to work with the rival camp no matter who is elected president, if they are prepared to uncover the human rights abuses during the authoritarian era, review past mistakes and seek reconciliation with society through dialogue.
Today, the perpetrators of past crimes have done nothing more than deflect accusations onto others. Some are enjoying great wealth and high positions in the DPP government
Our leaders have not only taken historical tragedies as cheap tools for power struggle, but have also gone down the same road as the KMT by abusing national power, threatening antagonists with media control or even hinting at the imposition of martial law.
Yang Wei-chung is spokesman for the Third Society Party.
Professional students and informants were the products of Taiwan's past authoritarian era. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) used to accuse the opposition's young cadres of being professional students for the Chinese Communist Party or the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT also accused the young supporters of the opposition movement of disguising revolution with student status, or carrying out such activities by using schools as bases.
During the student movement in the 1980s, both student leaders and supporters like myself were labeled as professional students by school administrations.
Informants, for their part, were spies placed by the KMT within the opposition camp to "push them in, pull them out." They were feared, worried over and hated by opposition activists. Through this fear of informants, the KMT aroused mutual suspicion among activists in order to create internal conflict.
Such authoritarian products did not completely disappear following Taiwan's superficial democratization. They have, in fact, turned into tools of the pan-blue and plan-green camps to influence elections. The former opposition camp repaid the KMT in kind by labeling presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) a professional student. Even more ridiculously, the former authoritarian rulers have called DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) a KMT informant.
Which begs the question: If being an informant is a sin, then how can the government or a party that created informants justify itself and its activities? If the KMT is basically politically and morally upright, what's wrong with being one of its informants?
The issue of professional students and informants has turned the election campaign into a mud-slinging war. More serious issues, such as the control of government violence and promotion of human rights, have not appeared on the parties' to-do list. Certainly, Ma and Hsieh's pasts should be exposed. But even if they really were professional students or informants, the whole thing is merely a selective exposure of the political darkness that characterized the nation's past. From the public's perspective, none of them should avoid the following questions.
For the KMT: If being an informant should be condemned, why does the party avoid discussing the past crimes committed by the intelligence service? Shouldn't the great number of files in the KMT cabinets be made public? Since the KMT claims to be "establishing links to Taiwan," why doesn't it link itself to historical responsibility as well?
The DPP, on the other hand, has always used "transitional justice" and the KMT's dark history as electoral tools. Yet, in its eight years in office, the party never released the intelligence service's records of public surveillance and human rights abuses. A reform of the intelligence apparatus has yet to be made, and government-sponsored violence continues.
To the Ma and Hsieh camps, we could ask whether they are ready to pledge to work with the rival camp no matter who is elected president, if they are prepared to uncover the human rights abuses during the authoritarian era, review past mistakes and seek reconciliation with society through dialogue.
Today, the perpetrators of past crimes have done nothing more than deflect accusations onto others. Some are enjoying great wealth and high positions in the DPP government
Our leaders have not only taken historical tragedies as cheap tools for power struggle, but have also gone down the same road as the KMT by abusing national power, threatening antagonists with media control or even hinting at the imposition of martial law.
Yang Wei-chung is spokesman for the Third Society Party.
2008年2月14日 星期四
The Direction of Taiwanese Politics
By Stephen Yates
The dramatic results of last month's legislative elections and anticipation for next month's presidential election have sparked a great deal of commentary on the implications for the future of the country. Much of the commentary is highly personalized, critiquing the current president and assessing the dramatic change of fortunes among top political leaders.
Most international observers anticipate a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) victory in the presidential election and perhaps an enduring majority favoring KMT rule in Taiwan, bringing with it an era of greater domestic and cross-strait stability. There are of course no guarantees in politics. You can never tell what might happen on a particular president's watch or how well he will govern. And, as US primary candidates are learning, there is only one poll that counts -- the actual vote.
Taiwan's presidential race is a contest between two personalities, both representing a break from the current administration, and each trying to bridge divisions within his own party. No matter who wins, a form of divided government is likely to continue in Taiwan, but different from the form that dominated President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) two terms in office.
If Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) surprises experts and wins the presidency, he will benefit from rejuvenated enthusiasm within his party, but will face the challenge of governing with an opposition supermajority in the legislature and perhaps shaping the composition of his Cabinet. If the KMT again loses the presidency, despite its significant standing in the legislature, it will likely have to face up to a dramatic reassessment of the party's leadership, identity and approach to working with an opposition president.
Many experts anticipated that such a reassessment or realignment might occur following the 2000 election, especially with Chen's appointment of a KMT premier, but instead a more raw form of partisan competition ensued.
If, as many anticipate, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wins the presidency, he will benefit from an era of unified party control of government not seen in Taiwan since the early 1990s. But the biggest question he will face is how long party unity will be sustained.
It appears that intense dislike for Chen, more than Ma's management skills, is the glue holding the KMT coalition together. If Ma becomes president, he may benefit from the marginalization of the opposition party, but be surprised by bureaucratic and political divisions within his party.
The Republic of China Constitution offers no assurance of presidential authority. It was written for an era of one-party rule dominated by a single leader. But is Ma a leader of that stature? The KMT premier, legislative speaker, party chairman and perhaps others could very plausibly claim to control significant portions of the party's and the country's political agenda. It is reasonable to question whether KMT leaders really have broad consensus on economic security strategy, national defense (military and diplomatic) and personnel appointments. Thus, even with nominal party unity across the government, a new form of divided government is quite plausible.
In fact, more than the ups and downs of the DPP and Chen, KMT unity and disunity has been the dominant factor in Taiwanese politics for the last decade, and will remain so for some time to come. The divisions among former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), and People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) directly contributed to Chen's surprising victory in 2000 with only 39 percent of the vote. The struggle for leadership and identity of the party left the KMT just shy of victory in 2004, even with Lien and Soong on the same ticket.
The traditional KMT base, dominant when unified, turned out for the election last month and seems likely to do so again next month. But how long will the unity last before competing agendas within the party once again divide it to where the opposition has a real chance to compete? It certainly will not be sustained if the KMT again loses the presidency. And even with victory, supermajorities bring high expectations and great pressure, powerful enough to break strong leaders and big parties.
Finally, as Chen's term comes to an end, it is natural to look back on his tenure and attempt to put it in some form of historical context. It will require the passage of time to allow for objective assessment of the Chen presidency. Above all else, Chen appears driven by the mission of ensuring that no man, party or outside power is ever again able to assert control over Taiwan's people without their free and direct consent.
Twenty years from now, if Taiwan's democratic way of life is preserved, the major political parties continue to reform and remain competitive and the people of Taiwan have practiced when and how to effectively use their right to hold a referendum, then Chen's tenure as president may be seen in a very different context.
What is certain is that Chen will go down in history as the first to govern Taiwan in an era of divided government. No one imagined in 2000 just how divided it was and would remain throughout Chen's time in office. Opposition leaders vigorously challenged the legitimacy of Chen's election victories, especially in 2004, and engaged in high-profile and highly partisan cross-strait diplomacy. These actions undermined the stature and influence of the office of president. A case can be made that many difficulties were brought upon Chen by his own conduct, but it is also true that the structural and partisan obstacles he faced would have challenged the most gifted politician.
Whichever party wins next month, one can only hope that the outcome will be accepted as legitimate and opponents will not again allow partisan differences, personal agendas or the agony of electoral defeat to unreasonably obstruct the agenda of the next directly elected president.
Stephen Yates is president of DC Asia Advisory, a Washington-based consulting firm, and former deputy assistant to US vice president Dick Cheney for national security affairs.
The dramatic results of last month's legislative elections and anticipation for next month's presidential election have sparked a great deal of commentary on the implications for the future of the country. Much of the commentary is highly personalized, critiquing the current president and assessing the dramatic change of fortunes among top political leaders.
Most international observers anticipate a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) victory in the presidential election and perhaps an enduring majority favoring KMT rule in Taiwan, bringing with it an era of greater domestic and cross-strait stability. There are of course no guarantees in politics. You can never tell what might happen on a particular president's watch or how well he will govern. And, as US primary candidates are learning, there is only one poll that counts -- the actual vote.
Taiwan's presidential race is a contest between two personalities, both representing a break from the current administration, and each trying to bridge divisions within his own party. No matter who wins, a form of divided government is likely to continue in Taiwan, but different from the form that dominated President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) two terms in office.
If Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) surprises experts and wins the presidency, he will benefit from rejuvenated enthusiasm within his party, but will face the challenge of governing with an opposition supermajority in the legislature and perhaps shaping the composition of his Cabinet. If the KMT again loses the presidency, despite its significant standing in the legislature, it will likely have to face up to a dramatic reassessment of the party's leadership, identity and approach to working with an opposition president.
Many experts anticipated that such a reassessment or realignment might occur following the 2000 election, especially with Chen's appointment of a KMT premier, but instead a more raw form of partisan competition ensued.
If, as many anticipate, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wins the presidency, he will benefit from an era of unified party control of government not seen in Taiwan since the early 1990s. But the biggest question he will face is how long party unity will be sustained.
It appears that intense dislike for Chen, more than Ma's management skills, is the glue holding the KMT coalition together. If Ma becomes president, he may benefit from the marginalization of the opposition party, but be surprised by bureaucratic and political divisions within his party.
The Republic of China Constitution offers no assurance of presidential authority. It was written for an era of one-party rule dominated by a single leader. But is Ma a leader of that stature? The KMT premier, legislative speaker, party chairman and perhaps others could very plausibly claim to control significant portions of the party's and the country's political agenda. It is reasonable to question whether KMT leaders really have broad consensus on economic security strategy, national defense (military and diplomatic) and personnel appointments. Thus, even with nominal party unity across the government, a new form of divided government is quite plausible.
In fact, more than the ups and downs of the DPP and Chen, KMT unity and disunity has been the dominant factor in Taiwanese politics for the last decade, and will remain so for some time to come. The divisions among former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), and People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) directly contributed to Chen's surprising victory in 2000 with only 39 percent of the vote. The struggle for leadership and identity of the party left the KMT just shy of victory in 2004, even with Lien and Soong on the same ticket.
The traditional KMT base, dominant when unified, turned out for the election last month and seems likely to do so again next month. But how long will the unity last before competing agendas within the party once again divide it to where the opposition has a real chance to compete? It certainly will not be sustained if the KMT again loses the presidency. And even with victory, supermajorities bring high expectations and great pressure, powerful enough to break strong leaders and big parties.
Finally, as Chen's term comes to an end, it is natural to look back on his tenure and attempt to put it in some form of historical context. It will require the passage of time to allow for objective assessment of the Chen presidency. Above all else, Chen appears driven by the mission of ensuring that no man, party or outside power is ever again able to assert control over Taiwan's people without their free and direct consent.
Twenty years from now, if Taiwan's democratic way of life is preserved, the major political parties continue to reform and remain competitive and the people of Taiwan have practiced when and how to effectively use their right to hold a referendum, then Chen's tenure as president may be seen in a very different context.
What is certain is that Chen will go down in history as the first to govern Taiwan in an era of divided government. No one imagined in 2000 just how divided it was and would remain throughout Chen's time in office. Opposition leaders vigorously challenged the legitimacy of Chen's election victories, especially in 2004, and engaged in high-profile and highly partisan cross-strait diplomacy. These actions undermined the stature and influence of the office of president. A case can be made that many difficulties were brought upon Chen by his own conduct, but it is also true that the structural and partisan obstacles he faced would have challenged the most gifted politician.
Whichever party wins next month, one can only hope that the outcome will be accepted as legitimate and opponents will not again allow partisan differences, personal agendas or the agony of electoral defeat to unreasonably obstruct the agenda of the next directly elected president.
Stephen Yates is president of DC Asia Advisory, a Washington-based consulting firm, and former deputy assistant to US vice president Dick Cheney for national security affairs.
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